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INVENTORY OF PROGRAM EVALUATION FINDINGS



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INVENTORY OF PROGRAM EVALUATION FINDINGS

Program Evaluation Branch
Strategic Policy
Human Resources and Development

January 13, 1997

TO THE HONORABLE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

JOHN MARSHALL HARVEY
OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY

1830.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER 1 - INCOME SECURITY PROGRAMS (IIWC)	IS
Old Age Security	IS.1.1.1
Guaranteed Income Supplement	IS.1.2.1
Spouses Allowance	IS.1.3.1
Canada Pension Plan - Survivors	IS.2.1.1
Canada Pension Plan - Disability	IS.2.2.1
Canada Pension Plan - Retirement	IS.2.3.1
CHAPTER 2 - INSURANCE PROGRAMS (EIC)	IP
Claimant Service Officer Function	IP.1.1.1
Social Insurance Number	IP.2.1.1
UI Claimant Abuse (UI control activity)	IP.3.1.1
UI Controls	IP.3.2.1
UI Appeal System	IP.3.3.1
UI Controls	IP.3.4.1
Record of Employment Validations	IP.3.5.1
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB)	IP.4.1.1
Sickness Benefits	IP.4.2.1
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Program (SUB)	IP.4.3.1
Report on Hirings Program	IP.4.4.1
UI Premium Reduction Program	IP.4.5.1
Insurance On-Line System in the Atlantic Provinces	IP.4.6.1
CHAPTER 3 - SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS	SD
Canada Assistance Program	SD.0.1.1
Disabled Persons Unit	SD.1.1.1
National Adoption Desk	SD.2.1.1
National Welfare Grants	SD.3.1.1
Child Care Programs	SD.4.1.1
Alcohol and Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation Program	SD.5.1.1
New Brunswick Works	SD.6.1.1
Deinstitutionalization Initiatives	SD.7.1.1
Women's Program	SD.8.1.1
Disabled Persons Participation Program (DPPP)	SD.9.1.1
Canada Student Loans Program	SD.10.1.1
National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities	SD.11.1.1
Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons	SD.12.1.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

	Page
CHAPTER 4 - LABOUR PROGRAMS	LP
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services -	
Evaluation Study	LP.1.1.1
Labour Operations - Occupational Safety and Health	LP.2.1.1
Occupational Safety and Health - (B) Framework	LP.2.2.1
Occupational Safety and Health - (C) Study Workplace	
Safety and Health Conference Evaluation	LP.2.3.1
Compliance monitoring in Canadian Grain Elevators (D)	LP.2.4.1
Study (E) - Impact of the labour Canada Occupational	
Safety and Health Program	LP.2.5.2
Labour Standard Operations	LP.2.6.1
Labour Standards and Equal Pay	LP.2.7.1
Injury Compensation	LP.2.8.1
Labour Canada Bureau of Labour Information	LP.3.1.1
Women's Bureau	LP.4.1.1
Labour Operations and Policy and Communications	LP.5.1.1
Policy and Communications - Consultation and Client Services	LP.5.2.1
Policy and Communications - Labour Outreach - Technical Impact Research	
Fund	LP.5.3.1
Policy and Communication - Labour Outreach - Labour Government	
Employee Secondment Program	LP.6.4.1
Policy and Communication - Labour Outreach - Labour Management Partnerships	LP.6.5.1
Labour Canada - PS 2000	LP.7.1.1
Policy and Communications - Labour Canada Communications Function	LP.7.2.1
CHAPTER 5 - EMPLOYABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (EIC)	EI
Job Development/Job Entry	EI.1.1.1
Employability Enhancement Initiative for Social	
Assistance Recipients	EI.1.2.1
The Severely Employment Disadvantaged Option (SED)	
of the Job Entry Program	EI.1.3.1
Job Development	EI.1.4.1
Job Entry	EI.1.5.1
National Institutional Training Program: Language	
Training	EI.1.6.1
National Institutional Training Program	EI.1.7.1
Canada Manpower Training Program	EI.1.8.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

	Page
UI Sponsored Training	EI.1.9.1
Outreach	EI.2.1.1
Program for the Employment Disadvantaged	EI.3.1.1
Youth Training Option	EI.4.1.1
Student Business Loans	EI.4.2.1
Summer Employment/Experience Development (SEED) Program Challenge '86 .	EI.4.3.1
Summer Employment/Experience Development (SEED) Program Challenge '85 .	EI.4.4.1
Canada Employment Centres for Students (CEC-S)	EI.4.5.1
Developmental Use of UI Funds for Job Creation Program	EI.5.1.1
New Technology Employment Program (NTEP)	EI.5.2.1
Employment Tax Credit Program (ETCP)	EI.5.3.1
Economic Growth Component of Canada (EGC) Works	EI.5.4.1
Canada Mobility Program	EI.6.1.1
Claimant Re-Employment Service (CRS)	EI.7.1.1
Employment Counselling	EI.7.2.1
Increased Interview Activity	EI.7.3.1
COMPASS	EI.7.4.1
Work Orientation Workshops (WOW)	EI.7.5.1
Women's Employment Counselling Centres (WECC) Pilot Program	EI.7.6.1
CHOICES	EI.7.7.1
CHAPTER 6 - LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM (EIC)	LM
Sector Studies and the Canadian Occupational Projection System (COPS)	LM.1.1.1
Industrial Adjustment Service (IAS)	LM.2.1.1
Skill Investment	LM.3.1.1
Skill Shortages	LM.3.2.1
Critical Trade Skills Training	LM.3.3.1
Work Sharing - (1993)	LM.4.1.1
Work Sharing - (1984)	LM.4.2.1
Work Sharing - (1980)	LM.4.3.1
Federal Contractors Program (FCP)	LM.5.1.1
Legislated Employment Equity Program (LEEP)	LM.5.2.1
CHAPTER 7 - COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (EIC)	CD
Community Futures Program	CD.1.1.1
Community Employment Strategy (CES)	CD.1.2.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

	Page
Self-Employment Initiative	CD.2.1.1
Local Employment Assistance and Development Program (LEAD)	CD.3.1.1
Local Employment Assistance Program (LEAP)	CD.3.2.1
Canada Community Development Projects (CCDP)	CD.3.3.1
Canada Community Services Project (CCSP)	CD.3.4.1
Local Economic Development Assistance (LEDA)	CD.3.5.1
CHAPTER 8 - INFORMATION AND SPECIAL INITIATIVES (EIC)	II
Automated Job Information Centres (AJIC)	II.1.1.1
Canada Employment Centres On Campus (CEC-OC)	II.1.2.1
National Employment Service (NES)	II.1.3.1
Local Economic Data Systems (LEDS)	II.1.4.1
Specialized Youth Units (SYUs)	II.1.5.1
Canadian Steel Trade Employment Congress (CSTEC)	II.2.1.1
Innovations	II.2.2.1
The Innovations and Entrepreneurial Management Project (TIEM)	II.2.3.1

INCOME SECURITY PROGRAMS (HWC)

TITLE: OLD AGE SECURITY	
PART 1 PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rational/Background: Provision of basic income for older Canadians.	
2. Program objective(s): To provide a basic level of income for older Canadians and additional income assistance for Old Age Security recipients, their spouses aged 60-64, and widows and widowers aged 60-64 who have limited income from other sources.	
3. Legislative Basis: Old Age Security Act; Income Tax Act, Section 122.62	
4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Persons 65 and over meeting residence requirements.	
4B. Number of Participants: 3,291,319 basic OAS beneficiaries at July 1993	
5. Resources: \$14,292,000,000 in 1992	
6. First Year of Operation: 1952	
7. Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch (ISP) delivers its services through three major modes through a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail. The service network comprises 12 regional processing centres and 68 full-time and 216 part-time itinerant client service centres.	
8. Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division Study from 1992.	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1.** **Key Evaluation Issues:** How well is the OAS Program carrying out its role in the retirement income system?

Are there any changes which could be made to the program structure or administration to improve its effectiveness or efficiency?

- 2.** **Methodologies/Data Sources:** Examination of income benefits programs/systems for the elderly. Primary data sources: Program Data; Survey of Consumer Finances; Income Tax Data.

- 3.** **Findings/Conclusions:** In terms of adequacy and earnings replacement, the OAS Program generally is fulfilling its role within the retirement income system. Only 25% of elderly single persons, and about 5% of couples with at least one senior, are below the (1986-based) disposable income Low Income Cut-Off. Furthermore OAS/GIS significantly bolster the ability of the CPP to provide reasonable earnings replacement rates for lower income people when they retire.

The incidence of low income is greater for singles than for couples, greater for females than for males, greater for older than younger seniors, and greater for seniors in large cities than for those in smaller communities.

Because of the special tax treatment of the elderly and because the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is not taxable, after-tax measures should be used to evaluate the Old Age Security Program, in addition to the usual measures.

While increasing GIS benefits would be one way to improve adequacy, a considerable proportion of GIS benefits go to people above the low-income lines now. To avoid a further increase in this proportion, any extra GIS benefits to the lowest income population would have to be accompanied by a change in the reduction rate structure of the program.

The evaluation identified a number of issues which merit further investigation. These include: whether eligibility for GIS and SPA should continue to be tied to eligibility for OAS; whether the definition of 'income' currently used by the Program is appropriate; whether the income verification process can be improved; and how the Program can respond to the Challenges on the basis of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A Policy Lessons Learned:** The OAS Program is the largest source of income of current seniors, and the evaluation found no indications that its importance will decrease in the near future.

Conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the OAS Program depend to a great extent on the measurement criteria chosen to evaluate it. Because conclusions about effectiveness and efficiency are highly sensitive to the choice of measures, it is important for the Department to establish appropriate measurement criteria for programs targeted to seniors rather than adopting criteria that apply to the whole population.

It is important to consider the role of OAS/GIS in relation to the objectives of the overall retirement income system as well as its more specific objectives. Any policy considerations should be looked at in the broader context of the retirement income system as a whole.

- 4B Operational Lessons Learned:** As in the recommendations below, it was recommended that the Department undertake further research into the differences between the official low-income lines (LICOS) and OAS parameters to determine the appropriateness of the LICOS and the measurement techniques commonly used.

As in the recommendations below, it was recommended that the Department should examine whether the income verification process for GIS and SPA accounts can be improved.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** Action relative to recommendations would need to be reviewed.

Recommendations of 1992 Evaluation Study:

1. National Health and Welfare should initiate its own review of the tax-benefit system in the context of its own Programs and the client groups they serve. This review should address:
 - (1) what groundwork needs to be done to facilitate evaluations in the future as conditions change;
 - (2) the disposable income of seniors relative to non-seniors, given the special tax treatment of seniors and of GIS benefits;
 - (3) the best mix of programs to achieve the objectives of the retirement income system;
 - (4) the implications of retaining the clawback allowing the OAS program to atrophy versus restructuring the seniors' benefit system;
 - (5) options for targeting a greater proportion of OAS/GIS/SPA benefits to those with lowest incomes, if called for by current or future fiscal restraints;

Any recommended changes to the current OAS Program should be weighed by their expected impact on the disposable incomes of beneficiaries.

2. National Health and Welfare should undertake further research into the differences between the official low-income lines (LICOs) and OAS Program parameters, with a view to determining whether the LICOs and the measurement techniques commonly used (gross income) are consistent with NHW's priorities for a national program targeted to a specific sub-group of the population.
3. National Health and Welfare should re-examine whether eligibility for GIS or SPA should continue to be tied to eligibility for OAS (i.e. based on residence requirements) since the objectives of each component appear to be quite different, and both the Program and the environment within which it operates have changed significantly in recent years. Particular consideration should be given to eligibility for partial OAS benefits and the interaction with GIS and SPA. The pros and cons of higher tax-back rates on the "OAS equivalent" benefits should be thoroughly investigated. The examination should take into account the effect of international agreements, and the impact on any policy changes on these agreements.
4. National Health and Welfare should examine whether the income verification process for GIS and SPA accounts can be improved.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 5. Outstanding Issues (cont'd):**
5. National Health and Welfare should examine whether the income-tested components of the OAS Program should continue to use the current definition of income. Some of the considerations which should be taken into account are:
- (1) the growing importance of Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs), for which deductions can be taken until age seventy, and from which income need not be realized until age seventy;
 - (2) the ultimate effect of the \$1M lifetime capital gain exemption on OAS/GIS/SPA, and the appropriateness of allowing capital losses to increase one's GIS or SPA benefit.
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:** 1992 OAS Evaluation Study Appendices: Description of Seniors Financial Benefit Programs in Canada; Statistical Profile of OAS/GIS/SPA Expenditures & Beneficiaries; Future of OAS; Detailed Statistical Tables from 1992 Evaluation Study.

TITLE: GUARANTEED INCOME SUPPLEMENT	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rationale/Background: Provide income assistance additional to basic OAS.	
2. Program objective(s): To provide minimum income guarantee to Old Age Pensioners.	
3. Legislative Basis: Old Age Security Act; Income Tax Act, Section 122.62	
4A	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Income-tested benefits for singles or couples 65 or over; must be OAS recipient.
4B	Number of Participants: 1,323,948 beneficiaries as July 1993.
5.	Resources: \$4,227,000,000 in 1992
6.	First Year of Operation: 1967
7.	Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch (ISP) delivers its services through three major modes via a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division study from 1984. Program Evaluation Division evaluation study of Old Age Security from 1992.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

(NOTE: Following information is from 1984 study: please also see information in section on Old Age Security program and Study form 1992 which considers adequacy of OAS benefits both in themselves and in conjunction with other sources of senior's income, including GIS)

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

- Does the rationale for this program still have validity?
- What is the demographic profile of GIS recipients?
- What sources of income do GIS recipients rely on?
- What effect has the Canada Pension Plan had on the GIS program?
- What are the implications of provincial top-up payments for GIS recipients?
- Why is the average age of GIS recipients greater in relation to all OAS recipients, and what are the implications for the program of this phenomenon?
- Do GIS benefits provide a reasonable minimum level of income?
- Are GIS benefits sufficient for those receiving partial OAS benefits?
- What proportion of the eligible population receive GIS benefits?
- What are the effects of differentiating GIS benefits by marital status?
- Is there a justification for differentiating benefit levels by marital status?
- What would be the criteria for determining the appropriate mix of benefit rates by marital status?
- What are the implications of excluding various types of income from the net income used to calculate GIS benefits?
- How could the program be made more efficient?

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources: Survey of OAS Benefit Recipients Conducted in July 1981 by Income Security Branch

3. Findings/Conclusions: The rationale of this Program is still valid and the Program should continue, since it provides greatest benefits to those that have greatest need and the benefits have little stigma.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** In 1982, over half of all OAS recipients received GIS benefits with more than half of these being single and more than 75% of single beneficiaries being female. Sources of income other than OAS are, in order of importance, CPP/QPP benefits, interest income, and private pensions. Older pensioners were poorer on average than younger ones. This is probably due to pensioners who were older than 80 years in June 1982 and having no claim on CPP/QPP benefits and to the fact that other sources of income causes their real value to shrink over time.

Without CPP/QPP benefits paid to GIS recipients in 1981, GIS expenditures would have been about \$248 million greater during 1982.

Six provinces and two territories provide top-up payments, that differ in size and reduction rate. In some provinces, the combined reduction rate on net family income is 100%. This provides a disincentive to save for retirement and violates the federal government's principle that people who save for retirement will be better off than those who do not.

About 85% of the eligible population received GIS benefits. Excluding several types of income from the GIS income definition results in a preferred treatment of GIS recipients.

Budget studies have established that single pensioners have income requirements of between 61-72% of those of a married couple. Because GIS benefits for single pensioners are higher than those paid to married couples this may provide an incentive to postpone marriages or to falsify applications.

- 4A **Policy Lessons Learned:** It cannot be clearly stated whether the Program was meeting its objective, since no measure of adequacy has been defined. A national standard for the needs of elderly Canadians must be established.

- 4b **Operational Lessons Learned:** Please see summary of recommendations below.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 5. Outstanding Issues:** Action relative to recommendations would need to be reviewed.

Recommendations of 1984 Evaluation:

1. Health and Welfare Canada should commission a comprehensive study to establish the income needs of the elderly in Canada.
2. Income Security Programs Branch should investigate the feasibility of comparing GIS records with Revenue Canada Taxation records to prevent falsification of GIS applications.
3. As an interim measure, the GIS benefit for single pensioners should be increased so that their maximum combined OAS/GIS benefit is 60% of the maximum combined OAS/GIS benefit to a married couple who are both pensioners.
4. The GIS definition of net income should be amended to capture all sources of disposable income available to pensioners and deductions that do not reduce disposable income or that are voluntary should be disallowed.
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:** Please see section on Old Age Security.

TITLE:	SPOUSES ALLOWANCE
PART I	
PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Provide income assistance additional to basic OAS.
2.	Program objective(s): To meet the income needs of couples, where one spouse is over 65 and an OAS/GIS pensioner, with only that income to live on.
3.	Legislative Basis: Old Age Security Act; Income Tax Act, Section 122.62
4A	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Must be 65 or over. Must be spouse of GIS beneficiary, or widow/widower.
4B	Number of Participants: 108,905 beneficiaries at July 1993.
5.	Resources: \$437,685,000 in 1992
6.	First Year of Operation: Spouses benefit - 1975; Widows/widowers benefit - 1985.
7.	Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch (ISP) delivers its services through three major modes via a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division Study from 1983-84 Program Evaluation Division study of Old Age Security from 1992.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

(NOTE: Following information is from 1983-84 Study; Please also see information in section on Old Age Security program and Study from 1992 which considers adequacy of OAS Benefits both in themselves and in conjunction with other sources of seniors' income, including the spouses allowance)

1. Key Evaluation Issues

- Does the rationale for the program still have validity?
- Is the program consistent with the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom?
- What are the implications of excluding single, widowed and divorced persons aged 60 to 64 from eligibility for SPA benefits?
- What is the demographic profile of SPA recipients?
- What sources of income do SPA recipients rely on?
- Does the program have any effect on spouses' labour force participation?
- How do SPA/GIS couples differ from couples where both are receiving GIS?
- What is the interaction with other programs?
- Does SPA provide a reasonable minimum level of income?
- What proportion of the eligible population receive SPA benefits?
- What are the implications of excluding various types of income from the net income used to calculate SPA benefits?
- How could the program be made more efficient?

2. Methodologies/Data Sources: (INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED)

3. Findings/Conclusions:

The rationale for the SPA program is valid. And there is a demonstrated need for the Program to continue.

The Program would appear to violate Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, since access to benefits for all persons aged 60-64 years is not being provided.

90.9% of regular and 96.8% of extended SPA beneficiaries were women. Among regular SPA recipients, the average benefit for male recipients was higher because those SPA/GIS couples had lower average net family income.

The most important source of family net income reported were, in order of frequency, CPP/QPP benefits, net interest and other pension income. SPA benefits were relatively more important to widows receiving SPA.

It cannot be clearly stated whether the introduction of the SPA Program had caused any effects on spouses' labour force participation, except for widows in receipt of SPA. This group showed a decline in labour participation after the expansion of the SPA program in 1979.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. Findings/Conclusions (cont'd)

The net income of SPA and two pensioner couples were similar regarding the total family net income. The two pensioner couple was better off than the SPA couple for all levels of net income. Total program benefits were equal for both types of couples. In provinces which provide income supplements to elderly couples, SPA couples with net family income of up to four times the provincial supplement are no better off than those with no net family income.

The SPA program is very successful in reaching its target population with 98.7% of the eligible population receiving SPA benefits in 1986; estimated take up rates declined as net family income increased.

Increasing the reduction rate of the supplement - equivalent portion of the SPA would more effectively target SPA benefits to recipients with lower incomes.

4A Policy Lessons Learned: No statement on the adequacy of SPA benefits can be made because there is no clearly defined national standard of elderly's income needs.

5. Outstanding Issues: Please see findings, conclusions and recommendations from this study and 1992 evaluation of Old Age Security.

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies: Please see section on Old Age Security

TITLE: CANADA PENSION PLAN - SURVIVORS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale: Provide basic earnings loss protection to families of CPP contributors.
2.	Program objective(s): CPP Survivors provides families with a basic level of protection against the loss of earnings due to death of a contributor to the Plan. This plan encompasses a unique configuration of savings, insurance and support elements.
3.	Legislative Basis: Canada Pension Plan Act
4a	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Surviving spouse of CPP contributor or beneficiary; Dependent child of CPP beneficiary.
4b	Number of Participants: 772,057 at July 1993
5.	Resources: \$193.5 million at July 1993
6.	First Year of Operation: 1967
7.	Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch delivers its services through three major modes via a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail. The service network comprises 12 regional processing centres, and 68 full-time and 216 part-time itinerant client service centres.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division study from 1990-91 Evaluation study of CPP Ancillary Benefits planned for 1993-94.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. Key Evaluation Issues

The need for and adequacy of CPP survivor benefits.

Examination of the fairness of the administration process by looking at the capacity of ISPB to ensure that all potential CPP beneficiaries are aware of their entitlements and, therefore, apply for their CPP survivor benefits.

Examination of the fairness of the administration process by looking at ISPB to ensure that all potential CPP beneficiaries are aware of their entitlements, and therefore apply for their CPP survivors benefits.

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources

Surveys of the CPP survivor benefit recipients

Surveys of the organizations (e.g. funeral homes) dealing with these beneficiaries

3. Findings/Conclusions

91% of the CPP survivor recipients were women, with 63% of all surviving spouses being in the 'retirement' age category (65+ years); this retirement group is entitled to both OAS and GIS benefits, if eligible.

CPP survivor benefits alone are not sufficient to cover essential needs. Only 35% of all CPP survivor recipients had private pensions and annuities; in 1986, their average total personal income was about 97% of that of unattached Canadians. Still, 39% of all CPP survivors had family incomes below Statistics Canada's low income cut-off levels for the general Canadian population.

The effect of new CPP survivor benefit structure as proposed in the 1987 Consultation Paper would reduce the financial problems of "non-retired" CPP survivors under the age of 65 years.

A reduction of other supplement benefits caused by an increase in CPP survivors benefits has not been registered, since survivor benefits have not undergone any recent increase.

Potential principal sources of income reduction are:

federal: OAS/GIS/SPA that are reduced by a given percentage (25%/50% or 75%) for every dollar increase in CPP survivor benefits;

provincial: Social Assistance and other supplement benefits have a reduction rate of 100% which completely offsets the benefit increase;

Private retirement plans are a further source of offsetting practice.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A Recommendations of 1990-91 Evaluation:

1. ISPB should investigate the possibility of contacting eligible CPP survivors through computerized eligibility lists developed with the help of provinces/territories. ISPB could then contact all survivors directly, on a personal basis, and provide them with the necessary information.
2. The direct contact approach for the survivors should be reviewed during federal/provincial discussions on the proposal for a new CPP survivor benefit structure.
3. If a computerized eligibility list cannot be put in place to communicate with eligible CPP survivors, ISPB would have to use a national communication strategy similar to, but distinct from, that proposed for the disabled.

4B Policy Lessons Learned

- The need for CPP survivor benefits is still partly justified by reasons of contractual obligations and that Canadians are reluctant to protect themselves against the loss of income from the death of their spouses.

4C Operational Lessons Learned

- ISPB cannot currently ensure that potential beneficiaries apply for their CPP survivor benefits due to a general low level of interest on learning about the Program. Key informants and funeral homes that provided the necessary information to CPP survivors have been ineffective.

5. Outstanding Issues

Action relative to the recommendations would have to be reviewed.

TITLE: CANADA PENSION PLAN - DISABILITY	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale: Protection against loss of earning power.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): To provide disability pensions to contributors who meet the minimum contributory requirements and whose disability seriously affects their ability to earn and will do so for more than a temporary period.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Canada Pension Plan Act</p>	
<p>4a Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Minimum CPP contribution requirement; Person with severe and prolonged disability; Dependent child of CPP Disability recipient.</p>	
<p>4b Number of Participants: 341,257 at July 1993.</p>	
<p>5. Resources: \$204.3 million at July 1993.</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1967</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch delivers its services through three major modes via a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail. The service network comprises 12 regional processing centres and 68 full-time and 216 part-time itinerant client service centres.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Titles & Dates Program Evaluation Division study from 1990-91. An evaluation of CPP Ancillary Benefits is planned for 1993-94.</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. Key Evaluation Issues

- The need for and adequacy of CPP disability benefits.
- Assessment of the impact of offsetting practices of both public programs and private plans on the CPP disability benefit recipients.
- Examination of the fairness of the administration process by looking at the capacity of ISPB to ensure that all potential CPP beneficiaries are aware of their entitlements and, therefore, apply for their CPP disability benefits.

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources

- Surveys of CPP disability benefit recipients
- Surveys of organizations (e.g. health agencies) dealing with these beneficiaries
- Revenue Canada, Taxation files, merged with CPP administrative data

3. Findings/Conclusions

- CPP benefits are not sufficient to cover essential needs.
- In 1986, the total personal average income of CPP disabled beneficiaries represents only 79% of that earned by Canadians aged 15 years old and over.
- Many of them (51%) considered their total personal income to be insufficient to cover their essential needs.
- Many CPP disabled have to rely on other sources of income (Social Insurance, family support, private savings), due to delays in the formal acceptance procedure of CPP disabled application forms.
- By January 1987, the flat rate portion of the CPP disability benefits was increased from \$91.06 to \$242.95. The CPP disability plan is closely integrated with private and other income, thus many beneficiaries saw these sources reduce their benefits in order to offset the CPP benefit increase:
 - on the provincial level, Social Insurance and Workmen Compensation Board (WCB) programs offset 5% of the total benefit increase;
 - on the governmental level, SPA and CAP programs offset 5% of the CPP disabled benefit increase;
 - private insurances offset 24% of the total benefit increase.

About 27% of all CPP disabled were subject of these practices.

The problem of offsetting would be avoided by increasing CPP disabled benefits to the extent that disabled beneficiaries would not receive any other benefit support.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A Recommendations of 1990-91 Evaluation Study:

1. ISPB should find out how many disabled do not apply for their CPP benefits by e.g., a survey of the disabled population in conjunction with existing Statistics Canada surveys.
2. ISPB should formulate a communication strategy to increase the likelihood that potential CPP beneficiaries apply for their disability benefits by increasing the capacity of the Client Service Centres and increasing the capacity of the CPP staff to receive applicationS for benefits.
3. Conduct periodic surveys to ensure that its strategy continues to work.

4B Policy Lessons Learned: The need for CPP disability benefits is partly justified by reasons of contractual obligation and the fact that many workers are not covered with adequate disability insurance. (Few CPP disabled recipients (26%) have an early retirement and/or a personal RRSP insurance).

4C Operational Lessons Learned: ISPB cannot currently ensure that potential beneficiaries apply for their CPP disability benefits since contributors lack interest to learn about the Program until they would face disability; thus ISPB is highly dependant on key informants (health services, employers), no proper communications channels have been established, no knowledge on the percentage of potential beneficiaries that fail to apply is received nor any knowledge of their characteristics.

5. Outstanding Issues: Action relative to recommendations would need to be reviewed.

TITLE:	CANADA PENSION PLAN - RETIREMENT
PART 1 PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rationale: Opportunity for Canadians to save for their retirement and gain protection against loss of earning power.	
2. Program objective(s): Means whereby members of the Canadian labour force can save for their retirement years while at the same time gaining protection for themselves and their families against the loss of earning power in the event of a disabling ailment or death.	
3. Legislative Basis: Canada Pension Plan Act.	
4a	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Persons who have contributed and are 60 years of age or older.
4b	Number of Participants: 2,080,351 at July 1993.
5.	Resources: \$771.5 million at July 1993.
6.	First Year of Operation: 1967
7.	Program Delivery: The Income Security Programs Branch (ISP) delivers its services through three major modes via a Canada-wide network of client service centres: walk-in; telephone; mail.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division evaluation study from 1983-84. Program Evaluation Division study of CPP Retirement Benefits in progress. See also Program Evaluation Division 1992 evaluation of Old Age Security.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

(NOTE: Following information is from 1983-84 evaluation)

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

Is there still a need for such a program?

What assumptions were made when the CPP fund was established in 1966, and are these assumptions still valid?

How financially viable is the fund under pay-as-you-go funding through 2050?

Are borrowers meeting principle and interest payments? If not, what are the financial implications for the fund?

What has been the impact of CPP retirement benefits on GIS expenditures?

How have private savings and private pension plans been affected because of the introduction of the CPP retirement benefit program?

What are the interactions of the CPP retirement benefit program with other government and private programs?

What source of income do CPP retirement benefit recipients rely on?

What effect has the application of the rules for combined benefits had on beneficiaries?

What has been the effect of the statutory 15 percent drop-out provision of the plan?

What has been the effect of the provision for the splitting of credits in the event of dissolution of marriage?

What is the expected rate of return on contributions to the Plan for those retiring in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, etc. compared with other investment opportunities such as RRSP's?

How does the CPP retirement benefit compare with various measures of adequacy?

Should RRSP's be encouraged as a suitable alternative to CPP retirement benefits?

Should CPP retirement benefits in pay continue to be indexed to the Consumer Price Index, or would it be more appropriate to index benefits to a wage index?

What alternative funding arrangements might alleviate or eliminate any problems of inter-generational inequity while preserving the financial soundness of the fund?

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources: Survey of OAS Benefit Recipients conducted in July 1981

3. Findings/Conclusions

The Program has been successful in meeting its objectives; it provides a reasonable return on individual contributions while the number of beneficiaries is steadily increasing.

The CPP retirement is a good investment for contributors who survive to an old age and for those who survived spouses and young children - but not for those who are single and die young.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

CPP retirement expenditures served to reduce SPA and GIS expenses by about \$320 million in 1980. The most often reported sources of income were, in order of frequency, OAS, CPP/QPP, investments, private pensions, employment.

It has been suggested that the rules for combined benefit tend to discriminate against female beneficiaries; they amount to 84% of the recipients. The current statutory drop out feature of 15% is too low regarding today's unemployment rate and economic situation. Credit splitting has not yet gained widespread application (4% in 1980).

4A Recommendations of 1983-84 Evaluation:

1. A review should be conducted by the Department to investigate alternatives to the current CPP formula used to adjust career earnings. The review should include as one of its options the possibility of using the current Years Maximum Pensionable Earnings as a means of better reflecting growth in wages.
2. The Department should undertake an examination of the feasibility of either altering the drop-out provisions of the Plan or should alter the definition of earnings to include earnings-related income to take better account of periods of little or no earnings.
3. The department should intensify its efforts to advise the public of the provision for splitting CPP credits upon the dissolution of marriage and that consideration be given to alternative strategies to publicize the splitting of CPP pension credits.
4. The rules for limiting the level of combined benefit should be removed.
5. To ensure adequate levels of replacement income after retirement, an expansion of the CPP, or of private sector pension plan coverage, should be considered.

Policy Lessons Learned

The design of the Program should be reassessed by means of e.g., changing the benefit formula. The CPP is viable in the short run at the present contribution rate, but calls for changes in the rate in the long run. Future generations of contributors will have to pay a form of inter-generational transfer, due to CPP's unfunded liability. To achieve generational equity while keeping the fund sound, other forms of income have to be considered as well. It is not clear that a change from the CPI index to the wage rate index would be warranted.

4C Operational Lessons Learned

As in the study recommendations summarized below, it was recommended that the Department intensify its efforts to advise the public of the CPP credit splitting provision.

5. Outstanding Issues

Action relative to recommendations would need to be reviewed.

INSURANCE PROGRAMS (EIC)

TITLE: CLAIMANT SERVICE OFFICER FUNCTION	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The introduction of the Claimant Service Officer (CSO) position in the 117 busiest CECs across the country was one of several initiatives introduced as part of the UI Administrative Improvements to further enhance service to UI clients.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of the program was threefold. To provide a special and personalized service to claimants who may be experiencing difficulties in dealing with the administration of the UI Program. To disseminate general program information on assistance to claimants, employers and the general public as well as to promote a clear and comprehensive understanding of unemployment insurance. To advise management and staff on internal and external issues that effect the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery system.
3.	Legislative Basis: U.I. Act.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: The CSO function is designed to assist all U.I. Claimants who are experiencing difficulties with the U.I. System as well as to provide assistance to management.
4.	Number of participants 1992-93: 75,562
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 112 \$: 4.1 Million
6.	First year of operation: 1988
7.	Program Delivery: Claimant Service Officers/CECs
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Claimant Service Officer Function, Implementation Assessment Study, December 1989

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation addressed three key aspects : The effectiveness, impact and amount of time spent on the specialized service function (i.e. Public Awareness Sessions and the Assistance to Management Function)
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis as well as the use of multivariate econometric models.

 There were two main sources of data used in the evaluation:
 Data from the CSOs Quarterly Activity reports.
 Surveys of EIC's staff and management involved with the CSO initiative. A mail survey was carried out in October and November 1989 to all CSOs all CEC managers with a CSO position and to the Regional CSO Coordinations.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The critical CSO activities had been implemented, some 70,000 individual cases were handled and 12,000 PAS delivered in the first 18 months. Approximately 94 percent of the CSOs indicated that their present activities contribute to the delivery of the CSO service.
 Over 80 percent of CSOs managers suggested that the initiative has been implemented to 75 percent of potential or better.
 Approximately 97 percent of the CSOs were satisfied with individual cases and 88 percent were satisfied with the personalized service function.
 One quarter of CSOs were not satisfied with the amount of work time they spend on Management Assistance Activities.
 Some concerns with the personalized service function were raised in Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces. The status of the management assistance activities and the amount of time spent on non-CSO activities was also a source of concern.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation showed that the CSO function did provide improved service to claimants.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Management support of the CSO function should be improved upon. In addition, the level of time that the CSO staff spend on specific CSO duties should be increased.

 The study also revealed that the CSO function, like any new administrative function, requires sufficient time to be fully implemented. The new CSO tasks have not been fully incorporated by the new officers. EIC management must be aware of the presence of a significant learning curve effect expressed by the CSOs.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The program has been expanded in scope and in terms of program expenditures as a result of Bill C-129
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Quarterly Activity Reports, Claimant Service Officers, Insurance Program Services, EIC, Ottawa.

TITLE: SOCIAL INSURANCE NUMBER	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Social Insurance Numbers (SINs) were introduced in 1964. The need to introduce SINs was two-fold. First, the UI registration system was running out of numerical combinations to identify its clients. Second, the pending implementation of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans required a national system with which to register and identify contribution/recipients.
2.	Program objective(s): Ensuring the integrity of the information maintained on the SIN registry (SIR) is a key mandate of the system. SINs are also used as the primary identifier by authorized government institutions to facilitate the administration of a number of their programs. The overall integrity of the system is the main goal.
3.	Legislative Basis: The SIN was introduced in 1964 under the authority of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Section 107 of the U.I. Act required that each person occupied in insurable employment to be provided with a SIN and a SIN card. In 1967 with the amendment to the Income Tax Act required that all income tax returns have a SIN. In 1988, SINs were required by law for thirteen federal Acts and there were an additional eight agreements authorizing the use of SINs.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: All individuals occupied in insurable employment are required to have a SIN and a SIN card. In addition the Income Tax Act requires that individuals filing Revenue Canada Tax Returns must have a SIN number.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: 975,000
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 168 \$: 10.1 Million
6.	First year of operation: The SIN program was introduced in Canada in 1964.
7.	Program Delivery: Central Index, a division of National Services and located in Bathurst, New Brunswick is the component of CEIC given the responsibility for issuing SINs, SIN cards and maintaining the S.I. Register.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Comprehensive Evaluation Report of the Social Insurance Number, December 1991

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The objective of the SIN program
 The program responsibilities
 The nature of the control activities used in maintaining the integrity of the responsibilities.
 How the SIN program is used in the public sector
 What is entailed in the SIN application process and how effective is it
 How the SIN application process is controlled
 The nature of the investigations carried out by the Investigation and Control group
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis
 There were two main source of data used in the evaluation:
 A survey of SIN coordinators and CEC personnel
 EIC's administrative files
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Overall there were 28 key findings as a result of the investigation.
 The evaluation determined that although EIC effectively maintains the integrity of the SIN system there are areas where new initiatives may yield positive results. It was suggested that these initiatives would have to be thoroughly examined to determine their effectiveness and the cost-benefit implications.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The SIN system is an essential component of an effective UI and Income Tax program.
 Cost savings that stem from accurate control mechanisms are significant and therefore improvements that can be established should be considered.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Lack of documentation explained most of the SIN applications rejections.
 More standard procedures would help to diminish SIN duplication and verify the authenticity of primary documents.
 The evaluation also raised the issue of the effectiveness of the mail process vs. direct application at a CEC.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The issue of the SIN as an universal identifier, while not within CEIC's mandate or responsibilities, was identified as being an area of possible examination and discussion amongst politicians, the public at large and possible beneficiaries in both the public and private sectors.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

Government Use of SINs, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, June 1989.

Examination and Analysis of Agreements between CEIC and Government

Departments/Agencies or Other Parties, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, March 1989.

Survey of Parties Involved With the Use of SINs, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, March 1990.

Review and Analysis of Administrative Data, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, July 1989.

Post Application Control of SINs, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, August 1990.

Survey of SIN Coordinators and CEC Personnel Involved with SINs, CEIC, Program Evaluation Branch, May 1990.

TITLE: UI CLAIMANT ABUSE (UI control activity)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: There are a host of control mechanisms used to detect abuse and misuse of the UI system. In general all control activities are designed to reduce unnecessary spending from the UI account. It is in this context that the Labour Force Development Strategy included reforms to the administration of UI to improve both the re-employment prospects of claimants and to reduce the abuse and misuse of the UI account.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): The objective of any UI control program is twofold: To protect the integrity of the UI system. To ensure the correct payment of benefits.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: U.I. Act. Bill C-121 The 1989 repeat offenders policy (September --1989) Claimant Re-employment Strategy (1990-1991)</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Potentially all UI claimants are subject to UI controls for claimant abuse.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: 1,141,692</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 1,222 \$: 43.7 Million</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1990</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Claimant control activities were carried out by the Investigation and Control Officers (ICOs)</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of Claimant Abuse, April 1992</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
Incidence of abuse by UI Claimants.
Level of savings to the UI account (direct and indirect) from these control activities.
Personal characteristics of claimants involved in abuse activities.
Relationship between sample personal characteristics and level of abuse.
Deterrent effect of UI control activities.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis as well as the use of multivariate econometric models.
There was one main source of data used in the evaluation:
In-depth investigations were carried out on a national random sample of regular claimants from the active claimload by the Investigation and Control Officers (IOCs).
The study was conducted in two phases, during the Fall of 1990 and the Spring of 1991, to test for the influence of seasonality on the incidence of abuse and misuse.
Some 950 investigations were completed in Phase I and a further 1722 investigations were achieved in Phase II.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The typical abuser is more likely to be a young male with relatively low prior wages.
Control activities are effective in detecting 62 percent of intentional abuse and 29 percent of non-intentional abuse.
Maximum potential savings to the UI account from detection of claimant abuse was in the order of \$1.2 billion.
The present rates of return for existing levels of investigation and control of regular UI claims are estimated to be \$5.10 in direct savings and \$5.00 in indirect savings for a total return of \$10.10 to the UI account for every dollar spent.
Previous UI claim experience reduced the detected abuse rate for men.
D/Ds in the previous claim were successful in deterring non-intentional abuse behaviour by women claimants.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Control detects 62% of intentional abuse and 29% of non-intentional abuse therefore the use of controls appears to be justified.
Cost benefit of full scale investigation of all Regular UI claims is \$6.30 of savings per \$1 spent.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Control activities are productive and effective (well targeted).
Computer-generated investigations, time spent on investigation and claimant interviews increase the probability of detecting abuse.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The issue of the level and significance of indirect savings was not fully explored in the evaluation.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Investigation and Control Manual, Vol 1, Group a. Mandates, Executive Summary, EIC, Ottawa.
Success in the Works: A Policy Paper, A Labour Force Development Strategy for Canada, EIC, Ottawa.

TITLE: UI CONTROLS

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The complexity of the collection of premiums and subsequent payment of benefits in the UI system has led to the implementation of a number of control activities to ensure compliance by employers and claimants to UI legislation and regulations. This evaluation deals with the process of controlling the payment of UI benefits. In particular the study focuses primarily on those control activities directed at claimants in receipt of regular benefits. The decisions in respect of insurable employment and the collection of premiums are the responsibility of Revenue Canada and thus are not considered in this evaluation.
2. **Program objective(s):** The objective of any UI control program is twofold:
Protect the financial integrity of the UI system.
Ensure the correct payment of benefits.

To meet these objectives there are three areas where the control function operates:
Decisions in respect of insurable employment.
Collection of premiums payable by employers and employees.
Payment of UI benefits to eligible claimants.

3. **Legislative Basis:** U.I. Act. 1971
- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Potentially all UI claimants are exposed to UI control activities.
- 4B. **Number of participants 1992-93:** 1,141,692
5. **Resources 1992-93:**

Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable
Operating Costs:	PYs:	1,222
	\$:	43.7 Million
6. **First year of operation:** 1971
7. **Program Delivery:** CECs/Insurance Services/Investigation and Control.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation Report of UI Controls, March 1988

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
Productivity and effectiveness of the control activities.
The level of exposure of claimants to UI controls.
The mix and timing of the control activities.
Impacts of control activity on claim duration.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed the use of descriptive statistical techniques.
There were several sources of data use in the evaluation:
EIC's, UI administrative data, Approximately 1,707 UI claimants representing approximately 3400 claims.
Survey of CEC Investigation and Control Supervisors.
Survey of CEC Investigation and Control Officers.
Survey of Insurance Services Supervisors.
Survey of Insurance Services Agents.
Survey of Employers and UI Claimants.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Approximately 13 percent of claims control activity resulted in the detection of misuse or abuse of the UI system.
Approximately 1 out of 2 claims are not exposed to control mechanisms.
Approximately 1 out of 3 are controlled only once.
Approximately 16 percent of claimants have in person contact during their benefit period.
The control mechanism does not occur until the latter portion of the benefit period (on average in the 22nd week of the claim or later)
Of those exposed to control activities 16 percent of claims received D/Ds, 10 percent were involved in O/Ps and 4 percent resulted in the disbursement of penalties.
Disqualifications resulting from UI controls were responsible for a saving of 2.5 percent in weeks of benefits paid.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** None
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** In an effort to increase the detection of misuse and abuse EIC should broaden the depth and scope of control activities. Specifically EIC should increase the level of control activities for individuals who have been previously detected for abuse or misuse and alter the mix of control programs periodically.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** There were several issues that could not be addressed because of data limitations:
Mix of controls used during a benefit period.
Proportion of claims exposed to such controls.
Frequency and timing of the control activities.
Characteristics of claimants who are controlled.
Impact of the control activities on their claims duration.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**
UI Control Activities: Survey of Employers and UI Claimants, EIC Program Evaluation Branch, March 1987.
UI Control Activities: Review of Administrative Data, EIC, Program Evaluation Branch, July 1987.
UI Control Activities: Survey Results of CEC Staff Survey, EIC, Program Evaluation Branch, January 1988.
UI Control Activities: Report on UI Files Review, EIC, Program Evaluation Branch, February 1988.

TITLE: UI APPEAL SYSTEM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The appeal system is a mechanism for reviewing administrative decisions relating to the Unemployment Insurance program. It is open to claimants, their employers and CEIC to review decisions that they consider erroneous. There are two avenues for contentious review: The first level of contentious review is provided by the Board of Referees - a tripartite tribunal composed of a chairperson, named by the Governor-in-Council, a employer representative and an employee representative, named by the appropriate Commissioner. The second level of review - the Umpire - is open to the claimant, the employer, unions and CEIC to contest a decision taken by the Board of Referees.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of the program is threefold: To provide recourse against the decision of administrative authorities. It is one of the safeguards required for the interest of the individual with regard to administrative action. To provide a readily accessible review process which entails a minimum of formality. To provide a guarantee of impartiality and technical competence, and ensure quality decisions.
3.	Legislative Basis: The U.I. Act (1940), sets the grounds for the appeal. Amendments S.95) 1971 U.I. Act.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: The appeal process is open to claimants, employers, unions and CECs under varying circumstances.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: N/A
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 141 \$: 5.5 Million
6.	First year of operation: 1940
7.	Program Delivery: CECs/Regions/NHQ
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the UI Appeal System, December 1985

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The pre-submission process
 The submission process
 Hearing of the Board of Referees, Hearing before the Umpire
 Clients' Perceptions
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The work plan for the evaluation of the UI Appeal system involved an in-depth study of hearings before a Board of Referees and Umpire, a gathering of relevant administrative data as well as surveys of claimants and appellants.
 There were three main sources of data in the evaluation:
 Survey of claimants that were disqualified or disentitled.
 Survey of appellants to the Board of Referees.
 Survey of appellants to the Umpire.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation study found that the UI Appeal System is readily accessible.
 Three out of four claimants are aware of their right to appeal, although factual knowledge about the process and the independence of the Board is limited.
 The informality of the hearings at both levels is viewed as an excellent feature of the system.
 Several concerns were raised with regard to the appeal process:
 Impartiality and competence of the services provided.
 Nature and composition of the Board of Referees.
 Training of the Board members.
 Distribution of information on jurisprudence.
 Quality of the written decisions of board members.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** None.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The appeal process is a necessary component of the UI system. Thus, the implementation of procedural or operational improvements that are cost effective should be considered.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The evaluation did not assess the impartiality, style and content of decisions handed down by Umpires or members of Board of Referees. These are significant issues that may be addressed in future evaluations.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Two major studies have been done on the appeal system.
The Unemployment Insurance Appeal System: A report by the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee, Unemployment Insurance Canada, Ottawa, 1976.
Issalys, Pierre and Watkins, Gaylord, Unemployment Insurance Benefits: A Study of Administrative Procedure in the Unemployment Insurance Commission, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Ottawa, 1978.

TITLE: UI CONTROLS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Prior to this study the estimates of the magnitude of abuse/fraud in the UI system were derived by investigating the claims of a sample of claimants selected at a given point in time. These periodic random sample surveys of UI claimants carried out by the CEIC head office with the cooperation of Investigation and Control units in the local offices had shown the existence of abuse/fraud in the UI system. However, from these estimates it was not possible to assess the overall impact of controls on the detection and deterrence of abuse/fraud. It was for this reason that the present, longitudinal study was carried out.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of any UI control program is twofold: Protect the integrity of the UI system Ensure the correct payment of benefits In general the programs are designed to detect and deter abuse/fraud in the UI system.
3.	Legislative Basis: U.I. Act. 1971
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: Potentially all claimants are subject to UI controls
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: 1,141,692
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 1,222 \$: 43.7 Million
6.	First year of operation: 1971
7.	Program Delivery: CECs/Insurance Services/Investigation and Control.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): UI Controls, Longitudinal Study Report, September 1985

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
The average time spent on control activity per claim.
The incidence of Disqualifications/Disentitlements (D/Ds).
The incidence and amount of Overpayments (O/Ps).
The average benefits paid.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The study consisted of a comparative analysis of the abuse/fraud among claimants subject to different degrees of controls. Claimants were assigned to three groups based on the level of control activity they were administered:
Minimum Controls
Regular Controls
Intensified Controls.

There was one main source of data used in the evaluation.

About 7,000 UI claimants were statistically selected from 21 CECs distributed across all the ten provinces. Their claims were monitored for a 52 week period and records were compiled on the adjudication and control activities carried out, the time spent on these activities and the results thereof.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The study has shown that an overall increase in the UI control activity leads to substantial savings in terms of overall reduction in the payment of UI benefits, a reduction in average amount of overpayment and an increase in the proportion of claimants identified with an overpayment. Moreover, it obtains these results in a cost effective manner.
It was not possible to identify at what point of intensification the costs of increased control activity outweigh the savings. Also, it was not certain that the results would prevail under different economic circumstances.
It was recommended that the study be followed up by evaluations of control activities on an individual basis.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** It is apparent that more intensified UI control activities increase the level of detection of abuse/misuse. Control activities appear to be cost effective up to a certain level.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** An important consideration is the fact that the level of effectiveness and the degree of cost savings varies for individual control activities. A matrix of control activities appears to be the best approach to reducing abuse/misuse and increasing detection.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Overall intensification of control activities appear to be cost-justified, yet it remains to be clarified which particular activity mix is most efficient at an intensified level. Due to the insignificance of the differences in benefits paid and activity level between the *normal* and *excluded* groups, it has not been possible to identify at what point of intensification the costs outweigh the savings. There also appears to be a measure of doubt as to whether the results of the evaluation will prevail under current circumstances.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Evaluation of Unemployment Insurance Control Programs, Preliminary Report, Record of Employment Validation, Insurance Program Division, Program Evaluation Branch, Ottawa, 1980. Guidelines for a Longitudinal Evaluation of UI control programs (Study Group Working Paper) Ottawa, 1979.

TITLE: RECORD OF EMPLOYMENT VALIDATION	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The Record of Employment (ROE) is a key document used when establishing a claimant's entitlement to benefit. The document is prepared by the employer when the employee experiences an interruption in earnings. The ROE provides information which is fundamental to a determination of whether a claimant is entitled to benefits and if so at what rate and for how long. Past studies have indicated that employers make a substantial number of errors when completing ROEs. Many of these result in the incorrect payment of UI benefits, particularly mis-statements of insurable earnings, insurable weeks, monies paid after separation and reason for separation.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): There are two objectives of the program: To resolve a specific problem which has been identified by an agent during the claims assessment process. To detect problems that will lead to incorrect payments of UI benefits.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: U.I. Act. U.I. Regulation (UIR 35) The new ROE form was introduced in 1979.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Potentially all claimants are subject to ROE validation processes.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: N/A</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 25 \$: 1.1 Million</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1979</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: NHQ/Regions/CECs</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): UI Control Programs: ROE Validation, December 1980</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1. Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The extent to which ROEs are incorrectly completed
 The type of errors
 The effect that errors have on the payment of UI benefits
 Estimation of the impact that errors have on the UI account
 Assessment of the impact of the new ROE form
- 2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
 There was one main source of data used in the evaluation:
 1,497 ROEs were examined that were used to support 1,159 claims for UI benefit.
- 3. Findings/Conclusions:** Approximately 47 percent of all ROEs which were examined contained at least one error. This is consistent with the level of errors made with the old ROE document.
 There were regional differences in the level of errors recorded. The Atlantic and Prairie Provinces and Quebec showed a decline in the number of errors recorded. Ontario and British Columbia experience a noticeable increase in the number of errors.
 The new ROE system did show a significant impact on the ability of the system to detect errors and make the appropriate corrections before benefits were paid.
 It was determined that Investigation and Control officers were ill-equipped to undertake the ROE validation process and that the current validation process was not conducted efficiently.
- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** None
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** The new system did not reduce the number of mistakes that were made by employers when filling out the ROE. Therefore, the new ROE document should be re-examined.
 The improvements to the ROE system are effective in detecting ROE errors. This has a positive impact on the level of spending from the UI account. Therefore, administrative improvements of this type should be examined.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:** Because the evaluation of the ROE validation process was a small component of the larger evaluation of the entire UI control programs there was a significant data problem that arose. While this sample size was large enough to provide reasonably reliable statements about the aggregate findings, it was frequently too small to support any detailed analysis at a regional level.
- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Bureau of Management Consulting (BMC), 1977
 Office of the Auditor General, 1978

TITLE: SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS (SUB)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The purpose of a private Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) plan --- introduced by employer initiative or through collective bargaining --- is to top up UI benefits during a period of unemployment. The existing four types of coverage are temporary stoppage of work, training, sickness and family leave due to maternity, parental and adoption needs. Under this program, the combination of benefits received from the SUB plan and the weekly UI benefits cannot exceed 95 percent of the worker's normal weekly earnings. Payments received from the SUB plan are not considered as earnings in the calculation of UI eligibility and benefits levels. SUB payments are also permitted to employees not in receipt of UI due to serving the two-week waiting period, or insufficient weeks of insurable employment to qualify for UI, or UI entitlement exhausted.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): The objective of the program is to provide improved income protection for workers and to promote stability in the participating employer's workforce.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: U.I. Regulations, 57(13) Income Tax Act, Section 145.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: UI recipients and Registered SUB plan participants.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: N/A</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 6-7 \$: N/A</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1956 Work Stoppage SUB 1971 Sickness and Maternity SUB 1984 Adoption SUB plan 1990 Parental SUB plan</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: CECs\NHQ</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB), 1992</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The extent of coverage and usage of the program
 The cost of the SUB program to the UI system, cross-subsidization
 The effects the program has on labour retention
 The extent of sickness and maternity SUB coverage and usage
 The extent to which SUB is used as a substitute for severance pay
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis as well as the use of multivariate econometric models.
 There were two main source of data used in the analysis:
 UI status vector
 Administrative data on 4527 existing SUB plans.
 A survey of some 2000 employers/plan administrators.
 Payroll Deduction Account (PAYDAC) file.
 Unpublished tables from the Labour Force Survey and CANSIM data on monthly GDP.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation showed that there is not cross-subsidization in usage.
 The SUB plans affected a very small portion of the UI claimant population only about 2.5 percent of all UI claims had SUB coverage.
 Labour retention was significantly improved when employees were covered by SUB plans with temporary layoff provisions.
 Coverage and usage is industrially concentrated.
 No apparent misuse of SUB as a substitute for severance payments.
 Information systems are inadequate for administrative and research purposes.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** SUB remains concentrated in industrially industries by type of coverage.
 SUB does embrace employee retention.
 There was no evidence of Cross-Subsidization.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Information from SUB plans should be better documented (database)
 Need to formally audit the implementation of SUB plans.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** If requirement to register Maternity and Parental SUB plans is dropped, the impact of the de-registration should be studied.
 The issue of the extension of SUB coverage to training and parental was too recent at the time of the evaluation to be examined as an evaluation issue.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Becker, J. (1968) Guaranteed Income for the Unemployed: The Story of SUB, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.
 Employment and Immigration Canada (1987) "Evaluation of the Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) Program" Ottawa.

TITLE: SICKNESS BENEFITS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: Under the Sickness Benefits program, workers who lose their jobs because of illness or injury may receive up to 15 weeks of benefits provided they have worked at least 20 weeks in insurable employment during their qualifying period. In 1987, approximately \$300 million in benefits were paid out, representing about 3 percent of all benefits. In addition, close to \$400 million in premium reduction was granted to employers who have their own wage loss replacement programs.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): The objective of the program is implied from the general U.I. objectives. The objective can be stated as follows: To provide temporary income support to unemployed workers while they are unable to work due to illness, injury or quarantine. Related sub-objectives are to provide sickness benefits with speed and efficiency.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: U.I. Act 1953, Amended to provide for the payment of benefits in case of illness. Amended in 1971 to extend coverage to any insured worker. Amended in 1978, under Bill C-14 to reduce the rate of benefit.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: All insured individuals are eligible for UI sickness benefits.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: 150,400</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: N/A \$: N/A</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1953</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: CECs/Regions</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of Sickness Benefits Program, March 1989</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The nature of sickness benefits as a form of income protection.
 The relationship to other programs and alternate solutions.
 Claimants Behaviour as it relates to the program.
 Overall program efficiency.
 Public reaction to the program.
 The evaluation issues can be summarized into several questions:
 Has the program improved the protection of workers in cases of illness?
 Can workers' protection under the program be improved?
 Improvements in the timing and duration of protection?
 Increase in the Program's coverage.
 Has the program removed the incentive for the private sector to act in the area of income protection in case of illness?
 Should the program go from second payer to first payer?
 Is the program administered efficiently?
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
 There were two main sources of data used in the evaluation:
 The survey on supplementary unemployment benefits.
 EIC's administrative data.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The sickness benefit program has given workers improved protection in cases of injury or illness not due to an occupational accident.
 Approximately half of the work force do not participate in a private wage loss replacement plan in case of illness.
 The program offers considerable protection to women, low skilled and part-time workers. It was estimated that roughly one-fifth of claimants draw benefits for the maximum period allowed under the Act. It was determined that the introduction of sickness benefits did not prevent the private sector from continuing to develop income protection plans which in most cases are more generous in terms of rates and duration of benefits.
 It was recommended that more attention should be given to improving the efficiency and speed with which benefits are paid to clients.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The program appears to have reached its stated objectives. As well, it appears that the chief concerns stated in relation to the program do not appear to be at issue. Specifically the program does not appear to undermine private benefit plans.
 Of note is the fact that women tend to use the program proportionally more than men. This might have an impact on program design and coverage issues.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** It appears that sickness claims are being handled as quickly as other claims.
 Adjudication time could be improved.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The evaluation raised the issue of extending coverage of sickness benefits to independent workers.

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Employment and Immigration Canada, Pre-Evaluation Assessment of Sickness Benefits, Program Evaluation Branch, March 1986.

TITLE: SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PROGRAM (SUB)										
PART II PROGRAM INFORMATION										
1.	<p>Program Rationale/Background: Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) Plans allow employers to supplement but not to replace unemployment insurance benefits so that the employees' income for a temporary layoff will be maintained at a level more closely approximating normal take-home pay. By accepting to pay their workers supplementary income during periods of unemployment, employers were looking to reduce losses of skilled workers who might seek out other jobs when laid off and who would not be available for recall as a result. Initially SUB plans were a tool of labour retention and improved income protection was an incidental consideration. The latter has become a major element of current SUB plans.</p>									
2.	<p>Program objective(s): The main operational objective of the program may be stated as follows:</p> <p>To recognize approved supplemental unemployment benefit plans.</p> <p>There are also two policy objectives:</p> <p>To allow improved income protection for workers.</p> <p>To promote stability in the participating employer's labour force.</p>									
3.	<p>Legislative Basis: U.I. Act, 1956 amended in 1971 to allow plans that covered pregnancy.</p> <p>Insurance Policy Guidelines, Subject 24.</p>									
4A.	<p>Clientele/eligibility criteria: UI recipients and Registered SUB plan participants.</p>									
4B.	<p>Number of participants 1992-93: N/A</p>									
5.	<p>Resources 1992-93:</p> <table> <tr> <td>Grants and Contributions:</td> <td>\$:</td> <td>Not Applicable</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Operating Costs:</td> <td>PYs:</td> <td>6-7</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>\$:</td> <td>N/A</td> </tr> </table>	Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable	Operating Costs:	PYs:	6-7		\$:	N/A
Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable								
Operating Costs:	PYs:	6-7								
	\$:	N/A								
6.	<p>First year of operation:</p> <p>1956 Work Stoppage SUB</p> <p>1971 Sickness and Maternity SUB</p> <p>1984 Adoption SUB plan</p> <p>1990 Parental SUB plan</p>									
7.	<p>Program Delivery: CECs\NHQ</p>									
8.	<p>Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) Program, September 1987</p>									

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 SUBs effect on the improvement in worker protection.
 The effect on work force stability for participating employers.
 Level of program awareness and reaction.
 Structure and administration of the program.
 Public reaction.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** There were several sources of data used:
 Survey of Employers with approved SUB plans.
 Survey of Employers with WLR plans (i.e. plans which qualify for UI premium reduction).
 Survey of Employers with neither SUB plan nor qualified WLR plan.
 Survey of UI illness and maternity benefit claimants.
 Survey of Unions Representatives
 Survey of Insurers, Agents and Benefit Consultants.
 EIC's BNOP administrative data.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** At the time of the study there were approximately 3,100 approved SUB plans in existence.
 The majority of the SUB plans were offered by large employers which covered at most 20 percent of the labour force.
 The majority of the SUB plans were for pregnancy and were heavily concentrated in Quebec.
 Based on a sample of 518 SUB plans, the analysis indicated that, overall, SUB plans provided substantial enhancements to an unemployed worker's income protection.
 It was determined that SUB plans reduce the financial incentive to return to work or seek alternate employment. The degree of the disincentive effect is not certain.
 It was determined that SUB program lacks legal authority because of several ambiguities in the legislation governing SUB.
 It was determined SUB program mandate raises the issue of equity in terms of the fact that SUB plans do not affect the payment of UI benefits while other earnings do.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** None

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** None

5. **Outstanding Issues:** None

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Becker, J. (1968) Guaranteed Income for the Unemployed: The Story of SUB, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.

TITLE: REPORT ON HIRINGS PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The failure to report work and earnings is a major problem area in the payment of UI benefits. Indeed, at the time of the evaluation (1982-83), this category accounted for some 93.8 percent of the total number of overpayments identified. In order to reduce and minimize the value of overpayments, it is important to detect cases of fraud and abuse as quickly as possible. The ROH program is aimed at the early detection of unreported work and earnings.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of the program is twofold: To detect, as early as possible those UI claimants who incorrectly report or fail to report their earnings received from employment while on active claim (detection). To reduce or eliminate the incidence of UI claimants incorrectly reporting or failing to report their earnings while on active claim (deterrence).
3.	Legislative Basis: In August 1976, the Canadian Manufactures Association (CMA) proposed that EIC investigate the possibility that employers be required to report all their hirings to the EIC. A program was implemented in 1978 called the Information on Hirings (IOH). This program was evaluated and subsequently became the ROH program in 1980.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: At the time of the evaluation the program covered approximately one third of the Canadian work force. The program participation on behalf of the employers is voluntary.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: 160,796
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: N/A \$: N/A
6.	First year of operation: 1980
7.	Program Delivery: NHQ/Regions/CECs
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Report on Hirings Program, September 1985.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
Recruitment: The recruitment issue relates to the procedures followed for recruitment of employers, employers' perception of the recruitment process, and a description of some basic characteristics of participation employers.
Compliance: This issue related to the completeness and accuracy of the data submitted by employers in their Monthly Hiring Detail reports.
Detection: Early detection of abuse is the key component of the ROH program.
Deterrence: This issue deals with the success and effectiveness of the ROH program in deterring abuse of the UI program.
Cost Effectiveness and Dollar Return Value: This issue addresses the economics of the ROH program.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
There were two main source of data used in the evaluation:
Survey of participating employers.
Survey of non-participating employers.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Growth in the level of employer participation was strong at the outset of the program but had diminished significantly at the time of the evaluation. It was determined that approximately 90 percent of non-participating employers had never been contacted to participate in the ROH program. Indeed, over 80 percent of the larger employers who did not participate in the program has never been approached.
Approximately 75 percent of non-participating employers were not aware of the ROH program's existence.
Over 80 percent of the supervisors of investigation and control suggested that it would be possible to increase the level of employer participation in their respective areas. However, 75 percent of non-participating employers were against a mandatory participation requirement.
The program was directly responsible for the detection of approximately \$14 million or 16 percent of all overpayments during the period the evaluation covered.
The program was deemed to be cost effective, there was a \$9.90 cost savings per \$1.00 spent on the control activity.
It was concluded that a substantial growth in the program could be achieved through a larger commitment of resources to the recruitment effort.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The program has proven to be cost effective and has resulted in a significant level of detection of overpayments.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The evaluation suggest that there is a need for a heightened publicity effort to make the program more visible to employers. Increased visibility may also generate secondary savings as it is believed that higher public awareness leads to a higher level of deterrence.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Because of the differences in the participating and non-participating employers the level of deterrence that results indirectly from the ROH program could not be determined with accuracy.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** An Evaluation of the Information on Hirings Pilot Program (Interim Report), Strategic Policy and Planning, Program Evaluation Branch, Ottawa, 1979.

Monitoring Report, Manual Report on Hirings Program, Benefit Programs Monitoring, Monitoring and Analysis, Ottawa, 1982.

TITLE: UI PREMIUM REDUCTION PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: In 1971 when the UI sickness and maternity benefits were introduced, there were great concerns that employers with private wage-loss replacement (WLR) plans would drop them or carve them out such that UI would become the first-payer of sickness benefits. Also, there were great concerns that the insurance industry would be disrupted. To encourage WLR plan retention, the decision was made to give UI premium reduction to employers.
2.	<p>Program objective(s): The primary objective of the program is to encourage the retention and upgrading, to CEIC standards, of Wage Loss Replacement plans. For evaluation purposes the objective of the program was stated in the following manner: To maintain or increase the number of Canadian workers who, when incapacitated due to pregnancy, non-occupational injury, illness or quarantine, receive, through WLR benefits, income at least equivalent to that provided by UI sickness or pregnancy benefits.</p> <p>To grant a UI Premium Reduction to employers to compensate for initiation, maintaining or upgrading wage loss replacement plans which offer their employees coverage equal or superior to that provided by UI sickness or maternity benefits.</p> <p>To ensure that premium reductions granted to the employers who hold qualified WLR plans equal the savings generated by such plans to the UI Account.</p> <p>To protect the integrity of the UI Account by ensuring that premium reductions are granted only to those employers holding qualified WLR plans.</p>
3.	Legislative Basis: U.I. Act, 1971.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: To earn a UI premium reduction plan, the employers' WLR plan must meet certain minimum criteria. There are four categories of premium reduction. In all four categories the benefit rate must be at least 60 percent of insurable earnings and the waiting period cannot exceed 14 days, entitlement can vary for each category.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: N/A
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: N/A \$: N/A
6.	First year of operation: 1972
7.	Program Delivery: NHQ/Plan Determination Officers (PDOs)
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the UI Premium Reduction Program, March 1985

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There were seven evaluation issues identified:
 Retention and Up-grading of WLR plans
 Matching UI savings with premium reduction
 Treatment of WLR Maternity Coverage
 Sharing of premium reduction with employees
 Overall effectiveness
 Program integrity
 Public Awareness and reaction
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis. There were several data sources used in the evaluation:
 Survey of employers with qualified WLR plans
 Survey of employees
 Survey of union officials
 Survey of insurers and benefit consultants
 Survey of CECs
 Survey of public.
 EIC administrative files
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** In 1985, over 5,000,000 employees and 30,000 employers were involved in WLR plans. It was determined that, in general, larger firms are the ones participating in the WLR programs.
 Four areas of change were identified from the evaluation:
 The method of calculating the UI premium reduction.
 The appeals process in the program.
 The 5/12 sharing requirement.
 Waiving the waiting period on UI maternity claims in certain cases.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The Premium Reduction Program is cost-effective, although the magnitude of cost savings is based on actuarial assumptions and is somewhat hypothetical.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** It is questionable whether or not employers receiving premium reductions are fully sharing these with employees.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** A key issue at the time is whether it is advisable to continue to grant over \$300 million per year in premium reductions when they are of secondary importance in the decisions on WLR plans.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Unemployment Insurance Benefits: A study of administrative procedure in UIC, P. Issalys and G. Watkins, prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Ottawa.
Review of the reduction of employer's premium program, Benefit Entitlement Directorate, Ottawa.
A Pre-Evaluation Assessment of the Premium Reduction Program, R. Hanson, Employment and Immigration Canada, Hull.

TITLE: INSURANCE ON-LINE SYSTEM IN THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES	
PART I	
PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The Insurance On-Line System (IOLS) was introduced into the Atlantic Provinces as a means of providing a more efficient and effective system of processing and accessing Unemployment Insurance claims data. The new system replaces a less efficient system that relied on mail service for data communication. The IOLS links EIC offices in the Region with the central computer centre and was anticipated to result in improved operational efficiency.
2.	Program objective(s): The objectives of the program were threefold: Facilitate quicker data communications. Increased efficiency of EIC operations. Increase the speed of service to UI claimants.
3.	Legislative Basis: U.I. Act. 1971
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: The IOLS is designed to assist both UI claimants and EIC staff.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: N/A
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable. Operating Costs: PYs: N/A \$: N/A
6.	First year of operation: 1981
7.	Program Delivery: CECs/Atlantic Region
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Insurance On-Line System in the Atlantic Provinces, February 1982

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1. Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 Effect on control and benefit payment operations.
 Impact on the efficiency of internal operations.
 Level of quality of service to the public.
 Person year savings.
 Employees attitudes towards IOLS.
 Cost benefit.
- 2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
 There were two main source of data used in the evaluation:
 Observations of on-site operations
 EIC administrative data
- 3. Findings/Conclusions:** The IOLS in general has improved the UI operations of EIC. The system has positive impacts on some internal operations and benefit controls while the effects on the quality of service to the public have been mixed. If all potential savings from the system could be realized, the IOLS would produce a positive cost-benefit. However, at the time of the evaluation it was suggested that if the system continued as it was currently constituted it may well have a net cost of \$3 million.
 The IOLS has a positive impact on the level of person year savings.
 The system did control benefits through faster processing of immediate stop payment decisions. Savings of \$1.3 million annually had been realized at the time of the evaluation.
 The efficiency of internal operations is improved though reduced delays resulting from fewer errors in insurance transactions.
- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** None
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** Additional measures appear to be necessary to facilitate full cost savings from the program.
 The IOLS appear to be effective in improving administrative functions in the Atlantic Region.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:** None
- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Given the specific nature of the program there were no related evaluation documents that could be drawn upon.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS (HWC) (SOS)

TITLE: CANADA ASSISTANCE PLAN

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale:** Extend availability of social assistance benefits based on need to persons across Canada.
2. **Program objective(s):** To encourage, through cost-sharing of provincial expenditures, the development of a comprehensive and integrated welfare system in Canada which: assists all persons in need; encourages the development and expansion of provincial welfare services.
3. **Legislative Basis:** CAP Act (1966); Government Expenditures Restraint Act (1991); An Act to amend the Canada Assistance Plan (1992); CAP Regulations; Agreements with Provinces/Territories (CAP Part I, General Assistance & Welfare Services; CAP Part III, Work Activity Projects).
- 4A **Client/Eligibility Criteria:** Some costs of provincially delivered social assistance and social services shared with provinces as specified in CAP Act and Agreements.
- 4B **Number of Participants:** Direct beneficiaries are provinces. Indirect beneficiaries (individuals/families) include welfare recipients (over 3 million) and clients of social service agencies (over 1 million). Indirect beneficiaries (governmental and non-governmental organizations) include some municipalities, over 6300 non-governmental agencies delivering social services, and 7000 residential care facilities.
5. **Resources:** \$7,234,300,000 (Main Estimates 1993-94)
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1966
7. **Program Delivery:** Provinces make requests for cost-sharing and establish to the Cost-Share Program Directorate's satisfaction that programs meet CAP requirements. The federal government may make its contributions to provinces as monthly advances of one-twelfth of the provinces' yearly estimated provincial costs. Each month, provinces may submit claims for advances on estimated costs to nine CAP regional offices which certify that the amounts claimed are appropriate. CAP regional offices conduct sample reviews of provincial programs, systems and records to ensure ongoing eligibility of programs and clientele for which costs are claimed. Final yearly settlements are made or negotiated on the basis of the submission of final claims by the provinces. Policy support and guidance are provided by HQ.
8. **Evaluation Titles & Dates:**
Program Evaluation Division study from 1990-91.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:**
 - To what extent have CAP objectives been realized?
 - What were the scope and scale of provincial programs before CAP and what are their scope and scale now?
 - Are the CAP objectives still valid?
 - What did the federal government wish to achieve in establishing CAP and why? Do these reasons still hold?
 - To what extent can the realization of the objectives be attributed to CAP?
 - To what extent did CAP assist in increasing the scope and scale of provincial programs?
 - To what extent did CAP have the effect of reducing their scope and scale?
 - To what extent has CAP limited Canada's sharing to disadvantaged Canadians?
 - What issues about CAP have provinces raised with the government of Canada?
 - To what extent and in what ways are disadvantaged Canadians better off because of CAP?
 - How does each province determine how its disadvantaged residents are better off because of CAP?
 - What measures can be used, if any, to determine the impact of CAP on disadvantaged Canadians?
 - What do these measures tell us?
 - What unintended impacts, good or bad, has CAP on Canadians? In particular, has it encouraged or discouraged independence?
 - Are there more cost-effective ways for the federal government to achieve CAP objectives and to make disadvantaged Canadians better off? (e.g. block funding, variable cost-sharing, changes in the scope of cost-sharing)
 - To what extent do such ways require the spending of more money by the federal government?
 - To what extent have CAP criteria forced the provinces to forego more cost-effective approaches in order to obtain cost-sharing? What additional cost have the provincial and federal governments together therefore had to bear?

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:**
 - Comparison of social assistance rates with various poverty lines.
 - Literature Review on economic impacts of welfare.
 - Review of work incentives available in provincial programs.
 - Analysis of provincial expenditures on social services 1961-88.
 - Review of CAP Act and of Provincial Social Assistance Legislation
 - Expert Panels
 - Interviews with all provincial social service departments and all CAP regional offices.
 - Analysis of options for alternative fiscal arrangements.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The overall effect of CAP on combined federal and provincial interpersonal redistribution cannot be determined, but it has been effective in directing federal monies to persons in greatest need. Along with the increase in overall provincial social spending, the proportion of provincial non-shareable social services expenditures has increased; it cannot be determined precisely to what extent CAP contributed to this. Generally, people are on social assistance for relatively short periods of time and only 5% or 6% are on welfare for more than five years. While the real value of minimum wages has declined over time, the real value of social assistance has increased. Factors within provincial social assistance and within CAP that may prevent some people from returning to the labour force are:
- the tax-back rate;
 - inadequate adjustments for inflation: while the nominal value of earnings exemptions under CAP increased, its purchasing power declined;
 - existing exemptions under CAP, which provide an unacceptable return on part-time employment.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A Evaluation Recommendations:** The following questions were recommended to be addressed by Health and Welfare Canada:
1. Can the fundamental nature of CAP as an open-ended, conditional, sharing vehicle for general assistance be easily changed or will such a change demand a broad and in-depth evaluation of the fiscal, economic, social, jurisdictional and constitutional relationships?
 2. Should there be enhanced assistance to poorer provinces, whether through different sharing rates between "have" and "have not" provinces or through narrowly-targeted conditional payments for specific groups?
 3. Should provinces which choose to fund initiatives and incentives beyond shareable limits under CAP be subject to a financial penalty over and above the true costs of these incentives?
 4. Are there alternate approaches for contributing towards provincial administrative costs and costs of welfare services?
 5. Should the 1965-66 base-year costs for determining shareable costs of welfare services continue?
 6. Should child care costs be restricted to non-profit agencies?
 7. Should the interpretation of "need" continue to be left to the provinces or should the regulation governing the conditions that provincial programs must satisfy in order to be eligible for cost-sharing be clarified?
 8. Are the provincial/municipal programs' conditional eligibility restrictions consistent with CAP regulations or is a review required?
 9. Should other family members be penalised if one family member fails to satisfy employment related, conditional, eligibility requirements?
 10. What would be the impact of sharing in benefits which ease the transition to full-time employment for low-income persons whose incomes are marginally above normal benefit cut-off levels?
 11. What is the impact of increasing the real value of asset exemptions?
 12. Can the maximum allowable exemptions on earnings be increased in a manner that allows a reasonable incremental return to full-time employment without jeopardizing the return to part-time employment?
 13. Are the administrative procedures required for using a proportional earnings exemption cost-efficient?
 14. What statistical information is needed to support planning and policy analysis?
 15. Would it be beneficial for the Cost-Shared Programs Directorate to compile an annual summary of major decisions taken?
- 4B Policy Lessons Learned:** No distinct analysis to isolate the achievements or deficiencies of the Canada Assistance Plan from those of other programs can be made, because CAP is highly interrelated with other programs and the socio-economic environment. Provinces are generally positive about CAP, resulting from the fact that social services, especially in poorer provinces, would have not developed as rapidly as they did with CAP. In order to reach CAP's target more efficiently, it is stated that a combination of open-ended sharing and constraints on sharable expenditures would serve its task best.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** Action relative to evaluation recommendations would have to be reviewed.
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:** Poverty Lines & the Measurement of Income Adequacy for Assistance Recipients 1965-87.
Work Incentives & CAP.
Expenditure Patterns of CAP.
Review of CAP Act and of Provincial Social Assistance Legislation.
CAP Issues Raised by Provinces
Key CAP Decisions Through the Years

TITLE: DISABLED PERSONS UNIT	
PART 1 PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The unit has the lead role in development of policy related to Departmental initiatives in the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities, as well as ongoing initiatives outside the Strategy.
2.	Program objective(s): To promote and support the development of programs and initiatives which enhance opportunities for disabled persons to live and work within the community.
3.	Legislative Basis: The ongoing role of the Unit derives from the Department of National Health & Welfare Act. As well, the Unit has responsibilities which derive from the government's National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities.
4A	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: The Unit's ongoing role centres on the coordination of activities and initiatives with other federal departments, national voluntary organizations and private sector groups. The Unit also delivers two special Departmental initiatives: the Ability Program; the Independent Living Centre Pilot Project.
4B	Number of Participants: In 1992-93, about 60 projects, involving partnerships among 75 agencies and businesses were developed and funded.
5.	Resources: A total of \$9.4 million (\$7.9 million contributions; \$1.5 million operating) over the five-year life of the Strategy (91-92 - 95-95) is allocated for the Ability Program. The Independent Living Centre Project is resources at \$1.5 million per year over the same period. For 1993-94, the Unit has an allocation of: 6 FTEs; a salary budget of \$279,000; a non-salary operating budget of \$330,000 and a contributions budget of \$3,800,000.
7.	Program Delivery: The Unit does not deliver direct services to any particular client group. Instead, the Unit provides service through its work with a variety of partners/stakeholders in the area of disability policy and services. All programs are administered nationally from HQ. Regional Offices are routinely notified of projects being considered and have been invited to submit project proposals from their regions. The Unit works regularly with other federal departments involved in the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division study from 1991-92.

**PART II
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

EVALUATION STUDY FROM 1991-92

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

What is the perceived role and importance of this Unit to the disabled community? the Department? other federal departments?

How effective is the Disabled Persons Unit in coordinating Departmental efforts with respect to disabled persons?

Are there other ways to improve coordination of Departmental efforts?

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:

Interviews with representatives of the federal government, the disabled community and a few private sector organizations

3. Findings/Conclusions:

Respondents perceive that the Unit is doing an excellent job in facilitating communication and ensuring that information flows between community groups and government; in providing various kinds of advice and information to the disabled community; and developing innovative approaches to issues, particularly in the area of employment and employability.

However, the role of the Unit appears to be in transition because of organizational change and new demands to undertake more policy work, following a move from a program division to a policy division. This increased policy work has left the staff with less time to spend on direct work with the non-governmental organizations and the Unit has become more reactive than proactive because its resources are stretched to the limit.

As the Unit is now structured and staffed, interbranch coordination activities undertaken by the InterBranch Committee fall outside the Unit's area of responsibilities. Although coordination objectives are clearly articulated for the Unit, it does not serve as secretariat for the committee.

While the Interbranch Committee is viewed as the most effective mechanism for facilitating interbranch coordination on programs and policy-related matters, its effectiveness is seriously compromised. Changes required to make the committee an effective coordination mechanism include a stronger mandate with Departmental commitment to the committee, senior management involvement, and the provision of adequate secretariat resources to support the work of the committee.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION

4A Evaluation Study Recommendations:

1. The Branch should clarify the role and objectives of the Disabled Persons Unit within the context of the Policy Development, Coordination and Information Division.
2. The Branch should examine and clarify the role and mandate of the Interbranch Committee on Policies and Programs for the Disabled.

4B Operational Lessons Learned:

Within government, the need for interbranch coordination is believed to be strong. Each of the five branches is undertaking work affecting the disabled within its unique mandate and it is difficult for any one branch to coordinate its work with that of the others without a coordinating body. Also, policy issues that cut across branch jurisdiction could be addressed more comprehensively through an effective coordinating body.

TITLE: NATIONAL ADOPTION DESK	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The Desk was created by NHW in 1975 at the request of the provinces/territories.
2.	Program objective(s): The National Adoption Desk is responsible for coordinating international and interprovincial adoptions in Canada. It represents provincial/territorial adoption authorities (except Quebec) in dealings with foreign adoption authorities; negotiates intercountry adoption agreements with foreign countries; coordinates intercountry adoption cases between provincial and foreign authorities liaises, shares information and coordinates intercountry adoption issues among the provinces/territories, other federal departments and foreign authorities.
3.	Legislative Bases: Other than the Department of National Health & Welfare Act, the Desk does not have a legislated base. It was created at the request of provinces/territories.
4a	Clients/Eligibility Criteria: Primary clients are provincial and territorial adoption authorities. Beneficiaries include adopting and prospective adoptive parents and children adopted.
5.	Resources: In 1992-93, Desk resources were 10 FTEs and \$263,000 in operating funds.
6.	First Year of Operation: 1975
7.	Program Delivery: All operational activities and resources are located in HQ. Policy is established by the Desk in consultation with provincial/territorial adoption coordinators and federal officials in other departments. The Desk convenes an Interdepartmental Committee on Intercountry Adoptions. The Desk convenes periodic meetings of the provincial/territorial adoption coordinators.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates: Program Evaluation Division study from 1990-91 At the request of the Branch, the Program Evaluation Division is currently developing an evaluation framework for the Desk.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

EVALUATION STUDY FROM 1990-91

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

What evidence is there to show that the National Adoption Desk is successful in arranging for international adoptions?

3. Findings/Conclusions:

The NAD appears to have undertaken reasonable efforts to facilitate international adoption, however its overall effectiveness in this field cannot be drawn due to insufficient information sources.

NAD has in the past met with some success in international orphan adoptions with an average rate of 44% in the period of 1984 to 1987. The study cannot comment on how effective or ineffective NAD has been as this is a matter of subjective judgement. Applications that fail to result in an adoption are not automatically a measure of NAD's failure in facilitating international adoptions. There appear reasons such as applicants changing their mind or applicants being turned down by the country to which the application was made.

The loss of Korea as an international source of orphan adoptions (61%) had severe impacts on NAD's ability to facilitate these adoptions. Therefore it appears that the viability of NAD depends largely on finding source countries, where the chances of success are reasonable; countries with the highest success rates were Korea, India, Philippines and Hong Kong.

4A Recommendations of 1990-91 Evaluation:

1. The National Adoption Desk should monitor and report on the results of recent efforts to find alternate source countries for international (orphan) adoption. This would include monitoring the number of applications and placements by source country. In interpreting this information, consideration should be given to finding a reasonable balance between level of effort to find placements (number and characteristics of applications processed for selected countries) and chances for success (percentage placed).
2. The National Adoption Desk should reassess how data are recorded with respect to the status of related adoption applications. The NAD should ensure that a more standardized approach is used to record outcome.

4B Operational Lessons Learned:

Three main factors that influence the effectiveness of the international adoption process are:

- willingness of foreign countries to allow their children to be adopted and by whom;
- the country to which people apply;
- the "match" between an applicant's characteristics and a country's criteria for parents.

TITLE: NATIONAL WELFARE GRANTS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	<p>Rationale/Background: National Welfare Grants (NWG) was established to provide grants and contributions for social welfare research, developmental projects and human resource development in the social welfare field. Originally, the program was mandated to respond to the serious and chronic shortage of trained personnel in the social service field, and to the lack of research and innovative program development bearing on social service delivery. Following extensive consultations, a new orientation was developed for the program. The mandate of the program is "the development and promotion of knowledge and resources which support individual social well-being and a healthy social environment".</p>
2.	<p>Program objective(s): The program has three guiding principles: Social Investment Social Participation Strengthening the Social Welfare Network These principles are supported by the following general objectives: To increase public understanding of, and support for, individual social well-being and a "healthy" social environment; To increase knowledge and use of methods to involve people in planning and implementing social programs appropriate to their needs; To increase the quality and availability of information which informs policy decision-making; To increase the number of effective linkages among public and private sectors; To increase knowledge and use of approaches to creative financial management and skill development.</p>
3.	<p>Legislative Basis: The program was created by Order in Council, and operates pursuant to the National Health & Welfare Act, Section 4, 2b.</p>
4A	<p>Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: To be funded, proposals must indicate, in addition to usual information on study objectives, method and budget, how the project will contribute to the existing knowledge base, its practical significance, and impact on social policy, programs or practice. Applicants must also have a dissemination plan identifying project products, relevant target audiences, and details of how the products will be dispersed. Applicants are expected to collaborate with a consumer/client group in the priority area.</p>
4B	<p>Number of Participants In 1992-93, the program funded 103 national projects, 27 voluntary organizations, and 16 fellowships.</p>
5.	<p>Resources: Allocations for 1993-94: Grants - \$2.65M; Contributions - \$3.95M; FTEs - 14.</p>

PART I (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION

6. First Year of Operation: 1962

- 7. Program Delivery:** The program uses contributions funding for social research and development activities. Grants are provided to National Voluntary Social Service Organizations, and Fellowships are awarded to doctoral students concerned with the study of significant social policy and service issues. NWG is a national R&D program centralized in HQ.
- 8. Evaluation Titles & Dates:**
Program Evaluation Division Assessment Study from 1984-85.
Program Evaluation Division Evaluation Framework June, 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

EVALUATION ASSESSMENT STUDY 1984-85

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The Assessment identified the following questions :
 1. To what extent have the apparent overlaps in mandate among programs resulted in: duplication in the nature of problems funded; inappropriate funding of projects; gaps in topics funded?
 2. Do the apparent mandate overlaps appear to be functional or dysfunctional to the attainment of program and Departmental objectives?
 3. Do program processes for acquiring proposals favour some eligible issues, organizations or disciplines over others?
 4. What are the eligible recipients perceptions about the purpose and priorities of the program, and how have these been affected by proposal acquisition processes?
 5. Do acquisition processes and constituent perceptions appear to have been functional or dysfunctional to attainment of program and Departmental objectives?
 6. Have program selection processes results in a concentration of funds on some issues, organizations or disciplines over others? To the extent that this is so, does it appear to have been function or dysfunction to attainment of program and Departmental objectives? To the extent that there is no apparent concentration of funds on identified issues or groups, why is this so, and what effect does it appear to have had on attainment of program and Departmental objectives?

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Because this was an assessment study, there were no major evaluation findings.

Recommendations:

1. NWG should develop a plan for developing periodic statements of funding priorities which are communicated to eligible program recipients. These statements should be based on systematic needs assessments related to the program's stated objectives.
2. NWG should develop and promulgate selection criteria which reflect its objectives and make explicit expected standards of proposal quality.
3. NWG should implement a regularized annual proposal submission circle and selection procedures which permit the relative merits of proposals to be assessed and that NWG develop guidelines for the conduct of Demonstration project evaluations and these should be communicated to recipients of Demonstration funds.
4. NWG should implement a strategy for disseminating cumulative results of groups of projects. Where applicable this should include the results of project evaluations.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 1992

The evaluation framework reflects the major changes in orientation that have taken place in NWG since the 1984-85 assessment study. The evaluation framework is now being implemented by the program in consultation with the Program Evaluation Division.

TITLE: CHILD CARE PROGRAMS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale: The organization administers three federal policy development and program support activities: the Office of the National Child Care Advisor; the National Child Care Information Centre; the Child Care Initiatives Fund.</p> <p>2. Program Objectives: To monitor, evaluate, promote and encourage quality child care in Canada in support of the federal cost-sharing of provincial child care services, as well as in the development of aboriginal programs.</p> <p>3. Legislative Basis: Activities are administered under the auspices of section 4, subsections (1) and (2)b of the Department of National Health & Welfare Act. The Office of the National Child Care Advisor and the National Child Care Information Centre were established in 1972 in response to recommendations from the Report of the Commission on Emotional & Learning Disorders in Children (1970) and the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada (1970). The Child Care Initiatives Fund was established in 1987 as the research and development component of the proposed National Day Care Strategy for a 7 year period ending March 1995.</p> <p>4a Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Program clients are: national and regional professional child care associations; non-profit child care and related service agencies; child care research and training institutions; aboriginal groups; municipal, regional and provincial agencies; provincial and territorial governments. Additional stakeholders include children's and women's advocacy groups, as well as organizations representing business and labour in relation to policy issues concerning work and family.</p> <p>4b Number of Participants: Child Care Initiatives funds have been expended or are legally committed to 481 projects.</p> <p>5. Resources: The original Vote allocated \$98 million to the Child Care Initiatives Fund over 7 years. The fund received a number of subsequent reductions. Of the remaining \$86.6 available over the 7 years of the fund, to date \$75.9 has been expended or is legally committed. Contributions allocations (after reductions) for 1993-94 are \$10,800,000. The organization has 21 FTEs.</p> <p>6. First Year of Operation: Please see details in "Legislative Basis".</p> <p>7. Program Delivery: Programs are administered directly from HQ. Liaison occurs with regional Departmental program units where appropriated. The organization works closely with the Child Day Care Directors in provinces/territories, as well as a number of federal national and regional funding and information programs.</p> <p>8. Evaluation Titles & Dates: An evaluation framework has been developed.</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

An evaluation framework has been developed and the Program has prepared systems and information in preparation for an evaluation. The Child Care Initiatives Fund is in its second last year. The evaluation will begin in 1993-94 in order to provide information in time for consideration of possible program redesign/renewal in 1995.

TITLE: ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale: This is a component of Canada's Drug Strategy to address what the alcohol/drug field identified as a shortage of treatment services particularly for youth.
2.	Program objectives: To increase the availability of alcohol and drug treatment services, especially for youth.
3.	Legislative Basis: Department of National Health & Welfare Act. Time-limited agreements.
4a	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Provinces/territories are the direct clients. Indirect clients are persons who experience problems with use of alcohol/drugs and who require treatment and rehabilitation services. The emphasis is primarily on youth, but also includes women, employed persons non-status Indian people and the elderly.
4b	Number of Participants: All provinces/territories except PEI, Yukon and NWT signed the 1990-93 agreements which expired March 31/93. Work is in progress to renew the Agreement for 1993-96 with option of a further two years. Information about number of indirect beneficiaries not currently available in the Program Evaluation Division.
5.	Resources: The funding level is set at \$15.5 million per year.
6.	First Year Of Operation: 1987
7.	Program Delivery: Agreements are time-limited and enable the federal government to share 50% of costs incurred by provinces/territories. Program delivery is decentralized to the Regions. Review and analysis of provincial submissions are the responsibility of Regions. HQ provides support for complex program issues and policy interpretation. The Agreement renewal process and program/policy development and coordination are HQ responsibilities.
8.	Evaluation Titles & Dates The Program Evaluation Division has not conducted an evaluation of the ADTR. However, insofar as this program receives funding from Canada's Drug Strategy (CDS), it will be among the subjects of the mid-term review of CDS (March 1995) and the full CDS evaluation (January 1997). The issues that the evaluation will cover are delineated in the 1992 CDS evaluation framework prepared by the Program Evaluation Division.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

The Program Evaluation Division has not conducted an evaluation of the ADTR. However, insofar as this program receives funding from Canada's Drug Strategy (CDS), it will be among the subjects of the mid-term review of CDS (March 1995) and the full CDS evaluation (January 1997). The issues that the evaluation will cover are delineated in the 1992 CDS evaluation framework prepared by the Program Evaluation Division.

TITLE: NEW BRUNSWICK WORKS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: A demonstration project to facilitate transition from welfare to work for social assistance recipients.</p> <p>2. Program Objectives: To support social assistance recipients in educational upgrading and skills training in order to help them make the transition from welfare to work. The model that is being tested and evaluated involves a long term commitment (up to 49 months) focusing on the individual's training needs.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Federal-provincial Agreement effective from April 1, 1992 to March 31, 1998 signed by Ministers of Employment & Immigration and National Health & Welfare, and the provincial Ministers of Income Assistance, Advanced Education & Labour and the Regional Development Corporation.</p>	
<p>4A Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Social assistance recipients who are family heads (mostly single parents) who have relatively low education, limited labour force attachment, and have been in receipt of social assistance for six months or more.</p>	
<p>4B Number of Participants: Three intakes of up to 1,000 participants.</p>	
<p>5. Resources: \$177 million over six years.</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1992</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Participants receive income support by combined means of provincial wage subsidies, UI developmental uses, and course purchase assistance through a special Training and Development Fund operated jointly with the provincial Department of Income Assistance. A joint management committee is responsible for the administration and management of the overall direction of the project. Federal delivery systems include the regional operations of the former EIC and the Cost-Shared Programs Directorate of the former NHW which administers the special Training & Development Fund jointly with the provincial Department of Income Assistance.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Titles & Dates: The Agreement has not been evaluated by the Program Evaluation Division.</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

The Agreement has not been evaluated by the Program Evaluation Division.

TITLE: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION INITIATIVES	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale: To facilitate the movement of persons with disabilities from institutions to communities. The initiatives are part of the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objectives: The major activity in the package is the Newfoundland project entitled "A Future With Rights - The Right Future". Federal funds will be provided over 4 years (1993-94 - 1996-97) to move 125 persons with development disabilities from institutions to communities. Other elements in the package include funding over three years for national initiatives of the Canadian Association for Community Living. Proposals are being developed for smaller complementary projects from other provinces. Any funded project will involve a partnership between Human Resources & Labour, a provinces, and provincial and national associations.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: In February/93, TB approved the submission of the Minister of National Health & Welfare seeking authority for deinstitutionalization initiatives (TB 819655). A Memorandum of Understanding for the "Right Future" project was signed in April/93 providing for the initiation of funding; an agreement for the entire project is now being negotiated. Similar processes will be negotiated for other provincial initiatives.</p>	
<p>4A Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Funded projects must involve a partnership between Human Resources & Labour, a provinces, and provincial and national associations.</p>	
<p>4B Number of Participants: The Newfoundland project involves 125 persons with disabilities.</p>	
<p>5. Resources: The initiatives will involve about \$15 million over 5 years to 1996-97. The Newfoundland project will involve \$10 million over 4 years. The Canadians Association for Community Living project involves \$600,000 over 3 years.</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1993</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Cost-shared Programs HQ has responsibility for project selection and contributions management contributions. Regions share in decisions on these and have responsibilities for implementation of agreements and monitoring cost sharing implications of projects. Projects funded will involve a partnership between HRL, the province, and provincial and national institutions.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Titles & Dates: The initiatives have not been evaluated by the Program Evaluation Division.</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

The Program Evaluation Division participated with the former Secretary of State Department in developing an evaluation framework for the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities. The Division also developed an evaluation framework for Health and Welfare Canada's component of the Strategy which includes references to these initiatives. Both frameworks were completed in March 1992.

PROGRAM: WOMEN'S PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: 1987, Standing Committee held cross-country hearings. Report noted gender equality not attained. Wage discrepancy noted as prime example. Family violence and sexual assault cited as examples of lack of social justices. Identified further efforts to ensure affordable day care, access to health, equality of treatment by the law and recognition of women's legal rights. Women's direct participation in political decision-making was seen to be slow; need for more appointments etc. Identified urgency of doubly-disadvantaged-visible minorities, etc.
2.	Program objective(s): MC/87 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase public understanding and encourage action on equality issues. 2. Promote organizational development of women's groups and increase their effectiveness in working toward equality for women. 3. Promote actions by institutions and organizations to incorporate women's equality issues.
3.	Legislative Basis: SEC Act. Program created in 1973 in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.
4.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: All Canadian residents.
5.	Number of participants 1992-93: N/A
6.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: <u>11,165 M</u> Operating Costs: FTES: _____ \$: _____
7.	First year of operation: \$.223 (1973-74)
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation Report of the Women's Program (SEC), 1993.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Keys Evaluation Issues:** Proposed renewal of program, its mandate, its funding criteria were concerns that drove the evaluation particularly in light of earlier decisions to change criteria and reduce funding which were later reversed
 - Continued relevance of the mandate.
 - Impacts intended and unintended.
 - Program delivery - effectiveness and strategies
 - Alternatives.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** 3 contracted sub-studies
 1. in-depth interviews with program officers and funded groups plus case studies.
 2. focus groups involving men and women not affiliated with any group funded by the program.
 3. mail survey of all groups funded in 1991-92 and a documentary analysis.
All studies synthesized in report written by Program Evaluation Directorate.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:**
 1. Significant problem at community level because of changed role of social development officers, turn-over and lack of knowledge and experience.
 2. Most identified that progress that has been made over past two decades is fragile.
 3. Violence, particularly as expressed against young, immigrant and elderly women not being adequately dealt with.
 4. Doubly disadvantaged women generally require more attention from the program.
 5. Funding criteria were found to be unclear and failed to identify program priorities re funding.
 6. Direct impact of WP is seen as positive. Level of funding and support provided by staff seen as inadequate in relation to government objectives.
 7. Networking identified as a major strength.
 8. Promotion of institutional change identified as the major weakness.
 9. Application process considered inefficient and unwieldy and working against program success.
4. **Lessons Learned/Recommendations:**
 - client services emphasis has become too administratively oriented; there is a need for greater emphasis for technical assistance and guidance.
 - established groups and organizations funded by the program should be required to address the program's priorities (see #5).
 - develop an accountability/evaluation framework that describes indicators, measures to be used to measure impact and data to be collected.
 - become more proactive in the development of ensuring into a research is to shared amongst groups.
 - provide training in models of institutional change.
 - consistency required for monitoring and reporting.
 - reduce staff turn-over.
 - solicit specific projects that will be consistent with program priorities.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. Outstanding Issues:

1. Doubly disadvantaged (visible minorities, immigrant, rural, students, elderly women) being neglected although they are identified as a program priority.
2. Greater emphasis required on working with institutions to promote change.

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

1. Standing Committee on SEC "Fairness in Funding" House of Commons, May 87.
2. 3 sub-studies.

PROGRAM: DISABLED PERSONS PARTICIPATION PROGRAM (DPPP)**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. Program Rationale/Background: The program was designed as a program to increase the effective participation and contribution of disabled persons to Canadian social, cultural and economic life.

2. Program objective(s):

1. To enhance the capacity for disabled persons to effectively represent their rights and responsibilities as Canadian Citizens;
2. To support the development of the community based mechanisms aimed at addressing attitudinal, institutional and informational barriers which exclude disabled persons from integration into Canadian society; and
3. To facilitate the development by disabled persons of innovative approaches to participating fully in the social and economic life of Canada.

3. Legislative Basis: The Secretary of State Act.

4. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Any organization, group or person supporting the empowerment of persons with disabilities.

5. Number of participants 1992-93: Cannot be determined. Forecast of grants: 325.

6. Resources 1992-93:

Grants and Contributions: \$: 6,380,000

Operating Costs: * FTES: _____ \$: _____

* Figures available only for Citizenship Development Sector

7. First year of operation: Separated from the Voluntary Action Program in 1986.

8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Secretary of State, Evaluation of the Disablead Persons Participation Program, March 28, 1991.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. Keys Evaluation Issues:

Specific issues addressed included:

1. Is there a continuing rationale for the program?
2. How effective is the DPPP in meeting its objective?
3. What are the impacts of the funded projects or organizations on disabled persons as individuals?
4. Can the funding process be improved?

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:

1. Review of existing documentation, studies and reports.
2. In-depth review of 196 project files.
3. National Mail-out survey of 270 organizations.
4. In-depth interviews.
5. Case-studies.

3. Findings/Conclusions:

1. There is a continuing need for existence of program. The program makes sense as a mechanism to meet the needs of persons with disabilities and it is an efficient mean for addressing attitudinal barriers and systemic barriers. Need to fine-tune.
2. The program has supported organizations of and for disabled persons where little was done before. There is lack of agreement among clientele as to the role of DPPP in facilitating linkages among organizations.
3. The program has achieved significant spin-off effects. Funded organizations have contributed to changes in policies affecting persons with disabilities.
4. Program funding criteria are clear and understood. Funding process needs to be improved: the process does not appear to be well understood by clientele.

4. Lessons Learned/Recommendations: The program has been effective, particularly in creating public awareness and understanding, improving the information available, and facilitating the formation of coalitions or alliances in matters affecting persons with disabilities. Some overlap in mandates exists between the DPPP and the Status of the Disabled Persons Secretariat. It was recommended that the mandate be fine-tuned to eliminate confusion and overlap. A further recommendation was made on the need for better articulation of project objectives in order to allow for results identification. A final recommendation was made on shifting emphasis to increased technical assistance from project funding in order to better help new and emerging groups.

5. Outstanding Issues: Follow-up of recommendations.

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

Appendix A: Data Collection Instruments

Appendix B: Detailed findings by Issue

**PROGRAM: CANADA STUDENT LOANS PROGRAM (IN STUDENT ASSISTANCE
BRANCH)**

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The mandate of the Student Assistance Branch is to make post-secondary education more accessible to those in need by administering the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP). Under the current CSLP, the federal government guarantees loans, made by private sector lenders, and pays the interest while full-time students with demonstrated financial need are in school. These loans are not intended to meet all the costs of education but are expected to supplement resources available to students from their families, employment and other sources. The CSLP is administered in collaboration with provincial governments who also operate their own student assistance programs.
If borrowers are temporarily ill or unemployed after their studies, the government may assume the payment of the interest on the loan for up to 18 months of interest relief. If borrowers default, the government pays the principal and accrued interest to the lender and attempts to recover the debt through private collection agencies, legal agents, and income tax set-offs.
2. **Program objective(s):** The objective is to ensure that all qualified students are able to obtain some financial support to further their education.
3. **Legislative Basis:** The CSLP is an ongoing statutory program. The legal framework is the Canada Student Loans Act and Regulations.
4. **Clientele/eligibility - Clients/Stakeholders:**
Direct beneficiaries: post-secondary students attending universities, community colleges, and private vocational schools.
Other stakeholders: post-secondary institutions, provincial governments, lending institutions, student and education associations.
5. **Number of participants 1992-93:** In the year 1992, there were 247,044 full-time students who had negotiated loans for a value of \$742 M.
6. **Resources 1992-93:** Estimated statutory expenditures for 1993-94 are \$489,516,000. These include interest payments, claims and alternative payments to Quebec and the Northwest Territories who have opted out of the Program. In addition, an estimated \$4 million will be spent for administrative fees to the provinces. 1993-94

FTEs	91		
Salary	\$3.4 million	Operating	\$2.5 million
7. **First year of operation:** Direct aid to students began in 1939. CSLP (per se) began in 1964/65.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Nota Bien: A Plan not an evaluation! "Canada Student Loans Program: Evaluation Plan"
Evaluation and Audit Branch, Secretary of State Department; March 31, 1993. (see attached document)

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Keys Evaluation Issues:** There are eight issues covered by the Plan; the first five fall under the rubric of continuous performance monitoring:
 1. Access to post-secondary education.
 2. Needs Assessment processes.
 3. Completion of programs by students.
 4. Default reduction.
 5. Impact on co-sponsors.
 6. Rationale for the program.
 7. Role of the CSLP and other student assistance.
 8. Alternatives to the program.

Current Pressure Points:

On August 16, 1993, the Prime Minister announced a comprehensive package of reforms for the CSLP. Beginning in 1994-95, loan limits will be increased for full and part-time students; flexibility will be provided for students with disabilities or in special circumstances; a national program of deferred grants will be established; interest relief will be expanded to include low-income borrowers; special opportunities grants will be provided to students with disabilities, certain students "at risk", and women in doctoral studies; a new financing arrangement will be implemented, subject to passage of legislation and conclusion of lender contracts which is expected to significantly reduce default costs; and this new way of financing the Program will provide for fair costs to borrowers in repayment, lower costs to taxpayers and reasonable compensation for lenders.

Consequently, the current pressure point is to proceed rapidly with the implementation of the reforms which are scheduled to become effective on August 1, 1994. A number of these reforms will be subject to further consultations with the provinces, lenders, student and education associations.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methods to be used:
 1. Assessment and refinement of administrative data bases.
 2. Personal interviews.
 3. Mail surveys: co-sponsors and students (several types).
 4. Management interviews.
 5. In-house merging of databases and their use.
 6. Secondary Data Analyses: eg., Statistic Canada
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Evaluation not yet undertaken.
4. **Lessons Learned/Recommendations:** Evaluation not yet undertaken.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Given the above, this is unknown at this point in time.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** "Canada Student Loan Program Analysis"; Secretary of State Department, 1986.

PROGRAM: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (NSIPD)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The National Strategy for the Integration of persons with Disabilities was developed, in part, in response to the Second Report of the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons: A Consensus for Action: The Economic Integration of Disabled Persons (June 1990). Announced on September 6, 1991, the NSIPD is to be implemented from 1991-92 to 1995-96, has a budget totalling \$157.8 million and puts in place a range of federal programs across ten federal departments and two agencies, that address the attitudinal, behavioral, informational and physical barriers restricting Canadians with disabilities from participating more fully and more fairly in the work force, in their communities and at home.
The Department of the Secretary of State was vested by Cabinet with the lead role to coordinate the development, implementation and evaluation of the NSIPD.
2. **Program objective(s):** The **overall goal** of the NSIPD is to enhance the participation of disabled persons in the social and economic mainstream of Canadian society.
The **overall objectives** are as follows:
 - **Equal access:** taking strategic action in areas of federal responsibility that demonstrate leadership and establish benchmarks for the accessibility of persons with disabilities to goods, services and facilities required for daily life.
 - **Economic integration:** taking measures to systematically alter policies and practises in order to remove barriers to the training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities.
 - **Effective participation:** involving persons with disabilities and their organizations in petitioning and educating government, the general public and disabled persons themselves as the key to redefinition of their role in Canadian society.
 The **implicit objective** of the national strategy is to encourage other levels of government and sectors of society to also take action on disability issues within their jurisdiction.
3. **Legislative Basis:** The Department of Secretary of State Act.
Cabinet Decision. Treasury Board Secretariat Decision.
4. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Some specific groups of Canadians with disabilities to be targeted by some NSIPD initiatives and activities include: low-income seniors with disabilities; homeless with mental health problems; visually impaired/print handicapped individuals; mobility impaired persons; hearing and speech impaired individuals; adults with mental handicaps; children with disabilities; disabled athletes; Indians on reserve and other aborigines with disabilities; disabled persons living in isolated communities; those who become unemployed because of a disability.
5. **Number of participants 1992-93:** Not applicable.

**PART I (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

6. **Resources 1992-93:** Coordination resources are taken from SEC's general operating funds.
7. **First year of operation:** Treasury Board Ministers granted resources for the NSIPD on August 13, 1991.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):**
Mid-term Formative Evaluation - Final Report — March 9, 1993

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Keys Evaluation Issues:** The objective of the formative evaluation was twofold: to assess the overall implementation and coordination strategy of the NSIPD and to improve further delivery of the NSIPD.

The review examined the following evaluation issues:

- monitoring/assessing the initial implementation of the NSIPD
- assessing the effectiveness of the interdepartmental approach
- identifying possible modifications/improvements to the coordination and implementation mechanisms
- assessing the effectiveness of the process utilized in developing the evaluation approach

It should be underlined that the review did not examine the impacts or effectiveness of the NSIPD, nor did it examine whether the objectives targeted were "correct" ones.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Four main data collection methods were employed: file reviews and document analysis

- files organized by department on the process of submission development
- committee files on each committee of the NSIPD
- drafts of the Memorandum to Cabinet and the Aide Mémoire
- files on the communication process & presentations made concerning the NSIPD
- interviews with partner departments and agencies, central agencies and stakeholder representatives
- interview guides developed as general frameworks for the interviews
- interviews with managers, evaluators, stakeholder representatives, ADMs, DMs and an expert panel
- issue paper based on the results of the reviews
- participants from five areas of expertise
- a survey of participating departments and agencies
- survey reporting form on budget allocation, financial information, level of implementation of the various programs.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

3. Findings/Conclusions:

conceptualization: (1) Partner departments and agencies did not discuss or attempt to reach a consensus on priorities to be addressed by the Strategy. (2) In the absence of guidance from Cabinet or central agencies, SEC could not easily provide advice to partner departments/agencies on the number or size of initiatives to be developed, or on the number of issues to be addressed. (3) Inter-departmental meeting were viewed by many as being mainly focused on information exchange and not on joint planning and coordination. (4) A perceived lack of direct consultation leads a majority of stakeholders to question the degree to which they were truly "partners" in the Strategy.

coordination: (Strong links exist between conceptualization of the Strategy and activities' coordination; elements of both constructs are present in some findings.) (1) The DM Committee has rarely met and involvement of DMs has been very minimal. (2) There is not a shared or agreed upon understanding of the role which the other committees should play in coordination, which is a source of dissatisfaction to some participants.

implementation: (1) Implementation of the Strategy has varied among departments and among programs or initiatives. (2) Disappointment was expressed over the major delays affecting the operation of the National Clearinghouse. (3) Communication problems have contributed to the difference between SEC and departments/agencies/stakeholders with regard to the Clearinghouse. (4) Funds allocated for 1991-92 were not expended under the strategy in many departments. (5) The legislative review is not complete despite passage of an Omnibus Bill (C-78) by Parliament.

communication: (1) Lack of communication was raised as an issue by members of the Strategy Committee and stakeholders. (2) The public is generally unaware of the strategy.

accountability: (1) SEC was not formally mandated to monitor participating departments and to take corrective action. (2) The accountability framework for the coordination of the Strategy is unclear. (3) SEC has been a strong proponent of the formative evaluation from the outset, indicating its willingness to be accountable.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4. Lessons Learned/Recommendations:

conceptualization: (1) There is a need to develop, at the conceptualization stage with participating departments and, to a certain extent, with stakeholders, an overall policy framework for joint planning and priority setting. (2) If stakeholders are to be "partners" in an interdepartmental Strategy, they should be consulted at the conceptualization stage so that their "buy-in" is ensure and so that the strategy reflects their concerns. (3) Guidance from central agencies regarding the magnitude of the strategy should be provided to assist departments/agencies in designing initiatives.

coordination: (1) There is a need to clearly define the role of the lead department and committees. (2) At the outset of a national strategy it is critical that responsibility for coordination and an effective mechanism be clearly defined. (3) There is also a need to coordinate and monitor program resources from the outset and to be seen by other departments as doing this. (4) At the planning stage, both the lead department and partner departments should ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for coordination.

implementation: (1) An need exists for the lead department to develop a project management philosophy for the overall Strategy.

communication: (1) A communication plan which ensures coordinated ongoing communication throughout the time frame of the Strategy is needed.

accountability: (1) The accountability framework for the strategy is unclear and the accountability of the lead department for the overall results and achievement of the strategy, and the accountability of coordinating committees should be defined.

RECOMMENDATIONS for future interdepartmental strategies

1. The designated lead department together with or mandated by Privy Council Office (PCO) should ensure that partner departments working on the development of an interdepartmental strategy discuss and identify common objectives and priorities for the strategy.
2. The accountability framework for the coordination of the interdepartmental strategy should be clearly defined in the Treasury Board strategy decision letter. The structure(s) to be used in ensuring accountability for coordination of the interdepartmental strategy should be clearly defined by the designated lead department.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. Once the scope of the interdepartmental strategy is defined, stakeholders should be consulted on the priorities of the strategy. Such consultations should be coordinated by the designated lead department. Information obtained through these consultations should be shared with all partner departments and agencies involved in the proposed strategy.
4. The designated lead department together with partner departments should develop an overall plan for collective activities of the interdepartmental strategy. This plan should identify a timetable for implementation and completion, and responsibility for major programs, initiatives or legislative reviews which are to be conducted as part of the strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS for the NSIPD

5. The Secretary of State, as the lead department, should ensure that terms of reference are developed for each committee used in the coordination of the NSIPD and that adequate support services be provided to these committees.
6. The Committee structure for the interdepartmental coordination of the Strategy should be streamlined and reduced in number. The Deputies' Committee should meet and review progress to date on the Strategy and reach a decision to either formally delegate its responsibilities for coordinating and monitoring the Strategy to the ADMs' Steering Committee or agree on another approach to ensure the implementation of the Strategy within the planned time frame.
7. The National Strategy Working Group should monitor, on a semi-annual basis, operational progress on the Strategy. All partner departments and agencies should provide the committee with information on program resources and major activities completed.
8. The ADMs committee should be encouraged (within existing authorities) to redistribute funds, at risk of lapsing or being permanently reprofiled to non-Strategy activities.
9. The Secretary of State should allocate sufficient resources for the efficient and effective interdepartmental coordination of activities of the Strategy.
10. The Secretary of State should clarify expectations vis-à-vis the National Clearinghouse and prepare a full progress report on the status and operations of the National Clearinghouse on Disability Issues, along with an action plan and timetable for the full implementation of the Clearinghouse. This should then be communicated to stakeholders and departmental/agency personnel.
11. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the partner departments, should also prepare an action plan and timetable for the completion of the legislative review.
12. The National Strategy Working Group, in consultation with the Communication Committee of the NSIPD, should develop an action plan to increase and maintain public and stakeholder knowledge of the Strategy.
13. A project management philosophy and approach should be adopted and

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

5. Outstanding Issues:

- Implementation of an action plan for the overall Strategy.
- Allocation of resources for the coordination of the National Strategy.

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

Evaluation Framework of the Overall Initiative — April 16, 1992

TITLE: VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OF DISABLED PERSONS	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale: Facilitate provincial development of programs to assist disabled persons to pursue employment.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objectives: To enable the federal government, under time-limited agreements, to contribute 50% of the costs incurred by provinces and territories in providing a comprehensive program to enable persons with disabilities to pursue employment.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: VRDP Act 1961. Time-limited agreements subject to periodic renewal.</p>	
<p>4a Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Direct clients are provinces/territories under terms of VRDP Act and agreements.</p>	
<p>4b Number of Participants: All provinces have signed the 1990-93 agreement. All provinces except Newfoundland, Quebec and Saskatchewan have already signed the 1993-96 Agreement. Each year, over 20,000 persons benefit from VRDP, including: persons who are disabled because of psychiatric, sensorial, intellectual or learning impairments and/or impairment related to mobility or to alcohol/drug addiction; persons who are at risk of losing their job due to a disability.</p>	
<p>5. Resources: 1993-94 transfer payment allocation: \$164 million</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1961</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Program delivery is decentralized to regions. Review and analysis of provincial submissions are the responsibility of regional staff. HQ provides support for complex program issues and policy interpretation. The agreement renewal process and program/policy development and coordination are the responsibility of HQ.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Titles & Dates VRDP has never been evaluated by the Program Evaluation Division.</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

The Program Evaluation Division has not conducted an evaluation of VRDP.

LABOUR PROGRAMS

TITLE:	FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICES - EVALUATION STUDY (FIRST STUDY)
PART 1 PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Bakground: Harmonious labour-management relations are an important aspect of maintaining and enhancing competitiveness of Canadian industry in a global marketplace.
2.	Program Objectives(s): Facilitate and sustain stable industrial relations; collect and disseminate labour-related information and statistics; foster constructive labour management-government relations.
3.	Legislative Basis: Part I and Part III (Unjust Dismissal), Canada Labour Code.
4A.	Clientele: Over 600,000 unionized and non-unionized employees in the federal jurisdiction.
4B	Number of Participants 1992-93:
5.	Resources 1993-94: \$4,618,000 and 62 FTE's
6.	First year of operation: Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services were first introduced in 1900. The current Canada Labour Code, Part I came into effect 1973.
7.	Program Delivery: Primarily headquarters with support from 5 regional offices.
8.	Evaluation title and date: Program Evaluation Study: Service Delivery of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, April 1993.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The project was initiated in the interest of improving the delivery of the range of services offered by the FMCS.
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Interviews with a broad cross section of FMCS clients (representing industries and geographical regions) and key informants within FMCS.
3. **Conclusions and Directions:** Challenge: Keeping up a good reputation - FMCS has a strong reputation for service. The challenge is to maintain the existing high level of service, improve in some areas, and extend the service line to include more preventive mediation.
 Potential basis for Service Standards - Clients for mediation and conciliation place a high value on settlement momentum and judge FMCS services in terms of its contribution to settlements; clients acknowledge that there is no one best way to resolve a dispute and appear to measure "responsiveness" in terms of mediator/conciliator adaptability to particular exigencies. Even though the mediator/conciliator must tailor services to meet the needs of individual bargaining situations, a mechanism for on-going client feedback and satisfaction, focusing on settlement momentum, could be developed.
 Service Delivery through People - There is a strong need for continued development of staff and human resource planning. People issues should be paramount in developing FMCS service strategies.
 Expanding the Range of Services - Clients expressed a widespread interest in and readiness for a preventive mediation approach. It is recognized that it will have to be a customized approach and the following questions will have to be addressed in its development: How should preventive mediation be structured? How can FMCS ensure that there is a balanced allocation of resources for preventive mediation and that intervening in disputes does not draw all the resources? How adaptable is the current FMCS team to the new approach? To what extent will FMCS technical support services have to be adjusted to accommodate a preventive mediation approach? To what extent will the MARS information system require enhancements to allow for expanded preventive mediation activities?
4. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Confirmation of good reputation among clients for mediation and conciliation and arbitration and adjudication.
 FMCS should move to preventive mode through educational and preventative mediation services.
 Given that quality service delivery is heavily reliant on highly qualified and experienced staff, there is a strong need for development of staff and human resource planning.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Cost-effectiveness: Currently there are 5 regional offices - are these required or could the service be offered out of headquarters?

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Literature Review of Service Delivery of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, April 1993 (English)
Draft: Profile of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, August,1992 (Revised April, 1993)
- Assessment: Technical Support and Operational Services, 1987 (English)
- Assessment: Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, 1983 (English)

TITLE:	LABOUR OPERATIONS - OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (OSH)
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Labour Codes constitute an essential part of the state infrastructure of democratic free market societies. Minimum health and safety has been high on the priority agenda for the federal government for the last eight years.
2.	Program objective: To prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of, linked with, or occurring in the course of work.
3.	Legislative Basis: Canada Labour Code Part II.
4.	Program Clients: All employers and employees in the federal jurisdiction industries.
5.	Resources: \$11.78 million dollars (approximately 250 FTE's at Headquarters and in the regions)
6.	First year of operations: Late 1970 some safety and health provisions: 1986 current OSH legislation in effect.
7.	Program Delivery: Labour affairs officers in the regions who visit and inspect the worksites; policy, legislative development and technical expertise are delivered from headquarters.
8.	Evaluation titles and dates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A: Evaluation Study: Occupational Safety and Health Program B: Framework: Methodology for Policy and Management Review of the Effectiveness of the Safety and Health Program C: Study: Workplace Safety and Health Conference, Hamilton, 1991 D: Study: Compliance Monitoring in Canadian Grain Elevators: An Evaluation of the Grain Dust Surveillance Program, 1992 E: Study: Impact of the Labour Canada Occupational Safety and Health Program: An Econometric Analysis, 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

A: EVALUATION STUDY: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The 1989-90 evaluation of the Occupational Safety and Health Program focused on three issues:
 - Issues 1:** Targeting: To what extent does the allocation of resources to program targets result in an optimization of effectiveness of the OSH program?
 - Issue 2:** Mix of Activities: To what extent is the current mix of activities within the OSH program effective in the delivery of the legislative and compliance policy mandate and the long and short term objectives of the program?
 - Issue 3:** Data System: To what extent do the OSH program data systems provide information needed to support management decisions with respect to the stated objectives of the program?

2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Document review; focus groups; stakeholder and expert interviews; major survey; specialists panel.

3. Findings/Conclusions:

Targeting

A multi-factored targetting process is in place for "proactive" activities, which take approximately one-half of the field's OSH time.

Sites of high risk to safety are the primary targeting focus; particular industrial sectors are a secondary focus.

Targeting is constrained by vast geography, national versus regional or district targeting and previous targeting.

Identifying appropriate effectiveness measures is a complex task which has implications for consistency. LOIS (Labour Operations Information System) assists with improved data analysis.

Mix of Activities

It is difficult to measure for separate and incremental impacts of various "activity" packages, and there are no mechanisms in place to assess how appropriate each alternative approach to a client is.

Headquarters support for field activities is good, with "strong technical support", LAO training and "client-oriented" promotional and educational materials.

Data Systems

Problems are inherent in the collectiton of OSH data, one problem being lack of agreement concerning overall effectiveness measures. Linkages with various data bases (provincial Workers Compensation Boards) should be further promoted, along with sentinel systems to provide a forewarning of potential issues or problems.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A1. Recommendations

1. The OSH program continue to develop and exploit available data, data systems and information technologies to improve program delivery. Specifically, that:
 - LOIS continue to be developed and maintained.
 - Accident information collection be improved.
 - Additional data be collected from various sources on both safety and health issues.
 - Services to support and maximize LAO delivery activities be enhanced.
 - The program explore the possibility of developing a sentinel system to capture early warnings of occupational safety and health risks.
 - Objective approaches and techniques for targeting resources be refined, formalized and promulgated across the program.
 - The program reinforce the OSH focus, strategies and priorities to all levels.
 - The econometric study be completed and reviewed by a reconvened ad hoc Steering Committee and a decision be reached on whether to continue/extend this pilot analytical work to other regions.

4A. Operational Lessons Learned:

- Program is functioning well and managed well given the current level of resourcing. Headquarters support to field activities is good but more use should be made of injury statistics, more educational activities undertaken and educational materials provided. Research indicates a link between enforcement and compliance but not between compliance and a safer, more healthful workplace. The program now targets work sites of highest risk to safety by using the frequency and severity of hazardous occurrences as the main criteria for targeting, but there is as yet little evidence of positive program impact (see OSH Econometric and Grain Dust studies). Proposed: A sentinel system to capture early warnings of occupational safety and health risks.

4B. Policy Lessons Learned:**5. Outstanding Issues:**

- Maximum utilization of OSH data for an optimal allocation of OSH resources; ways to support and maximize LAOs delivery activities.
 The effectiveness of the Labour Canada regulatory review process.
 Has better tiering (targeting) of work sites led to more program effectiveness?

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

Evaluation Assessment of the Labour Canada Occupational Safety and Health Program, August 1989 (the report contains the program profile and issues and options for evaluation).

An Econometric Study of the Labour Canada Occupational Safety and Health Program, January, 1993; Compliance Monitoring in Canadian Grain Elevators, September, 1992. (See OSH: D&E.)

TITLE: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
B FRAMEWORK: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH - SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMITTEES AND REPRESENTATIVES (SIIC/R)

PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The safety and health committees are based on a philosophy of voluntary compliance and recognition of joint and collaborative responsibility of management and employees for OSH. Legislating mandatory committees gives rise to the desired management-employee collaboration.
2. **Program objective:** To prevent accidents and injuries; to make occupational safety and health the shared and cooperative responsibility of employees and management; to involve all workers in ensuring occupational safety and health; to make compliance with OSH regulation a matter of the internal responsibility system.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Amendments to Part II of the Labour Canada Code (March 1986).
4. **Program Clients:** Committee members; unions; all employers and employees in the workplace (federal jurisdiction).
5. **First year of operations:** 1987-88
7. **Program Delivery:** Program delivery via the regional and district offices through compliance inspections by safety officers (Labour Affairs Officers).
8. **Evaluation title and date:**
 Information Analysis of Safety and Health Committees and Representatives: A Framework of Methodology for Policy and Management Review of the Effectiveness of Safety and Health Committees and Representatives, March 1987.

[Note: For specific background information on the OSH program, see Part I: Study Evaluation of Occupational Safety and Health.]

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The purpose of the framework was to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for a policy and management review of SHC/R.
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Document and literature review; interviews with program staff; LOIS data analysis.
3. **Conclusions deriving from the framework:** For purposes of policy analysis a survey of Safety and Health Committees and representatives is needed; a survey of "mature" committees which are known to have existed before legislation came into force would provide an insight into compliance problems and their impact on accident and injury reporting.
- 4A. **Recommendations:** A survey of 1,500 representatives and 1,000 committees be undertaken within the next 3-5 years; the Department undertake small surveys of "mature" committees and "exempt" representatives within the next eighteen months; the capacity of LOIS to undertake analysis of SHC/Rs be developed.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Information related to compliance with the regulations was readily available; information related to the effectiveness of SHC/R and the standards of "best practices" was not.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Do well-performing SHC/Rs result in better OSH performance with respect to accidents and injury rates.
There will be difficulty in linking the SHC/R performance to prevention of accidents and injury to health; an impact study will be required.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**
Thomas A. Kochan, Lee Dyer and David B. Lipsky, The Effectiveness of Union-Management Safety and Health Committees, 1977.

TITLE: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
C: STUDY: WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH CONFERENCE EVALUATION,
OCTOBER, 1991

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:**
Conference Rationale
Organization Content
Conference Process
Conference Results
Achievement of Objectives
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Document review; key informant interviews (5); interviews with speakers and chairpersons (5); on-site observation; survey of attenders; evaluation of individual sessions.
3. **Conclusions and Recommendations:** This was Labour Canada's first undertaking a national Conference of this type. Given this fact, and other situational constraints, the WSH Conference can be rated a general success.
 - A. **Rationale:** A consensus exists on a real need for better information on WSH-related issues, information exchange forums among WSH policy makers, and consultations among the groups involved with WSH.
 - B. **Organization:** Although it confronted considerable challenges, the organization of the conference was generally handled well. Given the fairly long lead time for the conference, and the turbulent nature of the environment, there were some delays and flux in the conference design. These changes may have increased the cost of the conference but they did not block the overall achievement of the objectives. The most visible negative impact delays was the failure to meet projected levels of sponsorship. Sponsorship cuts by major firms (as a result of the recession and limited media coverage of the conference), however, may have reinforced this problem.
 - C. **Conference content and results:**
The agenda was ambitiously broad.
The Conference also lacked pre-conference media coverage.
Overall satisfaction with the conference was good. The main strengths of the conference were the on-site organization, the Conference themes and the choice of speakers and chairs.
Attendees were satisfied with individual sessions for all dimensions except participation of attendees: respondents believed discussions and question and answer periods had been curtailed by the tight schedule and consequently, felt they had little opportunity to participate directly in the conference proceedings.

E: STUDY: THE IMPACT OF THE LABOUR CANADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, JANUARY, 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The impact of compliance/non-compliance with OSH regulations/standards on accidents/injuries.
The impact of government intervention (monitoring, enforcement and sanction) on accidents/injuries.
Effectiveness of inspection targeting.
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:**
Literature review, regression (the limited dependent variable model).
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** There is a statistically high significant relationship between injuries and non-compliance with OSH regulations/standards. In the majority of cases, injuries appear associated with "violations" which had been detected nor could be detected.
A weak relationship between injuries and detected violations was reported.
AVCs (Assurance of Voluntary Compliance) were not effective since many injuries were not directly caused by inspected violations.
The effects of monitoring and investigative activities in workplace safety varied. The estimated coefficients although highly significant, had different signs for different regions. In the Central region, the coefficient has a correct sign, showing an impact; in the Mountain region, the coefficient sign is incorrect, indicating no impact.
Inspection targeting in the regions studied was less than optimal because inspections were assigned according to violation, rather than injury frequency.
- 4A. **Evaluation Lessons Learned:** It is difficult to detect early violations of regulations/standards, which are "performance" oriented and not "design oriented"
Inspections activities should be targeted to injury related violations.
5. **Outstanding Effectiveness Issues:** How can one detect early violations of performance standards?
Methods to increase voluntary self-compliance are required.
Determination of safety and health risks which are acceptable to the workplace and society.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Evaluation of the Occupational Safety and Health Program, June 1990. (See A.)

D: STUDY: COMPLIANCE MONITORING IN CANADIAN GRAIN ELEVATORS: AN EVALUATION OF THE GRAIN DUST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Relationship between government compliance monitoring and a decline of grain dust level.
Effectiveness of employer's self-compliance vs. government compliance monitoring.
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Literature review, document review, interviews, regression analysis.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** There is a good indication that the grain dust surveys have contributed to some degree to a decline of grain dust levels.
Employers may have improved the physical environment (i.e., modernization of ventilation equipment) to reduce harm caused by airborne concentration of grain dust. Most grain elevators maintain a low level of dust concentration (at 5mg/m³ or less), so there would be less need for testing out the TLV compliance (required) across the country.
- 4A. **Policy and Operational Lessons Learned:** Review of the present TLV guidelines (i.e., 10mg/m³) is required.
Development of selective sampling strategies as opposed to random sampling strategies should be considered.
- 4B. **Evaluation Lessons Learned:** There is enormous difficulty in linking grain dust to injury to health.
Grain dust inspections continue to be a good way to monitor workplace safety and health.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Methods for linking environmental data to health data.
New approaches for inspection of grain dust survey.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Final Program Evaluation Report of the Environmental and Medical Surveillance Program in the Grain Industry by OSH branch. (The study examines the effect of grain dust exposure on respiratory health in the grain industry using the samples collected over the cycle I and II, a longitudinal study.)

E: STUDY: THE IMPACT OF THE LABOUR CANADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, JANUARY, 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The impact of compliance/non-compliance with OSH regulations/standards on accidents/injuries.
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AVCs (Assurance of Voluntary Compliance) were not effective since many injuries were not directly caused by inspected violations.
The effects of monitoring and investigative activities in workplace safety varied. The estimated coefficients although highly significant, had different signs for different regions. In the Central region, the coefficient has a correct sign, showing an impact; in the Mountain region, the coefficient sign is incorrect, indicating no impact.
Inspection targeting in the regions studied was less than optimal because inspections were assigned according to violation, rather than injury frequency.
- 4A. **Evaluation Lessons Learned:** It is difficult to detect early violations of regulations/standards, which are "performance" oriented and not "design oriented"
Inspections activities should be targeted to injury related violations.
5. **Outstanding Effectiveness Issues:** How can one detect early violations of performance standards?
Methods to increase voluntary self-compliance are required.
Determination of safety and health risks which are acceptable to the workplace and society.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Evaluation of the Occupational Safety and Health Program, June 1990. (See A.)

TITLE: LABOUR OPERATIONS - LABOUR STANDARDS AND EQUAL PAY
STUDY: LABOUR STANDARDS OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT, DECEMBER
 1991

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Labour Codes constitute an essential part of the state infrastructure of democratic free market societies where minimum labour standards are set to protect employees from unfair workplace practices. The program had its beginnings when the department was formed at the turn of the century.
2. **Program Objectives:** In the federal jurisdiction, to establish and protect employee's rights to fair and equitable conditions of employment consistent with prevailing social economic conditions.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Canada Labour Code, Part III and Canada Labour Standards Regulations; Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Act; Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Regulations.
- 4A. **Program Clients:** All employers and employees across Canada engaged in federal works, undertakings or business, such as inter-provincial and international rail, air, marine and road transportation; telecommunications, broadcasting; banks; certain crown corporations; the nuclear fusion sector; grain handling and long shoring (approximately 650,000 employees)
5. **Resources 1993-94:**
 Headquarters: \$5.7M (Salaries) + .9M (Operating & Capital) = \$6.6M (SOB)
6. **First year of operation:** 1900 (first Labour Legislation)
7. **Program Delivery:** Front line delivery by the Labour Affairs officers working out of the district and regional offices; headquarters develops the policy and the framework for the program.
8. **Evaluation title and date:**
 Program Evaluation Study: Labour Standards Operations, Program Evaluation Study, Final Report, December 1991.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Roles and Responsibilities: What are the current and preferred roles and responsibilities of the major players in the program, namely Labour Canada, unions, employers and employees?
 Shifting Environment: What are the current factors in the external labour environment that affect the federally-regulated labour market? What are the challenges and barriers that Labour Canada will face in its effort to adapt to these changes?
 Fairness and Equity: To what extent do clients perceive the program to be fair and equitable? Is treatment equal across all client groups; for example, across regions, company size, unionization and industrial sector? Should all client groups receive equal treatment?
 Mix and Level of Activities and Resources: What is the current and preferred level and mix of program resources and activities? Is the ratio of non-mandatory and mandatory activities adequate? Do clients prefer universal or selective coverage of complaints?
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Documentation review; focus groups; key informant interviews; administrative data review; survey of employers; survey of employees; delphi panel of experts.
3. **Findings:**

Roles and Responsibilities:
 The majority of key informants (representing employers and Labour Canada) were satisfied with the role currently played by Labour Canada - affecting a balance between the rights and interests of employees and employers.
 Key informants (representing employees) were the least satisfied with the existing arrangement of roles, believing that Labour Canada has been too passive in its response to the education and enforcement needs of its clients.
 When asked about preferences regarding the role of Labour Canada, a strong majority of surveyed employers and employees indicated the need for a more consultative, facilitator role, though views varied significantly by region. Conversely, key informants (from Labour Canada and the employee's organizations) preferred a more aggressive and interventionist role for Labour Canada in federal labour standards.
 Overall, the main direction for change promoted by "grassroots clients" (surveyed employers and employees) is for Labour Canada to become a facilitator in a co-operative process of dispute resolution between employees and employers.
 There was no consensus on the extent to which Labour Canada should vary its treatment of clients and client interventions in mandatory and non-mandatory activities.
 The existing compliance policy with its focus on enforcement and the program's consultative approach to regulation corresponds to the "facilitator" role preferred by most clients.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

Shifting Environment:

Increasingly, Labour Canada will be faced with the demands from workers to protect their interest and improve working conditions, while employers are expressing concern about being able to face more intense competitions.

Tendencies are expected to create pressures to strengthen and ensure the comprehensiveness of standards and their associated enforcement mechanisms.

Delphi panelists predicted a move toward deregulation and relaxed enforcement of federal labour standards.

There is a climate of change which will have implications for the Labour Standards Operations Program. The evolution of the labour environment is generating ambiguous pressures. On the one hand, there are forces to weaken federal standards and the operation of the program and, on the other hand, there are forces to increase its comprehensiveness.

Fairness and Equity:

Equality of Treatment:

The transportation sector receives more visits from Labour Canada than other industry. This pattern holds when examining inspections, response to complaints and education.

Education and inspection activities are more frequent in the Atlantic provinces, especially when compared to other regions such as Great Lakes or Mountain, where complaint activities are most frequent.

Responses to complaints were twice as frequent in unionized settings when compared to non-unionized ones; program activities did not differ by company size.

Equality of program outcomes (as measured by levels of understanding of the program):

Approximately half of surveyed employers and employees agreed that they had a good understanding of Labour Canada's role and activities; employers from large companies reported relatively greater understanding.

Employers from large companies and from unionized companies were somewhat more knowledgeable.

Fairness of the Program:

Surveyed employers and employees were asked to comment on the fairness of labour standards legislation and the interpretation and application of the legislation by Labour Canada. Employees indicated a slightly higher level of satisfaction than employers. Both rated the fairness of the department's interpretation and application of the legislation higher than the fairness of the legislation itself.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

Employer informants named unjust dismissal and hours of work provisions as unfair; employee representatives focused on the dispute resolution process.

The findings support the general conclusion that the program can accommodate considerable flexibility in delivery and application without decreasing effectiveness.

The program already uses a tiering system, based on violation rates, for non-mandatory inspection activities and education.

The study found that the Atlantic Region reports fewer violations and has marginally more resources. The Steering Committee discussions concluded that the resource differential was too small to effectively re-distribute across the country at this point in time.

Mix and Level of Activities and Resources:

The majority of program clients were in favour of changes to the program, but there was less consensus on what type of alternative program options should be adopted. Respondents appeared to be more receptive to changes in the complaint process itself.

Employers, employees and key informants, all agreed that the existing client "education" was insufficient. Most respondents also felt that a reduction in resources allotted to mandatory activities would be acceptable in order to increase funds for education efforts.

There was support for a cost-recovery option whereby Labour Canada's intervention is charged back to employers who are found to be in violation of federal labour standards - employees as compared to employers were more likely to endorse this option.

For example, surveyed employers and employees were in general agreement with the notion of stratifying complaints so that "some were responded to immediately and others on a priority basis". There was strong support for a procedure through which "certain types of complaints are handled by Labour Canada and others resolved internally by the employee and employer".

**4A1. Recommendations:
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

Recommendation 1: Continuing emphasis on co-operation, with a view to maintaining a balance between enforcement and self-regulation.

The principle of a co-operative approach to the design and administration of the labour standards program should be reemphasized in the current legislative review of Part III of the Code. In applying the Code, the department should maintain a balance between Labour Canada's role as an enforcer and client participation in self-regulation.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

THE SHIFTING ENVIRONMENT

Recommendation 2: Increase awareness of existing information.

Labour Canada should make a concerted effort to ensure that employers and employees are aware of information on the labour environment which is already made available by the Department.

Recommendation 3: Undertake more strategic analysis.

Labour Canada should undertake more strategic analysis in support of long-term policy directions and, where possible, appropriate summaries should be made available for client information.

Recommendation 4: Promote understanding of national and international labour standards.

Labour Canada should promote more information to its clients on the Department's activities at the interprovincial and international levels and pursue discussions at these levels aimed at a common understanding, and if possible, greater harmonization, of labour standards.

FAIRNESS AND EQUITY

Recommendation 5: Targeting of resources.

Proactive resources should continue to be targeted in areas with high non-compliance rates. These areas can be defined in terms of sector and should include smaller, non-unionized work places. The LOIS data base, should be used extensively in the determination of areas for inspection.

Recommendation 6: Relationship between proactive activities and compliance.

The program should undertake a study to determine the relationship of proactive activities on compliance outcomes.

MIX AND LEVEL OF RESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES

Recommendation 7: Refocussing of Educational Activities.

It is recommended that the client education component be given a higher priority and that the current activity be refocussed. There is a need to recognize and accommodate the differing needs of various target segments (e.g., large v. small firms; employers v. employees; unionized v. non-unionized; different industry groups.)

Recommendation 8: Procedures for responding to complaints (mandatory activities).

The program should investigate the feasibility for implementing procedures to establish priorities among complaints. This might include mechanisms whereby employers and employees would be encouraged to use their internal mechanisms for complaints before they reach Labour Canada. This would streamline the complaint

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

Recommendation 9: Cost-recovery.

Labour Canada should pursue the development of cost-recovery options with respect to the delivery of labour standards service to clients.

4A. Operational Lessons Learned:

Implications:

- 1) Current compliance policy approach to regulatory enforcement is supported by both employers and employees.
- 2) A more selective approach to complaint response would be supported by a majority of clients (2/3 of complaints are found to be unjustified).
- 3) Employers and employees are requesting more educational and dispute resolution activities in the workplace. These could be funded, at least in part, from the curtailment of complaint responses (see 2).
- 4) Clients refer to the federal government for information in regard to workplace issues.
- 5) Clients consider tripartite consultations on regulatory changes an effective means of developing and modifying federal labour standards.
- 6) Program has potential for cost-recovery.

Things to monitor in future:

Group termination provisions: may have to be improved in order to deal with the effects of economic globalization, technological change, deregulation and privatization.
Aging of the workforce: may require changes in pensions and benefits (i.e., sick leave and retirement).

Implementation of NAFTA: may lead to less extensive application of standards.

4B. Policy Lessons Learned:

Evaluation study findings and recommendations can have wide ranging policy implications for departmental boundaries which extend beyond the program under question. Policy representatives should be part of the steering or advisory committees.

5. Outstanding Issues: Do conditions of work still need to be regulated in Canada?

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies: Profile of the Labour Canada Labour Standards Program (January 1990) (English and French); Survey of Wages and Working Conditions (September, 1984); Conditions of Work Program (1983).

TITLE:	LABOUR OPERATIONS - LABOUR STANDARDS AND EQUAL PAY
STUDY:	REVIEW OF EQUAL PAY PROGRAM, EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS, JANUARY 1989
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The Program is a legislative requirement which recognizes that setting or maintaining differences in wage scales for male and female employees in the same establishment and who perform work of equal value is a discriminatory practice. This program addresses the issue through the compliance policy, which combines an inspection and governmental program for employees and employers.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective: To increase the compliance (of employers in the federal jurisdiction) with the provision of equal pay for work of equal value legislation in order to improve the economic well-being of female workers in federal jurisdiction industries.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Canada Labour Code, Part III, Section 38.1 and Canadian Human Rights Act, Section 11.</p>	
<p>4. Clientele: All employers within the federal jurisdiction.</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1993-94:</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: Legislation, 1977; Division established, 1984</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Headquarters for policy and training and the regional and district LAO's for actual delivery of program.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Program Evaluation Study: Review of the Equal Pay Program, January, 1989 (English)</p>	

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The study examined the implementation of the Program during the formative years of 1983 to 1988. It analyze the operational roles and relationships, communication strategies and the allocation of resources, with a view to the development of the final phase of the Program.

2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Document review; focus groups with employers; telephone and personal interviews with employers, union officials and program staff; interviews with stakeholders, union centrals and union representatives.

3. **Findings/Recommendations:** Positioning the program in Labour Standards has helped to transform equal pay from a "women's issue" to a labour issue.
The Equal Pay Program is a small vibrant program. It was implemented in a flexible manner and responsive to changing conditions.
Labour Canada appropriately followed the voluntary compliance policy in the staged implementation of the program: education and promotion of equal pay have preceded inspections.
Since the lack of a legally defined mandate for the voluntary compliance approach appears to be the crucial element, it is recommended that this be remedied the next time the Canada Labour Code is reviewed.
The organizational structure, with a small headquarters division in (former) ERCOW (current Labour Standards and Equal Pay) and the participation of LAOs in the field, is effective.
Labour Canada deliberately chose a low-key approach to education and facilitation, built around LAO visits with senior managers in employer organizations.
Communication plan which builds on the current sequence of employer visits and distinguishes among employers at various stages in the process.
Recommend the development of a more detailed equal pay kit.
Employer associations are an effective channel of communication and action and recommend that Labour Canada continue to play a catalyst role in the establishment of industry initiatives.
Effective collaboration between the Labour Canada and the Canadian Human Rights Commission is the key to implementing the present legislation.
The full implementation of the Equal Pay Program must include an inspection element. Employers expect a fair, impartial and non-bureaucratic inspection process. A targeted approach to inspection is recommended. Criteria: awareness of the issue, potential non-compliance, size, financial position and stereotypical employment.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy and Operational Lessons Learned:** The study identified the unusual circumstances where another Labour Canada component did not support the Equal Pay program, thus creating confusion in client's minds as to the federal government position.
Departmental policy process on all issues of direct interest should be made clear to all stakeholders (departmental clients and staff).
An implementation analysis study of the Labour-Management Partnership Program, Consultation and Client Services would be timely.
- 4B.** **Evaluation Lessons Learned:** Process related: A first time use of implementation analysis in Labour Canada: contributed directly to program mobilization which had been lacking by identifying the major implementation obstacle, i.e., the poor Labour Canada - CHRC working relationship.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:** Given that the program has been in operation for nearly a decade, what impact has it had on equal pay in the federal jurisdiction?
- 6.** **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** N/A

TITLE:	INJURY COMPENSATION
STUDY:	REVIEW OF OPERATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rationale/Program Objectives: To provide compensation benefits to federal employees for injuries occurring during the course of employment.	
2. Legislative Basis: The Government Employee Compensation Act (GECA).	
3. Program Clients: Employees in federal government departments and crown corporations.	
4. Budget/Resources 1993-94: \$1,662.0 million and 38 - FTE's	
5. First year of operation:	
6. Program Delivery: Program delivery via Headquarters and Regions, with 28 FTE's in the Regions and 9 FTE's in Headquarters.	
7. Evaluation title and date: Program Evaluation Study: Review of Operations under the Government Employees Compensation Act, September 1988.	

PART II
EVALUATION STUDY INFORMATION
NOTE: FRAMEWORK ONLY

- 1. Key Evaluation Issues:**
WCB charges for administration - economy.
The impact of WCB ceilings on injury compensation - equity.
The WCB-CPP/QPP overlap.
Injury-on-duty (IOD) leave and the Income Tax Act - economy.

- 2. Methodology/Data Sources:**
Regression and cost analysis.

- 3. Recommendations:**
Review and renegotiate WCB charges.
Review IOD leave administrative practices.
Enquiry into inequity occasioned by WCB compensation ceilings and into overlap.

- 4. Policy Lessons Learned:** Need to review legislation (GECA, Income Tax Act) to address economy, equity and reinstatement rights issues. (Program has been reluctant to do so.)

- 5. Outstanding Effectiveness Issues:** Are WCB charges too high or is the real issue one of delivery engineering through a federal board or the WCBs?

- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**
Federally Administered Workers Compensation, History and Evaluation, June 1987.
Evaluating Federal Administrative Charges with Baseline Measures (Vol. I & II), October 1987; Benefit Overlap: an Analysis of Injury Compensation, March, 1987.
The Impact of WCB Wage Loss Provisions, December 1987.

TITLE:	POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS - BUREAU OF LABOUR INFORMATION
FRAMEWORK:	LABOUR CANADA BUREAU OF LABOUR INFORMATION, MARCH 1991

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Background/Rationale:** Prior to the Niclsen Task Force report (1986), there were a number of divisions within the department providing labour information. The report recommended a consolidation of the overlapping areas into a "one-stop shopping" centre of labour relations information, thus, BLI was formed.

2. **BLI Objectives:** Provide accurate data concerning collective bargaining developments, wage settlements and work stoppages.
Provide a consolidated source of labour sector data for labour, management and other industrial relations practitioners.

3. **Legislative Basis:** Department of Labour Act, Section 4 (Minister of Labour) (1901) included a mandate to collect and disseminate data on labour characteristics.

4. **Program Clients:** Labour, employers, service providers/researchers and special federal government clients (Bank of Canada; Treasury Board and Finance) who utilize proprietary data compilation and analysis.

5. **Budget/Resources 1993-94:** \$555,000 (Operating); 45 - FTE's; Revenue generation: \$72,000 to Department; \$240,000 to Canada Communications Group.

6. **First year of operation:** BLI formed in April, 1987

7. **Program Delivery:** The program is situated at headquarters, with a hot-line 1-800 number for easy access from all parts of the country.

8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Program Evaluation Framework: Labour Canada Bureau of Labour Information Evaluation Framework, March, 1991

PART II
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK INFORMATION

1. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Personal interviews with staff; Working Group and Focus Group meetings; review and analysis of BLI related documents.

2. **Priority Evaluation Issues:** What are the opportunities for more cost effective alternatives to federal provision of BLI services?
What improvements in productivity and client service can be achieved through technological changes and revisions to current activities and systems?

3. **Outstanding Effectiveness Issues:** The mandate and the delivery mechanism of the organization currently are under review.

4. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Evaluation Assessment of Industrial Relations Information Service (1985), a forerunner to BLI, which was a "storefront" operation, providing personalized information service to external clients by assisting them in obtaining labour-related information produced by Labour Canada.

TITLE: EVALUATION STUDY:	POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS WOMEN'S BUREAU - MANAGEMENT REPORT - MAY 1989
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: In the 1950's there was recognition that there are problems facing women workers which should be given special attention. The government responded by creating a women's bureau within the Department of Labour.
2.	Program objective: To advance the full and equal participation of women in employment by working with key partners to effect changes in workplace policies and practices.
3.	Legislative Basis: None. Established by a new vote (#188) in the department's estimates for 1953-54.
4.	Program Clients: Other federal government organizations; provincial governments; unions; women's organizations; educational institutions; academics; the general public; international forums.
5.	Resources 1992-93: Budget/Resources: \$162,000 (Operating); 15 - FTE's
6.	First year of operations: 1954
7.	Program Delivery: Program activities are delivered through headquarters, although whenever possible, the regions are involved in distribution and promotion of the Bureau's products.
8.	Evaluation title and date: Program Evaluation Study: Evaluation of the Women's Bureau - Management Report, May, 1989

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The 1989 Women's Bureau evaluation examined three main issues:
 - Mandate and Objective: do the Bureau's activities support its mandate and objective?
 - Impact regarding Objective Achievement: What impact has the Bureau had towards the achievement of its stated objective, namely "the promotion and strengthening of the efforts of women to achieve equality in the labour force"?
 - Delivery Mechanisms: Are the Bureau's activities being delivered in the best ways (i.e., is the product in the best form - audio-visual, print, display, speech, etc.)?

2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Interviews with Women's Bureau staff, target groups within and external to Labour Canada and key informants; and, review of secondary information sources.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The overall conclusion is that the Women's Bureau has had a substantive, positive impact on the efforts of women to achieve equality in the labour force in Canada.
 - A. **The Women's Bureau and its Mandate, Objective and Activities**

The mandate of the Bureau is clear to a majority of respondents. The current mixture of activities is viewed to be consistent with attaining the Bureau's objective and fulfilling its mandate.

Some concern was expressed over the fact that it does not fall within the mandate of the Bureau to systematically review all Labour Canada legislation and programs for their impact on women, as might have been expected as a result of the 1976 Federal Integration Policy.

 - B. **Impact of the Women's Bureau**

The Bureau has been very successful in meeting the needs of its target groups. Its products and services are lauded for their high quality, objectivity and balance, and for their responsiveness to group needs (e.g. researching the appropriate issues). The Bureau has been commended for its competence and expertise and for its unique perspective (i.e., its research agenda and its policy role within the federal government).

- 4A. **Recommendations:** Recommendations represent modifications to the operation of the Bureau within Labour Canada and have the potential of strengthening the overall performance of the Bureau, and that of the Department.
 - A. Given that there is some uncertainty within Labour Canada regarding the appropriateness of certain activities of the Bureau, the wide range of activities that the Bureau undertakes to fulfill its mandate should be reaffirmed.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- B. The Bureau should augment its marketing efforts within Labour Canada through such means as meeting regularly with senior management of the various departmental programs and the regional directors to present the services of the Bureau, discuss proposed research projects and, in particular, to explore joint undertakings with respect to policy initiatives.
- C. The Bureau should also consider instituting an annual strategic planning exercise whereby it would identify its objectives and articulate its priorities on a yearly basis in terms of specific issues, activities and target groups and develop a plan of action to achieve its objectives within its limited resource base. Consultation with other departmental programs (recommendation B) would provide input into this process.

Note: Follow up audits reported that the Women's Bureau had instituted the recommended program modifications.

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The Women's Bureau has an excellent reputation associated with the quality of its products, and mechanisms to ensure continuing product quality are essential. The "critical mass" of dedicated researchers ensures consistent "high quality" product.
- 4C. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The Bureau has a central role to play in policy development. Integration of an organization such as the Women's Bureau into the mainstream consciousness of departmental strategic and policy development needs continuous support of senior management and proactive promotion on the part of the program.
- 5. **Outstanding Issues:** What is the best way to maintain the effectiveness of a unique group such as the Women's Bureau.
- 6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**
 Evaluation Assessment of the Women's Bureau, June, 1988; Appendices: Evaluation of the Women's Bureau (1989)

TITLE: LABOUR OPERATIONS & POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS
FRAMEWORK: LABOUR CANADA INITIATIVES FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR THE INTEGRATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,
FEBRUARY, 1992

PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Part of the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities, approved by Cabinet in September, 1991 with a view to encourage employers, labour and organizations representing the disabled community to identify problems and determine solutions which will lead to a greater participation of the disabled into the work force. Economic integration of persons with disabilities is beneficial to the Canadian economy.
2. **Program Objectives:** There are two elements to this initiative: Workers with Disabilities Fund and Legislative Review.

Workers with Disabilities Fund: Raise awareness regarding persons with disabilities in the workplace; promote the collaboration and the on-going partnership between labour and the disabled community.

Legislative Review: Identify and remove possible barriers to the employment of persons with disabilities in the legislation and regulations.
3. **Legislative Basis:**

Workers with Disabilities Fund: N/A

Legislative Review: CLC, Part III, Occupational Safety and Health Regulations
4. **Program Clients:**

Workers with Disabilities Fund: Employers, labour and organizations representing the disabled.

Legislative Review: Over 600,000 unionized and non-unionized employees covered by the federal legislation.

**PART I (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

5. Budget/Resources 1993-94:

Workers with Disabilities Fund: \$2,058,000 for a five year period (1991-96), with 4.5 FTE's.

Legislative Review: \$282,000 for a three year period (1991-94), with 1.5 FTE's.

6. First year of operation: Commencement Date: September, 1991.

7. Program Delivery:

Workers with Disabilities Fund

Through Headquarters by the provision of financial assistance to participants in joint projects and staff assignments approved by the department.

Legislative Review

Review of CLC, Part II and Part III pursuant regulations through extensive consultation. Specific issues include the requirement for injured workers, once recovered, to be permitted to return to their job (now an element of Part III) and removing barriers to access under Part II of the (CLC).

8. Evaluation title and date:

Program Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Framework for Labour Canada Initiatives for the National Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities, February, 1992.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

NOTE FRAMEWORK ONLY

1. Key Evaluation Issues: Proposed Issues

Program relevance; program effectiveness, results and success; cost-effectiveness (for Workers with Disabilities).

2. Methodology/Data Sources: Literature reviews; analysis of internal administrative and program files; surveys and interviews.

3. Future Study: Evaluation study scheduled for 1994-95.

TITLE: POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS - CONSULTATION AND CLIENT SERVICES
STUDY: LABOUR EDUCATION PROGRAM - EVALUATION STUDY, DECEMBER 1990

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** In order to ensure effective industrial relations, it is essential to have an educated and informed union leadership. The Labour Education Program provides funding and advice to encourage labour organization to train union leaders and members in a range of areas including leadership skills, collective bargaining, grievance handling, occupational safety and health and general labour economics and labour laws.
2. **Program objective:** To improve the operation of the industrial relations system by providing current and potential union representatives with labour education opportunities; to achieve a more equitable distribution of the public funds made available for education purposes.
3. **Legislative Basis:** N/A
- 4A. **Program Clients:** Central labour organizations, independent unions and individual union members eligible for education bursaries.
5. **Resources 1993-94:** Grants and Contributions \$3.7 million; 1 FTE
6. **First year of operations:** Established, 1977; 1992 organizationally moved from Labour Standards and Equal Pay, Operations Program to Consultation and Client Services, Policy and Communications.
7. **Program Delivery:** Delivered through the headquarters, as part of the Consultation and Client Services Directorate (effective, September, 1992).
8. **Evaluation title and date:**
 Program Evaluation Study: Evaluation of the Labour Education Program, December 1990 (English & French).

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Impact on Improved Operation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System: Does the LEP contribute to the improved operation of the Canadian industrial relations system?
 Equitable Distribution of Public Subsidies to Industrial Relations Education: Does the LEP contribute to a more equitable distribution of the public funds devoted to industrial relations education?
 Consistent and Efficient LEP Administration: Is the LEP administered in an efficient manner, consistent with Labour Canada's overall mandate and with the operation of other Labour Canada programs?
 Program Delivery Alternatives for Financial and Quality Control of the Program: Are there any other administrative measures or alternative forms of program delivery which would bring better financial and quality control of the program?
 2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** Case studies (7); in-depth interviews (25); written questionnaire to 1990 class of the Labour College of Canada (55); analysis of published information on public assistance for industrial relations education in the post-secondary education system; analysis of Labour Canada, labour education activity reports.
 3. **Findings/Conclusions:** LEP makes an important and on-going contribution to the improved operation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System. Course content, course selection procedures, development of better understanding of the IR system; involvement in leadership activities are some contributing factors.
 LEP makes a substantial contribution to a more equitable distribution of public funds allocated to industrial relations education. Termination of the LEP would result in reducing the labour movements share of federal and provincial subsidies to education would fall from approximately one tenth to almost 3rd.
 LEP is administered in an efficient manner, but a number of enhancements would make the program better, i.e., multi-year funding.
- 4A1. Recommendations:**
- Recommendation 1:** It is recommended that Labour Canada establish a special fund, separate from the per capita contributions to contractors and independent unions, to finance one-time projects which meet criteria specified by Labour Canada.
- Recommendation 2:** It is recommended that Labour Canada discontinue the program of individual bursaries under the LEP. It is further recommended that the funds used for bursaries be reallocated to the special fund.
- Recommendation 3:** It is recommended that Labour Canada encourage the regional staff to become more actively involved in the LEP. Without changing the current contracting procedures, regional staff can become more involved in "marketing" the program to independent unions.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Recommendation 4: It is recommended that Labour Canada establish a new multi-year contract for independent unions which have 20,000 members or more, and which operate ongoing education programs which are consistent with Labour Canada criteria.

Recommendation 5: It is recommended that Labour Canada contribution agreements specify data requirements for LEP contractor information covering LEP-supported educational activities. Reporting this data on a timely basis should be a condition of the LEP contract.

Recommendation 6: It is recommended that Labour Canada require that all LEP contractors provide complete details of any funds transferred to their affiliates or to subsidiary organizations.

Recommendation 7: It is recommended that Labour Canada adopt a system of verifying membership data submitted by applicants for LEP funding.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Curtailment of the LEP would result in a significant reduction to the quantity and quality of labour education available to adult labour leaders and further accentuate the strong skew (10 to 1) in favour of industrial relations funding provided in universities and colleges for "management".
5. **Outstanding Issues:** There are groups that consider Labour Education outside the mandate of the federal government. The following question is raised:
If not federal responsibility, why is this being done?
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** 3 previous evaluation studies, the prior one entitled, Labour Education in Canada, May 1985.
Nielsen Task Force Report, 1985

TITLE:	POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS - LABOUR OUTREACH
STUDY:	TECHNICAL IMPACT RESEARCH FUND (TIRF), APRIL, 1986
PART I	
PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: It was recognized within the department, and the government in general, that labour organizations (departmental clients) were having difficulty adapting to the impact of technological change in the workplace. TIRF was established as a pilot project to determine what might be appropriate mechanisms for better integration.
2.	Program Objectives: Provide support for the social and human side of technology by aiding Labour Canada's clients to adapt to technological changes affecting the workplace.
3.	Legislative Basis: N/A
4.	Program Clients: Labour organizations and women's groups.
5.	Budget/Resources: At inception \$5 million for 3 years and 2 FTE's. Currently TIRF is one element of the Labour-Management Partnerships Program, Client and Consultation Services.
6.	First year of operation: 1984, with a 3-year time horizon.
7.	Program Delivery: Contributions administered through headquarters offices.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Program Evaluation Study: Evaluation Study - Technical Impact Research Fund (TIRF), April, 1986.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

TIRF in the context of other federal government policies and programs.

Impact of TIRF.

Appropriateness of TIRF's clients. Efficiency and Effectiveness of TIRF.

2. Methodology/Data Sources: Telephone survey of successful and unsuccessful applicants (35); personal interviews with review committee members, program staff, Director-General of the Women's Bureau and a PCO representative; project file reviews.

3. Findings/Conclusions: See report - not included here due to the fact that TIRF has been subsumed under the Labour-Management Partnerships Program, Consultation and Client Services.

4. Lessons Learned: (to be completed at a later date)

Process Related:

Operational Implications:

Policy Implications:

5. Recommendations: Labour Canada extend the TIRF program and continue its emphasis on support for research and demonstration/pilot projects undertaken by its priority clients.

Proactive measures be taken to encourage women's groups and organizations with pilot/demonstration projects to apply for funds.

Measures be taken to meet the work back-log which is now developing in the program for both the current and the next (close out) year; so as to avoid a deterioration in the quality of relations of TIRF staff with their growing clientele, which would jeopardize the program's good image.

In 1986-87, the program select a relatively small sample of projects (8-12) and conduct case studies of these to track and demonstrate their impacts and effects.

TITLE: POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS - LABOUR OUTREACH
STUDY: LABOUR-GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SECONDMENT PROGRAM,
FEBRUARY, 1986

PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Since approximately 1968, the federal government had been encouraging interchanges of personnel between the federal public sector and other sectors as a method of improving understanding and better relations. In 1971 the Executive Interchange Program was introduced. Because there was very little exchange between the federal government and labour, a special Labour-Government Employee Secondment Program was introduced in 1984. The focus was the facilitation of exchanges between the federal government and organized labour.

2. **Program Objectives:** Promote understanding and contacts between the federal government and the labour movement through the exchange of personnel, so that labour and government become more effective as partners in dealing with a wide range of labour-related issues and legislation, including economic issues.

3. **Legislative Basis:** N/A

4. **Program Clients:** Staff of labour organizations and the federal government who were interested in and who met the program criteria.

5. **Budget/Resources 1993-94:** The program as such no longer exist except as a sub-element of a larger program, Labour Management Partnerships Program. Currently \$ are spent on the program.

6. **First year of operation:** 1984, for a 3 year period. Intention was to reintegrate the program into Interchange Canada, if warranted.

7. **Program Delivery:** Negotiations for the exchanges were conducted between Labour Canada and the host labour organization.

8. **Evaluation title and date:** Program Evaluation Study: Labour-Government Employee Secondment Program, February, 1986

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** What has been the impact of the Labour-Government Employee Secondment Program?
 How important is the subsidy element of the program in facilitating exchanges?
 Is a specific program for labour-government exchanges necessary? What would be the impact if exchanges were administered through Interchange Canada?
 Are other modifications to program design necessary or beneficial?
2. **Methodology/Data Sources:** In-depth personal interviews with participants (46); interviews with participant observers (7); interviews with program staff and management (3); document and file review; literature review.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:**
Impact: program has succeeded in facilitating exchanges of staff between labour organizations and the federal public service.
Need: the need for a program "orienting" or facilitating exchanges between labour and government - Labour Canada was seen as labour's entry to and major link with the federal government.
Subsidy: seen as critical by government departments and labour organizations, especially in smaller organizations, especially in smaller organization. The exact impact of subsidies, however, can not be determined.
Program Delivery Effectiveness: could be improved with implementation of a marketing strategy; secondees exchanges should be encouraged; guidelines for conflict of interest and subsidization for relocations are required; there are reentry challenges for secondees returning to government departments.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Government-Labour relations are enhanced using programs such as this.
- 4B. **Recommendations:** Labour-Government Employee Secondment Program should be extended - the program has been identified as a clear signal that the government seeks a labour perspective on policies and programs.
 Subsidy element of most secondment agreements continues to be necessary to overcome the restraints to secondments between labour and government.
 The program should continue to be administered by Labour Canada.
5. **Outstanding Effectiveness Issues:** Long Term impact of this type of exchange on government-employee relations.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** N/A

TITLE:	POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS - LABOUR OUTREACH
FUTURE EVALUATION:	LABOUR MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAM (LMPP)

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

No information. Prior to announcement of HRL:LC changes, implementation analysis tentatively scheduled for 1993-94.

TITLE:	LABOUR CANADA
STUDY:	PS 2000: CLIENT ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS, AUGUST, 1991

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

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| 1. | Program Rationale/Background: Labour Canada's PS 2000 Committee was interested in knowing about the departmental clients and their attitudes regarding Labour Canada's service delivery. A departmental wide survey of departmental clients was not undertaken, instead a review of clients opinions and attitudes culled from evaluation studies was undertaken. |
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TITLE:	POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS
FRAMEWORK:	LABOUR CANADA COMMUNICATIONS FUNCTION, 1988
PART I	
PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: There is a government-wide communications function policy in effect; the most recent one being the 1988 Government Communications Policy.
2.	Program Objective: To ensure that Canadian receive information about Labour Canada policies, programs and services, and conversely, that their concerns and interests are known and taken into account in the formulation and implementation of departmental policies and program.
3.	Legislative Basis: N/A, but overriding authority of the 1988 Government Communications Policy and Strategic Communications Plan, 1990-91.
4.	Program Clients: Extensive, ranging from Minister and his office to all Canadians.
5.	Resources 1992-93: \$1.52 million and 18 FTE's in 1992 (in accordance with Public Accounts figures).
6.	Program Delivery: Headquarters, Communications Branch, Departmental program heads and regional offices.
7.	Evaluation title and date: Evaluation Framework: Labour Canada Communications Function, 1988

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

Effectiveness of the Communications Function

Does the communications function effectively support Labour Canada's mission and goals? What improvements are needed to ensure an acceptable level of effectiveness, given the need to manage within the context of financial restraint?

Implementation of Changes

How well is Labour Canada doing in implementing the new thrust of its "communications partnership" and what improvements are required to ensure an acceptable level of congruency with the GCP?

Other Issue Areas:

Roles and responsibilities

Research analysis on the public environment

Communications advice and evaluation

Communications planning

Management of communications

Internal communications

2. Methodology for Framework Development: Consultations with Communications Directorate senior management; review of key documents; interviews with Labour Canada program managers and policy advisors.

3. Outstanding Effectiveness Issues: See above two evaluation issues.

4. Related evaluation documents/technical studies: N/A

EMPLOYABILITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (EIC)

TITLE: JOB DEVELOPMENT/JOB ENTRY	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The Job Development Program was targeted at the long-term unemployed. The program responded to the perceived increase in long-term unemployment in Canada, and it was viewed that this problem can best be addressed by programs with training components.</p> <p>The Job Entry Program was designed to reduce the transitional barriers faced by young people and women wishing to re-enter or increase their involvement in the labour force.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): Job Development and Job Entry were both intended to assist persons facing difficulties in fully participating in the labour market. The objective of the Job Development Program was to assist long-term unemployed individuals to participate effectively in the labour market, while that of the Job Entry Program was to assist youth and women having difficulties making the transition from school/home to work.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: E & I Reorganization Act, National Training Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, and Treasury Board Appropriation Act.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Job Development was targeted at those who had been unemployed for at least 24 of the 30 weeks prior to program participation. Job Entry focused on young people experiencing difficulties in finding regular employment, and women attempting to enter or re-enter the labour market after an extended period being out of the labour force.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1990-91: Job Development new starts - 56,580 Job Entry new starts - 54,496</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1990-91: Grants and Contributions: \$: 847,631,000 + 4781 (NHQ) = 852,412 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1985</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Job Development - decentralized, primarily through CECs, with extensive consultation with Local Advisory Councils, unions, employers, and other labour market partners.</p> <p>Job Entry - co-ordinators/sponsors who develop a plan with training place hosts who provide training positions for participants.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Longitudinal Study of Training: Impacts for the Job Entry and job Development Programs - July 1993</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1. Key Evaluation Issues:** The principal evaluation issues were:
 Have post-program outcomes improved significantly for participants relative to a comparison group in the longer-term?
 Do the Purchase of Training Option produce labour market outcomes different from other program options?
 Do program benefits decay at different rates depending on individual and program characteristics?
 Which options are most cost effective in enhancing long term employability and earnings and for which group?
- 2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The analysis of program impacts and effects was carried out primarily through the use of econometric modelling techniques. The econometric estimates of short run impacts were compared against estimates using data extending over a longer period of time after training ended.
 A sample of participants in the Job Development and Job Entry programs who were surveyed (along with comparison groups) in 1988-89, were surveyed again in 1992. Continuous labour market histories were created for the samples, stretching from one year prior to the original program participation through to the survey date.
 Longitudinal files of EIC was also used to develop a longer pre-program data set for participants included in the study.
 Three cohorts, those ending their training in 1988, 1989 and 1990, of Purchase of Training participants under Job Development, were also surveyed and included in this study.
- 3. Findings/Conclusions:** One central finding is that to the extent that these training programs generate short-run gains in earnings and employability, the gains usually decline as time passes. For the Job Development Program, only the Individually Subsidized Jobs and the Severely Employment Disadvantaged options showed some impact of training on labour market outcomes. For Re-Entry participants under the Job Entry Program, substantial positive impacts were found in the short run, and positive but much smaller impacts in the long run. The Direct Purchase Option of Job Entry showed positive earnings impact in the long run. As for the Purchase of Training participants under Job Development, positive training impacts were found for the cohort with the longest post-training interval.
- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** Policy implications resulting from the evaluation study are currently under development.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4B. Operational Lessons Learned:

Private sector involvement in training design and delivery was essential in improving results. Regional flexibility in program delivery was a positive feature and projects of longer duration tended to be more effective.

For Job Development, approximately 60 per cent of respondents indicated that they used their skills after completing training. However, for the Re-Entry Option and DPO, more than 70 per cent indicated that they used their skills in subsequent periods.

The evaluation indicated reduced dependence on social assistance for participants under Job Development. However, the relative decline is greatest for Individually Subsidized Jobs and least for General Projects. The proportion receiving some form of income assistance is higher for participants for the Entry Option but lower for Re-Entry and for DPO.

For General Projects, males were less likely to complete training; for Re-Entry, younger trainees, participants with more household members and those in higher unemployment rate regions were likely to complete.

5. Outstanding Issues: To be determined.

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

TITLE: EMPLOYABILITY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE FOR SOCIAL ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The impetus for active program measures to assist social assistance recipients (SARs) integrate into the labour market came with the 1981-82 recession which resulted in an increase in the number of employable SARs and the persistence of the problem after the recession. Training opportunities for this client population were limited, and not all provinces had employability programs for SARs. As well, SARs tended to be under-represented in federal mainstream employment and training programs.
The Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers signed an agreement in September 1985 in which it was resolved to make maximum use of the Canadian Jobs Strategy, the Canadian Assistance Plan (CAP) and other employment and training programs, to help SARs become more productive participants in the labour force.
2. **Program objective(s):** The overall objective of the program was essentially to promote the self-sufficiency of SARs and to reduce their dependence upon federal and provincial income support programs. This was to be achieved by enhancing their employability through the application of appropriate employment and training measures.
3. **Legislative Basis:** E & I Reorganization Act, National Training Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, and Treasury Board Appropriation Act.
- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** The program was targeted at those who had been on social assistance and were employable. Since individuals were trained under CJS, the projects would be expected to fit within the CJS funding criteria.
- 4B. **Number of participants in 1990-91:** 31,727 individuals
5. **Resources 1990-91:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: 295,700,000
Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
6. **First year of operation:** 1985
7. **Program Delivery:** Decentralized, primarily through CECs and private sector project sponsors. Overall policy set by the SAR Agreements with some flexibility at the regional level through consultation with SAR Management Committees.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation of Employability Initiatives for SARs in CJS - March 1993

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The principal evaluation questions dealing with the impacts of training for SARs can be categorized in terms of the following issues:
Dependence on social assistance;
Employability and earnings impacts;
Dependence on UI;
Benefits for SARs and overall cost-effectiveness.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation used econometric modelling to determine the impacts and effects of the program on participants' labour market outcomes. Two principal sources data were used in this evaluation: survey data participants and comparison groups, and information from administrative files. The survey data used in this study were collected in two waves: baseline and follow-up. All baseline surveys were conducted in March 1989 except in Manitoba, which occurred in March 1988. Most follow-up surveys took place in March 1991. The administrative data came from two sources: EIC's Longitudinal File and provincial Social Assistance files.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Training of SARs in CJS provided substantial gains for participants and for the Canadian economy. SARs enjoyed substantial gains in both earnings and employability as a result of the program. They also exhibited reduced dependence on social assistance, an increase in weeks employed and greater labour force attachment. However, they also increased their dependence on unemployment insurance.
The overall benefit-cost results are also positive with a benefit-cost ratio of 2 to 1 at the national level. A parallel cost-benefit analysis was also conducted by using administrative data for New Brunswick. The New Brunswick results were less positive with a benefit-cost ratio of 1.2 to 1.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation revealed SAR participants in CJS training programs registered clear and substantial gains in annualized earnings and employability. The research further indicated that the costs of training SARs is lower than the benefits resulting from reducing their reliance on social assistance. Any funding for SAR programming must reflect its cost-effectiveness relative to the cost-effectiveness of other programs.
The evaluation showed that participation under the Purchase of Training Option produced a very limited impact on trainees. Based on these results, project based training should be the primary method of training for SARs, and the Purchase of Training Option for this type of clientele be used on a limited scale.
The evaluation revealed that employability was related to certain characteristics of participants. Wherever possible, the program should consider funding those SAR clients having characteristics reasonably associated with positive employability effects.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The study revealed that non-cash social assistance benefits were allocated in an inconsistent and non-comparable manner across provinces. The issue of inconsistent application of non-cash benefits may best be dealt with through the existing SAR Agreement provisions whereby each Management Committee in each region/province would examine the problem and find ways to solve it.
- Flexibility in programs/projects to meet local training and employment needs are essential for success. Projects under the employability enhancement initiative definitely try to respond to local needs. The evaluation also showed that it is the matching of client needs with truly relevant program content that leads to the high completion rates.
- The fact that the programming is delivered by dedicated, experienced staff is an essential part of project success. The staff must take a broad view of measurement of success, combining the use of standard quantitative and qualitative indicators.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:** To date, the second generation of Employability Agreements have been signed with most provinces and the territories. It is essential that baseline data be collected forthwith on SARs participating under the second generation of SAR agreements. Some provinces do not have a centralized data system for SARs. Efforts should be made to encourage provinces to upgrade their administrative data system for SARs.
- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: THE SEVERELY EMPLOYMENT DISADVANTAGED OPTION (SED) OF THE JOB ENTRY PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The SED Option was initially a component of the Job Development Program of the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS) between 1985 and 1987. The rationale of this element of CJS was to focus in on the needs of those who significant barriers when attempting to find work, and who were among the most long-term unemployed. In 1988, SED was transferred to the Job Entry Program. The most significant outcome of this shift was the move from wage-based to allowance-based projects.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of SED was to serve those who encountered formidable, and often multiple, barriers to employment. What set SED apart from other CJS components was its focus on those individuals who often lack the confidence and self-esteem necessary to secure and maintain employment, and who may be limited by or discriminated against due to characteristics such as histories of drug or alcohol dependency, incarceration, lacking functional literacy/numeracy skills, having a mental or physical disability, or being unable to function in either official language. Training for these individuals took the form of integrated academic upgrading, skills training, job search advice and personal counselling.
3.	Legislative Basis: E & I Re-organization Act, National Training Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Treasury Board Appropriations Act.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: Clientele must be individuals who are severely employment disadvantaged, unemployed and considered <u>not</u> to be job ready. They must have demonstrated past difficulty in securing and maintaining continuing employment. Such individuals must have one or more of the following traits: poor work habits; attitudinal or motivational problems; serious lack of education/training; prolonged periods of institutionalization; functional illiteracy; a history of alcohol or drug abuse; the inability to communicate in either official language.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: New starts - 1990-91 - 10,046
5.	Resources 1992-93: N/A Grants and Contributions: \$: 102,594,400 (1990-91) Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
6.	First year of operation: 1985 (Job Development); 1988 (Job Entry)
7.	Program Delivery: Applications and referrals received and approved at CECs. Individuals who meet eligibility criteria then screened by project co-ordinators and/or their project managers.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Severely Employment Disadvantaged (SED) Option of the Job Entry Program, Final Report, January 1993

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The principal issues in the evaluation focused on comparing the incremental impacts of "grandparented" wage-based projects and allowance-based projects. Impacts on trainees and the incrementality of training SED clientele were the key outcome measures. Other important evaluation tasks included developing profiles of trainees, types of training provided, and the relative importance of various training activities in influencing the success of various participants.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The principal data sources included: telephone surveys of 2000 program participants and 500 comparison subjects; telephone interviews with 151 project managers; 38 in-depth case studies, involving on-site interviews with project managers and file reviews; and ten focus groups with training participants across Canada. Additional data were collected using administrative files. The analyses of program impacts were conducted within a comparison group design that employed econometric modelling techniques. Multivariate techniques were used to examine program incrementality for wage- and allowance-based project participants.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The overall assessment of the evaluation was that participation in either allowance or wage projects resulted in substantial gains in employability and earnings for both men and women. Incremental improvements in employability after training were especially high for women in wage projects. Despite these gains, dependence on UI increased after training as compared to what would have occurred had the training not been available. Annual earnings gains were also found to be significantly higher for participants in wage projects. Wage projects were also found to be less expensive overall, thus making them a better training investment. The relatively better performance of these grandparented projects could be attributed to their approach, which incorporated greater involvement of employers in the community and placing greater emphasis on skills training.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The funding of community-based training projects for the severely employment disadvantaged produces, for the most part, positive economic benefits to the participating trainees, and in a more general sense, to the economy. Providing avenues whereby those who have experienced formidable obstacles to employment, and thus decreasing dependence on income assistance and other social services, the Canadian economy and society as a whole benefits. Current studies have reinforced the idea that the social and economic value of reintegrating this potentially growing segment of the population into the labour force is important, and is fostered through locally responsive employment training such as that provided by SED projects. Participant opinions on the adequacy and necessity of income support has also paved the way for revisiting the current income support structure and its appropriateness.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The comparatively more effective and economical approach identified among wage-based projects points to a number of operational modifications, the most important being the adoption of strategies used by these projects in serving their clientele. The higher emphasis on skills training, the use of voluntary Boards of Directors, and a greater emphasis on the involvement of local employers in developing training strategies has proved to increase the overall effectiveness of these projects to meet the unique needs of their clientele. This finding was reinforced by managers of allowance projects who reported that simulating a work environment, where allowances were treated like wages, found that their success rates were higher. The above-mentioned policy lesson on income support has direct implications on the administration of allowances and wages to trainees.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:** Most programming previously covered under Job Entry has been subsumed under the Project-based Training component of the Employability Improvement Program. A potential area of further investigation is the extent to which the needs of the severely employment disadvantaged are being met under the newly formed program where there is no longer a specific designation.
- 6.** **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: JOB DEVELOPMENT

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Job Development, one of six CJS programs introduced in 1985, responded to the perceived increase in long-term unemployment in Canada. The Program featured four main options, General Projects which combined formal and on-the-job training; Individually Subsidized Jobs which involved private-sector partnership; Severely Employment Disadvantaged which provided employment on community-based projects; and Purchase of Training which provided occupational training in provincial institutions to meet skill requirements of employers and increase employability of individuals. The evaluation covered the first three options.
2. **Program objective(s):** The objective of the Job Development Program was to improve the employability and earnings of long-term unemployed and/or employment-disadvantaged individuals by the application of appropriate employment and training interventions.
3. **Legislative Basis:** E & I Reorganization Act, National Training Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, and Treasury Board Appropriations Act.
- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** The program was targeted at those who had been unemployed for at least 24 of the 30 weeks prior to program participation.
- 4B. **Number of participants 1992-93:** 1990-91 New starts - 56,580
5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$:449,353,000 + 254 (NHQ) = 449,607
1990-91 Operating Costs: PYs: . \$:
6. **First year of operation:** 1985
7. **Program Delivery:** Decentralized, primarily through CECs, with extensive consultation with Local Advisory Councils, unions, employers, and other labour market partners. Overall policy set at NHQ with considerable regional variation and flexibility negotiated with Regional Offices.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation of the Job Development Program - Final Report: August 1989

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The primary focus of the evaluation was to ascertain the incremental impacts and effects of the Job Development Program on the employability, earnings and income support utilization of participants. In addition, the evaluation addressed various aspects of Program design including the appropriateness of targeting, the adequacy of subsidies, and the compatibility of the terms and conditions with the achievement of Program objectives.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation used econometric modelling to ascertain the impacts and effects of the Program on participants' labour market achievements. Principal data sources were a survey of 3,983 Program participants; a survey of 1,500 comparison group members; a survey of 1,530 employers/sponsors; interviews with selected sponsors, employers and Program officials at EIC headquarters and regions; and administrative data files and literature reviews.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation found a continuing need for a program aimed at the long-term unemployed. Targeting conformed closely with the CJS philosophy of helping those most in need and local flexibility in terms of the selection of Program options was shown to be positive. Private sector involvement in specific Program options was considerable and effective particularly under Individually Subsidized Jobs which produced significant improvements in employability and earnings. Results were not as impressive for General Projects, which was used extensively as a temporary job creation measure in depressed labour markets. Severely Employment Disadvantaged individuals experienced improved employability but not earnings. For the job ready, Job Finding Clubs proved to be especially effective and inexpensive.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Private sector involvement was shown to produce significant, positive results. The evaluation revealed little progress in terms of training in non-traditional occupations and that attitudinal barriers on the part of participants, employers and counsellors needed further examination. Older workers and the poorly educated were under-represented in Job Development and more extensive and intensive treatments were indicated for these groups. Appropriate programs and policies must reflect regional priorities and labour market needs and more cost-effective approaches needed to be developed for those regions with depressed labour markets.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Private sector involvement in training design and delivery was instrumental in improving results. Regional flexibility in program delivery was a positive feature. There appeared to be considerable scope for the adjustment of levels of income support to reflect individual needs. Projects of longer duration tended to be more effective and program completion was also positively associated with favourable labour market outcomes.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The Job Development Program has been subsumed under the Labour Force Development Strategy, specifically the Employability Improvement Program and the job opportunities component and Community Development Program, local projects component.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: **JOB ENTRY**

PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** The Job Entry Program evolved from the experimental Youth Training Option which was designed to counter the transitional problems faced by youth, particularly school drop-outs, upon entering the labour market. Job Entry represented a far greater scale and program options were added to include women re-entering the labour market after a lengthy absence.
- 2. Program objective(s):** The principal objective of Job Entry was to assist persons having difficulty making the transition from school or home to the labour market. The evaluation examined the extent to which the program improved the employability and earnings potential of labour market entrants and re-entrants by increasing opportunities for immediate employment and training or encouraging further education and/or training as a means of enhancing longer-term employment prospects.
- 3. Legislative Basis:** E & I Reorganization Act, National Training Act, Unemployment Insurance Act, and Treasury Board Appropriations Act.
- 4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Young people who had attained legal school leaving age, were out of the school system, and were having difficulty finding regular employment, and women attempting to enter or re-enter the labour market after an extended period (at least three years) engaged in homemaking activities.
- 4B. Number of participants 1992-93:** New starts - 1990-91 - 54,496
- 5. Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$:398,278,000 + 4,527 (NHQ) = 402,805
1990-91 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
- 6. First year of operation: 1985**
- 7. Program Delivery:** The program built upon the YTO model of co-ordinators/sponsors who developed a plan involving at least ten positions and training place hosts (employers) who provided training positions for participants. In addition, participants could be referred by CECs to institutional training purchased directly or indirectly through Co-ordinating Groups.
- 8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation of the Job Entry Program - Final Report - July 1989

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The central issue of the evaluation was the impact of program participation on the labour market outcomes of participants. Outcomes were measured primarily in terms of gains in employability and earnings for participants in each option. The former was defined as estimated annual hours employed and the latter as estimated annual earnings. Other issues included Program Rationale, Design and Delivery, Objectives Achievement, and Program Alternatives.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation relied upon multiple lines of evidence including telephone interviews of 908 participants in the Entry Option, 1,095 Re-entry participants, 1,102 DPO participants, and 1,808 matched non-participants; telephone interviews with 324 Managing Co-ordinators and 999 Training Place Hosts; administrative data bases and selected Statistics Canada data; interviews with CEIC staff at national and regional headquarters; and econometric modelling to produce estimates of the incremental impact of program participation.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation found evidence of a continuing need for labour market intervention on behalf of the target groups of job market entrants and re-entrants. Unemployment rates among youth were consistently higher than among prime age groups and women seeking to re-enter the labour market tended to remain unemployed longer than men. Job Entry attracted many employers from the private sector who had never before participated in similar government programs. Job Entry enhanced the post-program employability and earnings of all participants except for males in the Direct Purchase Option. The unique design of the Entry and Re-entry Options contributed to the success of Program.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation highlighted the relative success of options featuring extensive private sector involvement, especially the Entry Option. A sequence of off-site and on-site training appeared to be most effective. The institutional training model was effective for female re-entrants but was ineffective for males except when associated with further academic or skill training. The Job Entry Program was effective in helping Social Assistance Recipients become independent of income support.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** Training of longer duration was generally found to be more effective than shorter duration training and a clear link was found between completion of training and more positive labour market outcomes. The evaluation suggested that the allowance structure should be adjusted to bear a closer relationship to the needs of participants. Training for female re-entrants was more effective when based on smaller groups of participants per managing co-ordinator with assignment to fewer training place hosts. The ideal configuration for this group appeared to feature managing co-ordinators also acting as training place hosts. For males in the Entry Option, on-the-job training was most effective when supervised by training place hosts.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:** The Job Entry has been subsumed under the Employability Improvement Program under the Labour Force Development Strategy.
- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM: LANGUAGE TRAINING	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rationale/Background: As part of the NITP, language training was offered to refugees, immigrants, Native Canadians and interprovincial migrants.	
2. Program objective(s): The objective of language training was to reduce employment barriers for individuals in these groups who were prevented from finding employment because of a lack of fluency in English or French.	
3. Legislative Basis: National Training Act	
4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Immigrants, refugees, Native Canadians and interprovincial migrants.	
4B. Number of participants 1992-93: 13,999 new starts in 1983-84.	
5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$:52 m. in 1983-84 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:	
6. First year of operation: 1982	
7. Program Delivery: The program was delivered according to federal-provincial training agreements which outlined the roles and responsibilities of each level of government, as well as the financial arrangements for federal purchases of training courses.	
8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): National Institutional Training Program: Language Training Evaluation Report - October 1985	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation addressed five main issues: the impact of language training on the economy, particularly as it pertains to the labour market behaviour of trainees; the impact of language on the employability and earnings of trainees; the reasons for a discontinuation rate in excess of 20%; the impact of income support on decisions to discontinue; and the perceptions of trainees regarding the usefulness of language training under NITP.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation was based on data compiled from a survey of 837 language trainees as well as a review of administrative files. Pre- and post-program labour market indicators were compared as a measure of impact. Comparison groups techniques were not used at that time.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation indicated substantial increases in the proportion of trainees employed after training as compared with the pre-training period. Refugees and immigrants achieved gains in employability and earnings while interprovincial migrants did not. Trainees who did not complete their courses experienced higher gains than completers, likely because the main reason for discontinuing was to take a job. Very few trainees discontinued due to dissatisfaction with the courses or because of inadequacy of income support. The majority of those surveyed believed that the language course had improved their chances of getting a job and the majority of those who had a job considered that the language training had been necessary in obtaining their job.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Language training appeared to produce positive results especially for refugees and immigrants.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:**
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The lack of comparison groups make it difficult to attribute findings to program participation.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** The National Institutional Training Program was the largest of three programs introduced under the National Training Act in 1982. NITP provided for the purchase of training seats in specific courses given in public and private vocational centres, technical institutes, and community colleges. Training courses were generally less than 52 weeks in duration and normally did not lead to a diploma or degree. The program also provided income support to trainees during their training.
- 2. Program objective(s):** The objective of NITP was to provide occupational training for the labour force and thereby to better meet the need for skills created by a changing economy and to increase the earning and employment potential of individual workers.
- 3. Legislative Basis:** National Training Act
- 4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Unemployed individuals beyond the legal school-leaving age.
- 4B. Number of participants 1992-93:** 1984-85 - 216,750 trainees started.
- 5. Resources 1992-93:**
 Grants and Contributions: \$:892,900,000 in 1984-85
 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
- 6. First year of operation:** 1982 although institutional training had been on-going since 1967 under the Adult Occupational Training Act.
- 7. Program Delivery:** The Canada Employment Centres enroled and referred candidates to training courses purchased primarily from provincial institutions.
- 8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s):**
 Evaluation - National Institutional Training Program (NITP) - Final Report, June 1985.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation focused on Skill Training, which was occupationally oriented, and on Basic Training for Skill Development, which consisted of academic upgrading. The evaluation assessed the impact of training on the employability and earnings of trainees and also covered issues related to program operations including course selection, course linkages, the impact of income support on training decisions, and reasons for discontinuing training. Other issues covered included the extent to which the Program addressed the skill needs of the Canadian economy, women in non-traditional occupations, the correlation between longer-term employability measures and the shorter-term operational three-month follow-up surveys, and the concept of skill retention in the post-training job.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation was based on data drawn from telephone interviews of 3,000 skill trainees, 1,000 BTSD trainees and a comparison group made up of 200 individuals. The analysis also utilized administrative data from EIC files and data on labour market shortages. The analysis of employment and earnings data used regression models comparing the employability, wages and earnings for trainees and non-participants.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation found that trainees showed no significant benefit from participating in the training relative to comparison group of non-participants. The incidence of improved labour market performance was greater among those with lowest levels of pre-program employability. The skill training component did not contribute to the reduction of labour market shortages since the majority of training took place in occupations which were in surplus. The level of income support was at least adequate. There was little impact upon women in non-traditional occupations. Finally, the evaluation found that the 3-month follow-up survey was not a good predictor of longer term employability.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation indicated that skill training should correspond more closely to the needs of the local labour market. Training resources should be reallocated from weak labour markets to stronger labour markets and trainees should be encouraged to relocate to demand areas.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** A higher proportion of skill training should be provided in occupations with emerging skill needs and a lower proportion of resources should be allocated to basic academic upgrading. Where BTSD was provided, it should be linked to subsequent skill training in specific occupations. Trainees should be more effectively counselled on the prospects of obtaining employment after training in their own region and in other regions of Canada.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:** The overall findings of the evaluation were reflected in the new program configuration under the Canadian Jobs Strategy.
- 6.** **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: CANADA MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAM**PART I
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** The Canada Manpower Training Program, which originated in 1967 with the passage of the Adult Occupational Training Act, was a major initiative by the federal government designed to improve the available supply of labour. CMTP provided training for participants in an institutional setting. Trainees were referred to seats purchased primarily from provincial government institutions. Courses generally ran for a maximum of 52 weeks and trainees were given training allowances and other income support such as dependent care, travel and commuting, and living allowances. The Program provided mainly BTSD (academic upgrading, job readiness, and work adjustment) and Skill courses as well as some language training for immigrants and some elements of apprenticeship training.

- 2. Program objective(s):** The objectives of CMTP were to provide individual workers with the skills required to increase their employability and/or earning capacity, and to help satisfy the needs of industry for suitably skilled workers.

- 3. Legislative Basis:** Adult Occupational Training Act

- 4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Unemployed individuals who were beyond the legal school leaving age in the province of residence.

- 4B. Number of participants 1992-93:** 1979-80 - 110,000 full-time trainee starts (31% in BTSD, 59% in Skill, and 10% in language)

- 5. Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$:418 m. in 1979-80
Operating Costs: PYs: \$:

- 6. First year of operation:** 1967

- 7. Program Delivery:** Canada Manpower Centres referred unemployed individuals to seats purchased from provincial institutions. Training allowances and other financial support was delivered through the CMCs.

- 8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation of Canada Manpower Training Program (Institutional) - October 1982
Final Evaluation of Canada Manpower Training Program (Institutional) - April 1984

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The main evaluation issues were the impacts and effects of the program on the employability and earnings of participants; the achievement of objectives in terms of impacts on individuals as well as on the incidence of skill shortages in the economy; and the benefits derived by society in relation to the costs incurred.
 2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation of CMTP was based primarily on two follow-up surveys of trainees, one 12 months and the other 24 months after leaving the program. Comparison group techniques were not used at the time of the CMTP evaluation.
 3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation concluded that BTSD may have helped trainees meet entry level requirements for work but did not prove necessary for job performance. Some gains were noted in post-training employability and earnings as compared to the very low pre-training levels. However, in the absence of a comparison group, it was impossible to attribute observed changes to program participation. The crude estimates of cost-effectiveness suggested that benefits were only marginally greater than government outlays for the training. The comparable analysis for Skill training suggested a more favourable outcome although, again, no comparison group analysis was done. The pre- and post-program analysis indicated that Skill trainees experienced improvements in employability and earnings, particularly when trained in shortage occupations.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluations highlighted the superior results for Skill training as opposed to BTSD alone unless the academic upgrading is followed by skill training or combined with on-the-job training. The advantages of training in shortage occupations also emerged from the evaluation as well as the relative advantage of completing the course.
 - 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The relative advantages of skill training, especially in shortage occupations, and of combining BTSD with subsequent skill training were relevant to future program design. BTSD should be combined with skill training, either in an institution or on-the-job. More effective counselling should be provided to BTSD trainees. The screening, counselling and orientation of skill trainees should be improved. Course duration should be sufficient to provide adequate training in occupations reflecting the skill needs of the labour market.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The issue of attributing results to program participation had not been addressed at this point.

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: UI SPONSORED TRAINING**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** It is recognized that job training may be particularly useful for individuals on UI to help them return to work. In 1989 the Federal government announced the Labour Force Development Strategy. With this policy, the government shifted the emphasis of the Unemployment Insurance program toward more active measures such as training. Subsequently, with the passage of Bill C-21, a greater percentage of the UI fund could be earmarked for developmental uses such as training.

2. **Program objective(s):** UI sponsored training in general: to provide an earlier return to employment by improving the employability of UI claimants through training.
Job Entry: assist labour market entrants and re-entrants in making the transition from school or home to the labour market.
Job Development: assist the long-term unemployed, generally those unemployed for at least 24 weeks out of the 30 weeks immediately preceding participation.
Skill Shortages: provide financial assistance for up to three years for employers to train workers in specific high demand skills that are deemed to be in short supply.
Feepayer: to provide for an early return to employment by improving the employability of UI claimants through training, and to help develop a training culture in Canada by increasing individual and third party sponsoring/participation in training the unemployed.
DIR trainees: UI claimants who take part-time training (usually occurs in the evening) without EIC sanction. DIR trainees are entitled to regular UI benefits subject to regular requirements.

3. **Legislative Basis:** U.I. Act, amended in 1971 to allow the UI Account funds to be used for Development Uses.
The Feepayer training program was added under S26.) of Bill C-21. The DIR training program operated under the authority of Section 14 of the UI Act.
Skill Shortages, Job Development and Job Entry are covered under the CJS group of programs, September 1985.

- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Individual training programs have varying entrance requirements and are targeted towards many different individuals.

- 4B. **Number of participants 1992-93:** Varies by training program.

5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable
Operating Costs: PYs: Varies by training option
\$: Varies by training option

PART I (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION

6. **First year of operation:** Varies by training program.
7. **Program Delivery:** Varies by training program.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** An Evaluation of UI-Sponsored Training, August 1983

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 Whether government training programs enhanced the re-employment prospects of UI claimants.
 Whether the programs differed in their effectiveness.
 How the five dimensions of employability changed after participation in the various UI training programs:
 Re-employability success.
 Length of time to find a job.
 Stability of employment obtained.
 Receipt of social assistance.
 Earnings.
 The rate of return of the various training programs.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis as well as the use of econometric techniques.
 There were several main data sources used in the evaluation:
 Data relating the regional guidelines and operational procedures.
 Interviews with EIC regional officials
 Mail survey of 2450 trainees of the five programs.
 Mail survey of 927 non-trainee regular UI claimants.
 Telephone survey of 30 CEC managers
 Mail surveys of CEC counsellors.
 EIC administrative data on the trainees and non-trainees.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Although there were large variations across training programs, the typical trainee was a young male in the twenties with 10 or 11 years of education, employed in low-skill occupations before unemployment.
 Time spent employed in the year prior to training varied substantially across training programs.
 Over half of trainees and non-trainees experienced one or more spells of unemployment in the two years following training/UI.
 Trainees and non-trainees were equally likely to find a job after finishing their initial selected UI spell.
 After completing training, 66 percent trainees got jobs in the field for which they were trained.
 Trainees required 11-17 weeks less than their non-trainee counterparts to find a job following training/UI.
 Real earnings gains were experienced for Feepayer group (\$4,816), Skill Shortages group (\$6,188) and for the Job Entry group (\$4,461).
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** After they find a job, Feepayers, Skill Shortages and Job Entry trainees are substantially better off than the UI-only group non-trainees.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The comparison across options for a client group is useful in assessing what works best for individual clients.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** None

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card. Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to estimate the effect of training programs. Review of Economics and Statistics. 1985;67:648-660.
LaLonde, R.J. Evaluating the econometric evaluations of training programs with experimental data. American Economic Review. 1986;76(4): 604-620.

Riddell, C., 1991. Evaluation of manpower and training programmes: The North American experience. In OECD (Ed.) Evaluating Labour Market and Social Programmes. Paris:OECD.

PROGRAM: OUTREACH**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Outreach came on the scene in 1972 and is one of the specialized counselling and placement services funded under the National Employment Services. It supports projects sponsored by community-based organizations on a one to three year renewable basis. Outreach is a major component of Specialized Services Units (SSU). It provides services to selected client groups in overcoming barriers to employment.

2. **Program Objective(s):** Outreach supports projects designed to increase the overall employability and eventual employment of selected client groups by offering employment-related services through contracts for service with community-based organizations, to persons who have severe difficulty competing in the labour market and are unable to be served adequately by their CECs.

3. **Legislative Basis:** National Employment Services (NES) Regulations of the Unemployment Insurance Act

- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Organizations are reimbursed for the costs incurred in providing services to special groups of clients.

- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____

5. **Resources 1992-93:** Grants and Contributions: \$51 million*
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____

- * For Employment Assistance having Outreach as its major component.
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1972

7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada

8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Outreach Program, March 1990

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were:
Extent to which Outreach projects complement or duplicate CEC activities;
The group assisted effectively;
Its impact on disadvantaged workers; and
Potential for streamlining functions across Outreach and CECs.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology had three components. They were client survey, interviews with program administrators and analysis of quarterly reports.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** They were:
Improved client self-reliance and employability;
Several factors influenced the success of an individual project: good relationship with project employees, workshops, job finding clubs, active contact with employers, aggressive marketing of clients; staff identification with client-groups;
Outreach served a clear need beyond CEC's capabilities;
No major shift needed across CECs and Outreach; only room for adjustment in CEC-Outreach working relationships; and
Current system to monitor performance of many projects did not monitor the right things.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The concept of specialized services to help severely employment disadvantaged groups continued to maintain its validity. It promotes the equity objective of the EIC.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Some room to streamline CEC-Outreach working relationships existed. Performance monitoring system did not go after the right things for many projects.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: PROGRAM FOR THE EMPLOYMENT DISADVANTAGED	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The Program for the Employment Disadvantaged was mandated as a major experiment in the field of wage subsidies. It was authorized to provide incentives to private sector employers to hire and maintain in employment, persons who were employment-disadvantaged and to seek community groups' support in integrating employment-disadvantaged persons into the work force. The program was approved by Treasury Board for just under three years with an evaluation requested at the end of that period.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): The objective of PED was to stimulate continuing employment in the private sector of the physically or mentally handicapped and other employment-disadvantaged persons who face barriers in securing such employment.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Mandated by Treasury Board</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: Handicapped individuals (physically handicapped, learning disabled) and other employment disadvantaged persons such as ex-alcoholics, welfare recipients, older workers.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: 1981-82 - approximately 10,488 participants</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$:25 million in 1981/82 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1981</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Coordination of CEC and non-CEIC referral and support agency efforts; wage subsidies to employers; related support (post contract) through agencies.</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): An Evaluation of the Program for the Employment Disadvantaged - March, 1984</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation was to determine the following: the organizational efficiency of PED in reaching and processing its intended target group; the adequacy of program resources, effectiveness of program delivery; and the impact of PED in stimulating an increase in private sector employment of disadvantaged persons.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The study relied on surveys of 1,600 participating employees and 1,550 participating employers, approximately 200 CEC Counsellors participating in PED delivery, about 180 referral and support agencies, and 188 non-participating employers in 15 urban areas across Canada. Analysis included selected multivariate analyses of impact and program features as well as presentation of descriptive survey results. The methodology did not include a comparison group for trainees.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation found that, overall, the program appeared to produce positive results in post program employability and earnings for certain groups of participants, notably those whose labour market barriers relate to human capital or screening factors. For some groups, longer run subsidies would be necessary.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation indicated that careful targetting of initiatives to the disadvantaged was needed.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Differential subsidies recognizing the complexities encountered by employers in providing assistnace to the employment disadvantaged were indicated by the evaluation. The need for improved liaison with social agencies and other Federal and Provincial program officials was highlighted as was the need for more publicity and the broadening of the pool of participating employers.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The lack of a control group was seen as a shortcoming of the analysis.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: YOUTH TRAINING OPTION**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** The Youth Training Option was introduced in November 1984 as an experimental pilot program to counter the transitional problems faced by youth, particularly school leavers, as they enter the labour market. The evaluation was requested by Treasury Board as a prerequisite to expansion of the program to a more general application. Projects combined practical, on-the-job experience and theoretical, off-site training. Participating trainees received an allowance or, if they were eligible, Unemployment Insurance benefits.
- 2. Program objective(s):** The main objective of YTO was to provide youth with the alternative of a structured practical and theoretical training experience to facilitate their transition from school to work and to enhance the opportunities for the private sector and communities to support the transition.
- 3. Legislative Basis:** Treasury Board Minute 794537.
- 4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria:** YTO was targeted on young people who were not interested in pursuing post-secondary education or who had already dropped out prior to completion of secondary school.
- 4B. Number of participants 1992-93:** November 1984 - September 1985 - 4,162 participants commenced training.
- 5. Resources 1992-93:**
 Grants and Contributions: \$:22,115,000 Nov. '84 to Aug. '85
 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
- 6. First year of operation:** 1984
- 7. Program Delivery:** YTO projects originated at the community level. Project development and implementation, as well as participant recruitment and selection, were carried out by more than 100 managing coordinators rather than by the existing CEC network. Managing coordinators were responsible for securing training place hosts to provide the practical, on-the-job experience portion of the program.
- 8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Evaluation of the Youth Training Option, February, 1987.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation addressed a wide range of issues regarding the unique features of design and delivery of the experimental YTO. Of major importance, as well, was the issue of the impact of program activity on the labour market performance of participants.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation relied on the following data sources: the YTO trainee documentation file; the file of contracts between Managing Coordinators and EIC; the National Institutional Training Program trainee documentation file; telephone surveys of 2,805 YTO trainees; telephone surveys and on-site visits involving 239 YTO and Job Entry Coordinators; telephone surveys of 514 Training Place Hosts; telephone and on-site interviews with YTO regional coordinators; and the NITP three-month follow-up survey. Administrative files were used to develop profiles of trainees and managing coordinators. Multiple regression techniques were used to investigate the impact of a number of independent variables on the level of employability after training and to identify factors associated with the decision to discontinue before the anticipated termination date. Due to timing and cost constraints, rather than a comparison group of non-participants, comparisons were made using a matched group of NITP trainees in order to gain insight into the relative effectiveness of new program initiatives featuring greater private sector involvement.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** YTO participants showed considerable gains in wages, employability, and labour force status in the post-program period compared to pre-training levels. Improvements in labour market performance were markedly better for YTO participants than for the comparable group of NITP participants. Moreover, the average cost per participant under YTO was substantially below than under NITP. The program design, which featured Managing Coordinators and Training Place Hosts, contributed considerably to its success. An alternating pattern of on- and off-the-job training exerted a positive influence on outcomes.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation highlighted the program benefits to be achieved through greater involvement of the private sector in the delivery of training programs. The second major lesson which emerged was the relative superiority of a combination of on-the-job and theoretical training as compared to institutional training alone.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** From a program viewpoint, the evaluation suggested that young people should be directed towards program options which featured a combination of training approaches rather than classroom training alone.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The YTO model was used as a prototype for the Job Entry Program under CJS. The subsequent evaluation of that program, using more rigorous analytical techniques, confirmed the findings for YTO.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: STUDENT BUSINESS LOANS (SBL)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: SBL was an element of the wider federal initiative to assist summer students. It was announced in late December 1985. Under the Program, students were eligible to obtain interest-free loans of up to \$2,000 to create their own jobs by starting/operating small summer businesses. The Program operated as a federal government loan initiative in only certain regions - Newfoundland, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the Northwest Territories. Elsewhere, provincial/territorial governments offered similar programs except in New Brunswick where federal/provincial programming of student loans was provided.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): To create meaningful and productive employment opportunities for students during the summer by providing for costs in support of interest-free loans to enable students to manage and operate small business enterprises.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis:</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Returning students who were legally entitled to work in Canada and who provided a written business plan and a cash flow forecast concerning the proposed summer business.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1986 as a part of the Challenge '86</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Program Evaluation - Student Business Loans, July 1987</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were:
impact of business experience on the development of students' entrepreneurial potential;
role in providing students with experience in negotiating business loans;
focus towards particular sub-groups of students;
impact in developing sufficient income for student entrepreneurs to pay partially or fully for their educational expenses; and
program effectiveness in meeting its objectives.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The main data source was the telephone survey of a random sample of program participants conducted immediately prior to their returning to pursue their education. Data from administrative records supplemented the survey data.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**
Students felt that the Program developed their entrepreneurial potential and increased their confidence in approaching a bank for a business loan. They felt that it enhanced their understanding of business development and their ability to manage a business. The program's impact on incremental business activity was less clear. Overall, business failures were not excessive. Most proposals were economically viable. The Program showed a stronger performance in stimulating incremental business activity among certain groups (high school students and females). The partnership with the private sector banking system worked well.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** SBL was an effective tool for the development of young entrepreneurs. It was in its role as a catalyst, rather than as mechanism for subsidies, that a SBL-like program was likely to produce its most positive impact. The Program was an efficient and effective means of creating human capital and summer jobs for students.
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** The program needed to develop a more balanced focus in order to move away from being focused on males and on older students. Although actual practical experience was the greatest source of strength in encouraging future entrepreneurial talent, this needed to be reinforced through the possibilities of expanding FBDB small business training.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: SUMMER EMPLOYMENT/EXPERIENCE DEVELOPMENT (SEED)
PROGRAM CHALLENGE '86

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The SEED program was the largest component of Challenge '86. It provided wage subsidies to employers for the purpose of hiring those summer students who were returning to resume their studies in the fall. Wage subsidies were available to employers in the private, municipal/education and non-private sectors. The Program supported job activities that were related to students' field of study or which would enhance a student's employability through work experience.
2. **Program Objective(s):** The SEED program was designed to provide incremental, career/study related and practical work experience to students during the summer months.
3. **Legislative Basis:**
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93:** Grants and Contributions: \$82.5 million
Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1985
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Summer Employment/ Experience Development (SEED) Program - Challenge '86, January 1987

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were:
extent of impact in terms of work activities among assisted employers and of incremental employment for students;
exploration of the context of employment - particularly with respect to seasonality of employment and employer dependency in terms of government wage subsidies;
potential for long-term job development and career development assistance to students as a result of their work experience; and
efficiency of the SEED program referral process in filling employers' vacancies through CECs-for-Students or regular CECs.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology differed significantly from that used in the 1985 evaluation of SEED program. First, employers' and students' feedback covered the entire period of the program's operation in 1986 as compared to only half of this period in 1985. Second, the methodology was limited to findings at the national level. This was appropriate in view of the "supplementary" nature of the present study following the extensive study undertaken last year. Third, the present study, unlike the previous one, included a survey of a comparison group of employers who applied for support under SEED but were unsuccessful due to limited funds.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:**
The SEED program was effective in producing incremental summer employment for returning students.
It effectively reduced the average summer student unemployment rate by 3.7 percentage points.
Students strongly preferred jobs generated through SEED compared to their other options in the labour market. Well over half the student participants in SEED believed that they would have been able to find jobs on their own.
The SEED program design continued to impart a strong bias for the employment of post-secondary students.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** The wage subsidy incentive was effective in encouraging employers to create incremental employment opportunities for summer students who were returning to resume their education in the fall. The SEED program, being the largest component of Challenge '86, effectively reduced the average summer student unemployment rate.
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** The structure of the SEED program design continued to have a strong bias for the employment of post-secondary students compared to secondary students. This was undesirable from a perspective of equality of employment opportunities. The Program had a balanced focus in terms of gender.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: SUMMER EMPLOYMENT/EXPERIENCE DEVELOPMENT (SEED) PROGRAM CHALLENGE '85	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1. Program Rationale/Background: The SEED program was the largest component of Challenge '85. It provided wage subsidies to employers for the purposes of employing students through the summer months. Wage subsidies were available to employers in the private, municipal/education and non-private sectors. The Program supported job activities that were related to students' field of study or which would enhance a student's employability through work experience.	
2. Program Objective(s): The SEED program was designed to provide incremental, career/study related and practical work experience to students during the summer months.	
3. Legislative Basis:	
4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:	
4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____	
5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$82.5 million Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____	
6. First Year of Operation: 1985	
7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada	
8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of Challenge '85 Summer Employment/Experience Development (SEED) Program Element, November 1985	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issue was to assess the performance of the program as an aid to the planning and design of 1985-86 summer employment programming. The evaluation being concurrent with the first year of program operation, it was impossible to measure program's accomplishments in respect of its long-term goal. An other key issue was to examine the degree to which career-study related positions correlated with the students' studies or labour market aspirations.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Survey techniques were used to gather evidence on program results. The survey of employers covered 2,008 respondents. It was conducted during July and August 1985. The survey of participants covered 2,000 students. It was carried out in July-September 1985.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The Program design had a bias for the employment of post-secondary students as it emphasized the creation of career-related employment compared to work experience positions. Wage subsidies received by employers were effective in producing incremental summer employment for returning students. Students were satisfied, in general, with the jobs they had.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The Program design had a strong bias to benefit post-secondary students and those secondary students who aspired to continue their studies at the post-secondary level. Although the evaluation design lacked a comparison group, there was evidence to indicate that the Program was effective in creating incremental employment for summer students. Many SEED Program participants (more than 40%) who had held summer jobs before 1985, stated that those jobs were directly or indirectly due to government assistance.
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** The SEED Program achieved its intended targeting. However, the Program had a strong bias to benefit post-secondary students, an undesirable feature from the perspective of equality of opportunity. The design should achieve a more balanced focus. The implementation process experienced some delay (often times lengthy) in getting NHQ approval for proposals to create four or more jobs. Provincial assistance in harmonizing their summer programs with federal initiatives was seen as beneficial to the program in almost all regions.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: CANADA EMPLOYMENT CENTRES FOR STUDENTS (CECs-S)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** CECs-S were introduced in 1968 as separately identifiable operations within the network of regular CECs. It was a response to the pressing needs of students for summer jobs in the context of their large and growing population during the 1960s and 1970s. The program linked job creation measures with job placement and job marketing for students. CECs-S operate during the summer. Student managers run them, except in Quebec where some CECs-S use regular CEC personnel. Student Placement Officers (SPOs), hired from among students, assist the managers.
2. **Program Objective(s):** The program was designed to assist secondary and post-secondary students in obtaining summer employment in the private and public sectors and to assist employers in obtaining the services of students as temporary help. It also has two sub-objectives:
 - To help reduce social and economic inequalities which may be experienced by disadvantaged students; and,
 - to match available student labour force with the worker needs of key areas of the private sector experiencing labour shortages.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Functions as part of the regular National Employment Service with legislative basis in the UI Act.
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** CECs-S operate each year between April and August and deal exclusively with secondary and post-secondary students. They act as a focal point for students seeking work and for employers who want to hire students.
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$:
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1968
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Canada Employment Centres for Students, March 1990

* \$12 million (budgeted)

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issues were: (a) the continuing validity of rationale for separate CECs-S; (b) the impact of the program on its student and employer clients; and (c) alternative mechanisms for program delivery.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data came from existing and new sources. They were: survey of student clients; survey of employer clients; analysis of Statistics Canada Labour Market Activity Survey; youth and students labour market trends analysis; and interviews with program managers.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** CECs-S served a high proportion of students seeking summer jobs. Students found the services quite helpful and felt a high degree of satisfaction with services received. CECs-S also appeared to be serving non-returning students, in addition to those who planned to go back to school in the Fall. The Centres helped students to find jobs quickly, although the jobs paid minimum or close to minimum level wages. Earnings from these jobs were an important source of financing education, especially for post-secondary students.

The job duration and wage rates of jobs filled through the CECs-S were the same or slightly inferior than those filled through other means by the same employers. Statistical analysis showed that CEC-S services had no influence on job search time, employability and earnings of their clients.

Demographic and economic developments were reducing the strength of the rationale for maintaining separate CECs-S. Young people, as a proportion of the Canadian population, were declining and projected to decline further, thereby weakening the program rationale.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The rationale for having separate CECs for students was losing its ground on account of demographic and economic developments. There was, affecting all young people, a large increase in temporary labour market activity during summer months. These young people have little job search skills.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** It was learned that many regions moved away from mandatory referrals from CECs-S SEED supported jobs. Revitalization of Employment Services had an impact on the way the job orders were served. Use of open display vacancies was increasing but the pace of change differed across regions. Some overlap existed between CECs-S and regular CECs in serving employer job orders.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: DEVELOPMENTAL USE OF UI FUNDS FOR JOB CREATION PROGRAM	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: Three developmental uses of UI funds were provided for when the UI Act was amended in 1977 - occupational training, work sharing, and direct job creation. The rationale for the use of UI funds for job creation was to provide constructive employment in preference to income maintenance when regular employment alternatives were lacking. It was a strong contra-cyclical response to the increasing extent and duration of joblessness in Canada, a substantial commitment of \$220 million over a two year period beginning in mid-1982.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): To use income maintenance expenditures under the UI program to create opportunities which would not otherwise be available for productive employment involving the continued utilization of skills of laid off workers in receipt of UI and with poor prospects of alternative employment in the short term. The program was designed to focus on communities hard hit by cyclical unemployment as opposed to chronic unemployment conditions.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: The Unemployment Insurance Act was amended in 1977 to authorize the payment of UI funds to claimants for developmental purposes.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Eligible employers include businesses, municipalities, individuals and non-profit organizations. Eligible participants include unemployed who are receiving or eligible to receive UI benefits. Participants must be legally entitled to work in Canada and be referred through a Canada Employment Centre.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: 26,323</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$116.4 million* Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>* Both UI and CRF</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: The program was tested on a pilot basis (3 pilots) between March 1979 and September 1980. Evaluation results were released in January 1982 by EIC Program Evaluation Branch. In light of the positive evaluation, the UIJC was implemented as a full program in mid-1982.</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation - Developmental Use of UI Funds for Job Creation, July 1984</p>	

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were:
whether projects were well targeted to areas of cyclical unemployment, sectoral orientation and whether they conformed to program criteria;
whether project outputs met standards in terms of both value of output and incrementality;
program's impacts on communities, industrial sectors and program clientele.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology included analysis of the Longitudinal Data File and telephone surveys of clients and a comparison group to assess employment impacts. Review of program implementation was based on a wide variety of data sources: 150 project files; 30 in-depth case studies; interviews with officials from major federal departments; interviews with program staff; and views of a panel of experts. Finally, methodology included analysis of the value of output for 30 projects involving intensive site visits.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The program succeeded well against its objectives. It was applied to communities hard hit by cyclical unemployment. It was offered to people laid off in hard hit sectors such as forestry and mining. The projects would not have occurred in the same form or as soon without program funding.
The average UI/JC participant was employed more than twice as long as he/she would have been in the absence of the program. This participant received benefits estimated to be \$2,138 more than from the regular UI benefit. Program benefits were confined to the time period of program participation.
The Program was concentrated in three industrial sectors - forestry, mining and fishing - and in a broad range of community-type projects. It was well targeted to areas of cyclical unemployment.
The actual costs to the economy of employing UI/JC individuals were substantially less than the wage costs incurred. The program generated net social benefits per year of employment created in the range between \$2,588 and \$5,686. This impact is the result of substantially reduced cost to society of employing labour during a recession and the structure of the program itself. Recession means low chance of sourcing labour from other jobs. The important program design feature was the provision that participation in UI/JC did not establish further eligibility for UI following project termination.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The developmental use of UI funds for job creation, if well designed and well implemented, was an effective contra-cyclical strategy for communities and sectors hard hit by cyclical unemployment as opposed to chronic unemployment conditions. A strategy that is clearly and sharply focused works.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The most frequent problem encountered by sponsors and participants was late UI cheques. Long delays brought strong reactions and even led to some potential participants not being involved.

The program designers asked the program to do more than create short-term employment. They wanted it to assist in the retention of job skills at higher and middle levels. But half the participants had low skilled jobs prior to entering the program. It is an important lesson that a program should not be overloaded with multiple objectives. That kind of design impairs the impact and effectiveness of the program.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: NEW TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM (NTEP)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: NTEP was one of the three job creation components introduced in 1980 under the aegis of the Canada Employment Program (CEP). The period covered in the evaluation excludes the extreme intensification of cyclical unemployment which occurred during the second half of 1981 and through 1982. NTEP was a response to problems of structural unemployment among highly qualified workers.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): Focused on highly educated scientific/technically qualified <u>recent</u> labour force entrants who were unable to find employment in their discipline; Encouragement of research and development and its applications in a number of priority areas (manufacturing, process development, small-scale energy conservation programs, and alternative energy technologies).</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis:</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>* Program no longer exists</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1980</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of Three Job Creation Programs, August 1983</p>	

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to examine the effectiveness of the implementation of the program and its short-term and long-term impacts. Other key evaluation issues were: to assess the value of output of sponsored projects; whether the program was bringing forward the scheduling of R&D which firms had already planned to undertake at a later date; and how the primary objective of job creation meshed with the secondary objective of supporting R&D.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology included in-depth case studies involving site visits to a sample of projects, post-program survey of participants, and comparison group, long-term labour force tracking of pre and post-program employment experience, and assessment of projects against the long-run contribution of various types of R&D to the economy.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**

In terms of value of output, NTEP was less effective than the other two components (CCDP and CCSP) of the Canada Employment Program. There was some evidence to indicate that the program was not well-focused. It funded areas which the private sector could handle through its own activities - since it was focused only on limited adaptations rather than major innovations. The program's benefits were to bring forward the scheduling of R&D which firms had already planned to undertake at a later date - though alleviating cash flow difficulties. NTEP was less effective as well in terms of "incremental jobs" compared to CCDP and CCSP. While it was difficult to identify precisely, the majority of the jobs created displaced employment that would have existed in the absence of the program.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Job creation policy for the highly qualified individuals who are experiencing structural unemployment should not be like NTEP, loaded with incompatible objectives. For NTEP, the primary objective of job creation and the secondary objective of supporting R&D appear to have worked at cross-purposes. If one cannot get rid of incompatible objectives, then the lesson learned is that the internship principle of the program should be in areas other than occupations involved in R&D.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Because the program (NTEP) was well-managed, no operational lessons were learned.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDIT PROGRAM (ETCP)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The ETCP was introduced on March 8, 1978. It offered a tax credit of up to \$2.00/hour (depending on area) to a maximum of 40 hours per week for a maximum of 12 months for each "eligible worker" hired. It was a new approach to job creation in Canada, introduced by the then Minister of Finance, Mr. Jean Chrétien.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): The Program objective was to stimulate incremental employment in the private sector. The secondary objective was to improve the future employability of participants above that which would have occurred in its absence.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Authority was provided by amendments to the Income Tax Act and associated regulations.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>* Program no longer exists</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1978</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of the Employment Tax Credit Program (ETCP), January 1982</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The major evaluation issue was to determine the extent to which the jobs created by the program induced employment incremental to that which would have occurred in the absence of the program. Another key evaluation issue was to determine the extent to which the program has been associated with improved participant employability during and after the program.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data came from a number of sources. Basic employer and employee data were developed from the Agreement (EMP2204) and the Notice of Hiring Form (EMP2280). A mail survey of 4,006 participating employers supplemented the basic employer data. Supplementary employee data were obtained from a mail survey of employees, producing 4,807 employee questionnaires. The methodology also utilized the Commission's Longitudinal Labour Force Data Base. It included a comparison group of workers who started to work at the same time as ETCP participants.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Rate of incremental employment was at best 60%. The program was more cost-effective than other direct job creation programs. Hiring patterns revealed a preference for prime-age males. Smaller firms were relatively more inclined to participate. Most of the jobs created were short-term in nature. The subsidized jobs had lower than average wages.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The program uptake was slow in the first year but speeded up in the second year. The rate of incremental employment was nearly 60%. The overall evidence indicated that the program was effective in creating worthwhile jobs in a cost-effective way.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Some features of the program design made employers somewhat reluctant to participate in the program. Any future programming should embody a more simplified design than in the past.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

PROGRAM: ECONOMIC GROWTH COMPONENT OF CANADA (EGC) WORKS

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The ECG program was introduced in fiscal year 1978-79. Federal government departments and agencies were invited to propose projects which satisfied program criteria. The program supported a limited number of projects. It was established within the Canada Works Program to address elements of job creation not adequately dealt with under the existing strategy - i.e., permanent, private sector employment. Provision was made for up to \$50 million of Canada Works Funding in 1978-79 (later reduced to \$35 million with austerity measures) and \$20 million for 1979-80.
2. **Program Objective(s):** EGC was designed to create continuing incremental private sector employment and/or to support immediate job creation in activities which contribute to increased economic growth. Its sub-objectives were:
 - to encourage federal agencies to adopt a labour intensive approach in the design and delivery of activities within their mandate;
 - to create jobs which were desirable (matched with local labour market needs) in terms of productivity, seasonality, skill levels, wages, working conditions;
 - to support activities which would otherwise not occur within an appropriate time frame; and,
 - to utilize funds in areas of highest unemployment, particularly in rural and resource-dependent areas.
3. **Legislative Basis:**
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
- * EGC no longer exists
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1978
7. **Program Delivery:**
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Economic Growth Component of Canada Works, April 1980

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were:
whether the projects achieved the objective of creating permanent, private sector employment;
whether the projects would have otherwise occurred;
what the activities of individuals employed on projects would have been in the absence of the program; and
whether the program had the impact of creating continuing private sector employment.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Thirteen projects were selected for intensive investigation. Departmental interviews, EGC records and Secretariat Staff were other data sources.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The majority of departments formally solicited did not submit proposals, most claiming that the EGC concept was not compatible with their objectives and operations. Sponsors of accepted projects frequently expressed a concern over the vagueness of program criteria and the constraint on time to implement projects effectively. Projects amounting to 19% of the total EGC budget in 1979-80 were withdrawn due to the shortage of time remaining to implement the project and lack of private sector financing.

Analysis of selected projects showed that four projects had unsavourable benefit cost ratios, three were marginal, and four were favourable. This indicated that the program was moderately successful at best.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Dispersed responsibility for project management across departments is not an effective strategy. It leads to the lack of accountability for outcomes and potential for program goal displacement. The probability of conflicting goals obscured the decision-making process. Simple and clear goals and program criteria are essential.

4B. Operational Lessons Learned:
More intensive program administration, perhaps grouping staff into specialized areas such as wage subsidy or resource development.
More selective attention to canvassing those departments and agencies which appear more likely to develop relevant proposals.
More lead time in order to facilitate project implementation.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: CANADA MOBILITY PROGRAM

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The Mobility program was introduced in 1965. In recent years, since the evaluation, it has been integrated into the Canadian Jobs Strategy. The program provided relocation grants to workers who had secured employment outside of their home community to assist them with the cost of moving. It also provided travel grants for several purposes. The evaluation focused on three components of the program: relocation component, exploratory component and seasonal component.
 2. **Program Objective(s):** Canada Mobility program had two objectives, one referring to the regular program components and one referring to the enriched components. Regular components was designed to encourage the geographical mobility of workers who were unemployed, under-employed or about to become unemployed and for whom work was not available locally and who wish to seek work or move to employment. Enriched components were designed to provide a special financial incentive to facilitate the geographic mobility of workers who were unemployed, under-employed, or about to become unemployed in order to meet serious skill shortages or to move from conditions of severe labour surplus.
 3. **Legislative Basis:** Canada Mobility Program was administered under the authority (Appropriation Acts) Manpower Mobility Regulations
- 4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
- 5. Resources 1992-93*:**
 Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
 Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
- * Program no longer exists
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1965
 7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
 8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Canada Mobility Program, February 1985

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were: (a) to determine the short-term employment impact of the program; (b) to determine economic benefits and cost-effectiveness of the program; (c) extent to which the program reduced structural unemployment; and (d) extent to which CECs actively promote the program.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data came from several sources: (a) a telephone survey of 359 participants in the Relocation component of the program; (b) telephone interviews with 178 participants in the Exploratory component; (c) telephone interviews with 75 rejected applicants to the Relocation component; (d) telephone interviews with 77 rejected applicants to the Exploratory component; and (e) personal interviews with 360 participants in the Seasonal Agricultural component. Other data sources were: (a) a field survey of 15 selected CEC offices across the country together with interviews with Regional and Headquarters CEIC personnel; (b) program data; and (c) data on regional economic and labour force conditions.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Evidence indicated that the program was not highly incremental. Of the three program components, the seasonal agricultural component appears to be the most incremental (61%) and the relocation component the least incremental (21%). Exploratory component was 50% incremental. The female and youth shares of relocation and exploratory authorizations were well below their shares of the unemployed. Gender and age data for seasonal agricultural components were not available. For the Relocation component, the benefit-cost ratio (incremental benefits divided by incremental costs) was only 0.32. Evidence indicated that the Mobility program was helping to reduce structural unemployment, though this impact was modest. With respect to the effect of enriched measures on skill shortage, no evidence existed to suggest that such measures had a major influence on increasing or accelerating the filling of skills shortages. The overwhelming majority of workers assisted under the program did not encounter problems as a result of delays in responsiveness on the part of the Mobility program.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The Relocation component did not have a rationale in terms of producing net benefits to society. However, adjustment programs like Mobility can, and typically will, help prevent the emergence of responses that attempt to counter pressures for economic change.
The designated shortage measure which allowed for enhanced benefits did not have a rationale in terms of influence on increasing or accelerating the filling of skill shortages.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Criteria for relocation assistance needed to be streamlined or tightened. Some workers receiving relocation assistance were moving to jobs which might have been filled by unemployed workers already resident in the community.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: CLAIMANT RE-EMPLOYMENT SERVICE (CRS)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: CRS, formerly known as the Claimant Re-Employment Strategy (CRS), is a key element of CEIC's Labour Force Development Service (LFDS). Under the CRS, employment services are offered to selected claimants as early as possible in the claim period, thereby facilitating their re-employment. The Pre-Evaluation Assessment (PEA) recommended a two-phase evaluation of the short-term results of the CRS implementation. Phase I was to deal with CRS implementation and its impact on CEC operations. Phase II is to measure the impact of CRS on the participating client (claimant). Phase I has been completed.</p> <p>2. Program Objective(s): CRS was designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) help claimants find employment through short-term re-employment measures; (b) help claimants enhance their employability and increase their earnings by referring selected claimants to long-term measures where necessary; and, (c) ensure that claimants fully understand their rights and fulfil their obligations under the UI Act. <p>3. Legislative Basis: Part VI, section 120(1) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Administered in accordance with the National Employment Service Regulations.</p> <p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Claimants selected in accordance with criteria established by the CEC. They are potential CRS participants. Those who would most benefit from the programs and services under the CRS receive the interventions geared to their re-employment or to the improvement of their employability.</p> <p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p> <p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____</p> <p>* Because CRS is a new method of services delivery rather than a new program, it is virtually impossible to determine the level of resources allocated to the CRS.</p> <p>6. First Year of Operation: 1989</p> <p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p> <p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of the Claimant Re-Employment Service (CRS), Phase I: Implementation of CRS, December 1992</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** This study concentrated on the Phase I evaluation. The key evaluation issue of this Phase was to deal with the analysis of the implementation of CRS and its impact on CEC operations. It focused on whether or not CRS actually transformed itself from an idea to complete implementation.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** CEC Managers Survey was conducted in January-March 1992. Overall, 373 questionnaires were sent to them. Respondents numbered 328.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Evidence indicated some prioritization and some strategic selection of CRS participants, but much improvement was needed in these areas. Survey results showed fairly extensive use of CRS committees. They reviewed procedures at the local level and established clientele and selection criteria.

Although CECs were slowly developing an integrated service mentality, much more work was needed in this direction. The still weak linkages between the Employment and Insurance staff were delaying the development of more strategic client selection. This problem will persist without activities like organizational development designed to integrate the staff.

There is a need to improve the currently available LMI if CECs were to develop a strategic direction for the selection of CRS participants.

Computer systems in the CECs were not supportive of an effective delivery of the CRS. They need to be improved to the level that allows for proper monitoring and tracking of clients.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** CECs did not have/achieve the level of linkages between Employment and Insurance staff required to effectively deliver re-employment services to a select group of UI claimants who would benefit most. They were not very effective in prioritizing the UI claimants and selecting a group of those who would benefit most. Policy was based on overly optimistic assumptions about the state of CEC workings.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The Insurance staff played a limited role in employment services and were largely indifferent about the CRS. They saw it as an employment service program. Their priority remained claims processing. Still two separate cultures existed within CECs. CECs were treating CRS participants as virtually two separate clients - one for Insurance staff, and one for the Employment staff. Indeed, several files were opened for one single client, contrary to the CRS design. CECs were only slowly developing an integrated service delivery.

Computer systems were not conducive to the delivery of the CRS. They did not permit proper tracking and monitoring of clients.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

PROGRAM: EMPLOYMENT COUNSELLING

PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION

- 1.** **Program Rationale/Background:** Employment Counselling is an on-going, direct service which uses the client-centred approach to help people who are facing labour market difficulties. Employment counsellors work with clients to assess their employment needs, and to define and achieve realistic employment goals. Counselling is an important link to further needs-based programming for clients. Clients participate on a one-to-one basis or in a group. Additional community resources for employment counselling may also be purchased by the CEC.

2. **Program Objective(s):** Program objectives are to help clients assess their employment-related needs and improve their employability in order to facilitate their labour market integration, and/or to assist them to become self-sufficient in their efforts to find and maintain suitable employment.

3. **Legislative Basis:** National Employment Services Regulations; Unemployment Insurance Act and Regulations; CJS Terms and Conditions approved by the Treasury Board on June 20, 1991 and relevant CJS Policy Statement approved by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission

4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Recipients are unemployed and employed workers as well as businesses and organizations

4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____

5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: 251 \$9.9 million _____

6. **First Year of Operation:**

7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada

8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of National Employment Services: Longitudinal Tracking Study of CEC Clientele, Phase II Employment Counselling, June 1990

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to measure the effects of counselling on the labour market experience of those CEC clients who received counselling. This study was able to address this issue more thoroughly by using the full two years of data on labour market experience. Previous phases of the study were unable to do so. Another key issue was to describe and analyse the counselling process. While the Phase I study addressed this issue, the interim and Phase II studies addressed the more important issues of counselling outcomes and impacts.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** This study extended earlier studies with the addition of data which was not previously available, i.e. the data from the 24 month interview. The clients were interviewed by telephone at 2, 6, 12 and 24 months from the baseline interview, conducted shortly after the enrolment survey. Survey design followed a two-stage sampling strategy. Seventy-two CECs were selected in the first stage. The second stage consisted of enrolment interviews which involved two random samplings of CEC exit traffic during separate one week intervals, yielding two cohorts of CEC clientele. The present study pools the data of the two cohorts in all model estimations. Also, the longer time period for longitudinal analyses (two years) makes the period of the starting point less important than in the previous studies, which used only responses up to one year from the baseline interview.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The results of models which compare labour market outcomes of counselled and non-counselled clients provide some evidence that counselling increases employment stability and job satisfaction. Previous studies revealed the effect on job satisfaction, but did not detect an effect of counselling on employment stability. It is possible that the longer period of observation was necessary to detect the effect on employment stability. Evidence was less clear that counselling during an unemployment spell provides assistance in returning to work. This would be quite compatible with the evidence for a positive effect on job satisfaction, in that a more selective job search may take longer to produce results for some individuals, but would lead to greater job satisfaction. The models suggested that the probability of an immediate return to work increases most after the first counselling interview, with the second interview having an additional but weaker positive effect. The effect of the third counselling interview could not be detected statistically. The diminishing impact of additional counselling interviews suggested that resources could be better spent providing more individuals with few counselling sessions, or possibly only one.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions (cont'd):** No evidence could be found that counselling leads to increased wages, a result consistent with the previous studies. It is possible that this result would occur if some people were assisted in obtaining higher paying jobs, while others were led to more realistic expectations.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Employment Counselling has a credible role and rationale in terms of its impact on CEC clients.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Evidence of diminishing impact associated with additional counselling interviews suggests that resource use efficiency can be enhanced if resources were used to provide more individuals with few counselling sessions, or possibly one.
5. **Outstanding Issues:**
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:** Evaluation of the Quality of Employment Counselling Services, Phase One Report, June 1988
Evaluation of the Quality of Employment Counselling: Analysis of the Counselling Outcomes, Phase II, Interim Report, December 1988

TITLE: INCREASED INTERVIEW ACTIVITY	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: Inaugurated in July of 1986, the Increased Interview Activity (IIA) consists of two mandatory interviews. First, an employment assistance interview takes place in the second month after an initial UI claim has been established. Secondly, a UI benefit entitlement interview was conducted with those claimants entering the regionally extended benefit phase.</p>	
<p>2. Program objective(s): The objective of the program is threefold: To assess claimants' employment needs and help them with their job search by informing them of local labour market conditions and of the programs and services that may help them find work. To conduct a thorough review of the claimant's entitlements to benefits. This is to be done by providing claimants with proper information regarding their rights and obligations. To reduce the costs of the UI program. It was postulated that helping claimants in their job search would reduce their duration of unemployment and thereby lead to savings in the UI account.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: The 1984 Ministerial Task Force on Program Review identified the need to more broadly assist claimants in their job search, and to reduce both deliberate abuse and unintentional misuse of UI benefits. The Commission decided to implement this recommendation and in February 1986, made a submission to the Treasury Board for additional resources. The Treasury Board accepted CEIC's proposal and allocated 529 additional PY's. As a result, the in-person interviews of UI claimants started in July 1986 under the name of the Increased Interview Activity (IIA)</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: All UI claimants are eligible for assistance through the IIA program.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: N/A</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: N/A \$: N/A</p>	
<p>6. First year of operation: 1986</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: CECs\Regions</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Increased Interview Activity program, September 1987</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several evaluation issues addressed:
 The level and type of assistance provided to claimants in their job search.
 The effect IIA has on prevention and detection of misuse of UI benefits.
 The reduction in UI benefits paid due to reduction in job search duration.
 The impact on the delivery of other CEC activities as a result of the implementation of the IIA program.
 The nature of the cost-effectiveness of IIA and identification of possible alternatives.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
 There were three main sources of data used in the evaluation:
 IIA administrative data.
 BNOP data.
 Survey of IIA Coordinations and interviewing officers.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** During the first nine months of implementation of the program some 391,000 Employment Assistance Interviews and 40,000 Regionally Extended Benefit (RE) interviews were completed.
 A large majority of the coordinators (95 percent) were satisfied with the implementation of the activity. Approximately 93 percent felt that the activity was needed to assist claimants in their job search and felt that the activity was also required in order to reduce abuse in the UI system. 86 percent IIA detected abuse among 15 percent of claimants and may have deterred some 17 percent of claimants scheduled for in-person interviews from potential abuse.
 Estimated savings from disqualifications/disentitlements served are estimated at \$26 million, while those from placements are estimated at \$5 million.
 A savings/cost ratio of 5.5 to 1 was realized.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** IIA had positive effects for abuse detection and deterrence but did not appear effective in reducing job search duration.
 Employment Assistance Interviews may improve the quality of job search but does not effect job search duration.
 Only 2 percent of those who received Employment Assistance Interview were placed as a result of referral.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The program resulted in cost savings through disqualification/disentitlement. As well there were positive savings experienced as a result of job placements. In general there was a positive cost benefit ratio.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** Because the planned survey of claimants participating in IIA was not authorized, it is not possible to examine questions relating to attitudes and opinions of those claimants.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Evaluation of Increased Interview Activity: Opinions and Perceptions of CEC Officers, EIC, October 1987.

PROGRAM: COMPASS**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** COMPASS is an interactive computerized system for providing assistance, especially to young people, in entering and adjusting to the labour market. Its development began in 1982. In 1984-85, Treasury Board approved in principle continued COMPASS development and the conduct of a pilot trial in 10 centres across Canada. Treasury Board also asked, at that time, for an evaluation of the pilot trial.
 2. **Program Objective(s):** COMPASS was designed to provide assistance especially to young people, in entering and adjusting to the labour market.
 3. **Legislative Basis:** Unemployment Insurance Act which is the legislative basis for Employment Services
-
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
 - 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
-
5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
 6. **First Year of Operation:** 1985
 7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
 8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of COMPASS, November 1986

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issue was to assess the effectiveness of the Job Interview Skills module delivered through micro-computers in 10 CECs, one in each region. More specifically, the issues were:
How effective was the COMPASS service in terms of its impact on users?
How cost-effective was the COMPASS service?
What was the profile of COMPASS users?
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data came from the following two sources: (a) COMPASS service record/questionnaire which collected data pertaining to the client interaction with the COMPASS micro-computer, the impact of this interaction on the client, data on client characteristics; and (b) the daily record of COMPASS operation which picked up data on the length of time of interaction for the two groups of clients; those who completed the COMPASS service questionnaire and those who did not.
The number of clients who completed the COMPASS service questionnaire over a three-week period (on a voluntary basis) was 345.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The length of time a client interacted with the micro-computer made a difference in terms of the effectiveness of the COMPASS service (self-service) in providing information and learning to users. Users who spent more time on the COMPASS micro-computer had a greater chance of acquiring information and learning compared to those who interacted with the service for shorter periods. Because many of the users interacted with COMPASS on a casual basis for short period, and because the volume of users was low, the estimated extent of COMPASS capacity under-utilization was found to be high at 80 percent. The estimated cost per user was \$2.40 - costs associated with the depreciation of the COMPASS intellectual property and of its complement of hardware and the costs of repair and maintenance. Overall, about 60 percent of the users had a positive experience from their interaction with COMPASS; the rest had no such experience. Users suggested that the placement of the COMPASS computer in more accessible place, like the shopping centre, should attract more clients.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions (cont'd):** Most of the COMPASS users (66%) were unemployed and looking for work. The rest were either employed (17%) or outside the labour force (also 17%). Female users were under-represented (31%), a low figure compared to their share in the national labour force (43%). Profile of the COMPASS users showed that they were a job-ready group, who thought of COMPASS as one more place to look for information addition to EIC publications, counsellors or public libraries.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The role and rationale of the COMPASS micro-computer in a CEC were uncertain in the context of its high underutilization rate.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Placement of COMPASS micro-computers in more accessible places, like the shopping centre, should attract more clients.
5. **Outstanding Issues:**
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

TITLE: WORK ORIENTATION WORKSHOPS (WOW)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** WOW, an element within the Challenge '85 framework was designed to meet the needs of a particular sub-group of students who are considering dropping out of school without completing high school and who are not fully prepared for the demands of the labour market. The program was authorized on an experimental basis to learn how best to serve this sub-group in terms of a developmental learning experience against which they could test their labour market participation. The program provided for a maximum of 10 participants per workshop.
WOW projects were to be implemented in conjunction with private sector associations and/or community organizations, social service agencies, educational institutions, and other corporate bodies as project sponsors. Forty-six projects were undertaken.
2. **Program Objective(s):** To provide disadvantaged in-school youth and drop-outs with a developmental training experience against which they can decide upon and test their future labour market participation requirements.
3. **Legislative Basis:**
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Disadvantaged youth or potential drop-outs at the high school or CEGEP level
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1985
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Work Orientation Workshops, September 1985

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issue was to determine the appropriateness or otherwise of the program structure and processes in relation to the needs of the target population. Other key issues were: whether implementation was well handled across regions; sponsors, trainers and participants' views on the value of the subject matter presented in workshops; whether or not the program was well targeted; the extent to which the objectives of the WOW project were achieved; and sponsors, trainers and participants' views on the workshop and work experience components.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology took the form of detailed case studies of fourteen of the forty-six approved projects. These case studies were conducted in all ten provinces, and were representative of the distribution of projects, by province and by type of sponsorship. Separate surveys were conducted among principal interest groups, including EIC Regional program management, project sponsors, trainers, participants, and cooperating employers. The methodology relied heavily on qualitative rather than quantitative assessment.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The WOW program was perceived to have been soundly conceptualized, and to have provided a valuable experience to the participating students. Its implementation was found to have been successfully and effectively done with a high degree of sponsor and client satisfaction. Regions achieved an expected distribution of projects, and selection of participants conformed to program guidelines. Participating students have been credited by trainers with having achieved an enhanced awareness of labour market requirements. Participants reported an increased awareness of employee attributes and a more realistic appreciation of future job possibilities if they leave school early.
Dramatic changes have occurred in future education plans in a number of cases, and motivation to continue in school has been enhanced in others; most participants who had planned to drop out either definitely returned to school or seriously considered doing so.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Role and rationale of the WOW projects were confirmed in terms of the soundness in conceptualization and providing a valuable experience to targeted students.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The target group needed to be more narrowly defined. Trainers, employers, and participants alike considered that poorly motivated and disruptive students should not be selected for future projects.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Role and rationale of the WOW projects were confirmed in terms of the soundness in conceptualization and providing a valuable experience to targeted students.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The target group needed to be more narrowly defined. Trainers, employers, and participants alike considered that poorly motivated and disruptive students should not be selected for future projects.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT COUNSELLING CENTRES (WECC) PILOT PROGRAM							
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION							
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: WECCs are part of the regular CEC in each location either physically within or adjacent to the parent CEC, or in a separate building from the parent CEC. Counsellors use the same general counselling tools as the regular CEC offices but in a way designed to meet the particular problems of the target clientele involved. Some WECCs offer placement services on a limited basis, and those centres affiliated with post-secondary educational institutions offer social counselling to women who have personal problems that may be barriers (time management, day care, social interaction, etc.) to employment. Seven of the 9 WECCs established under the pilot program participated in the evaluation.</p>							
<p>2. Program Objective(s): WECC objective, in general terms, is to improve the CEC's capacity to help women adapt to a changing work environment. More specifically, the WECC program is designed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve the labour market position of women; Assist women to make employment or career-related decisions; Facilitate successful entry or re-entry of women into employment; Actively promote the choice to pursue non-traditional occupations; and Help women qualify for specific occupations. 							
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Unemployment Insurance Act which is the legislative basis for Employment Services</p>							
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Three specific groups of women are the focus: (a) women 25+ years who have never worked before at a job for wages and are in the process of being absorbed in the work force for the first time; (b) women who have worked for wages in the past and are in the process of returning to the work force after an absence of one year or longer; and (c) employed women considering a major career change from their current occupation/career, with special emphasis on the non-traditional occupations.</p>							
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>							
<p>5. Resources 1992-93:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 40%;">Grants and Contributions:</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: right;">\$:</td> <td style="width: 50%;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Operating Costs:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">PYs:</td> <td style="text-align: right;">\$:</td> </tr> </table>		Grants and Contributions:	\$:		Operating Costs:	PYs:	\$:
Grants and Contributions:	\$:						
Operating Costs:	PYs:	\$:					
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1981</p>							
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>							
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Supplement to the 1984 Evaluation of Women's Employment Counselling Centres (WECC) Pilot Program, September 1985</p>							

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Two key issues propelled this evaluation. One such issue was to detect any effects associated with counselling services in terms of increasing the employability of the clientele. Another one was to look for any further effects identifiable in terms of the impact of EIC services in channelling women into jobs more suitable to their interests and abilities, better paying jobs - particularly non-traditional higher skill occupations and the like. Another important issue was to compare the characteristics of WECC clients with that of the comparison group females receiving regular CEC services.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation design compares the experience of the WECC clients with that of females receiving regular CEC services. Seven WECCs and eight regular CECs were involved. Client data were collected at three points in time: at registration, after counselling, and in a follow-up telephone survey. On average, WECC clients were surveyed 10 months after registration; in the case of regular CEC clients, the average period covered was 6-7 months following registration. The preliminary 1984 WECC evaluation was focused on the experience of the WECC clientele alone without the benefit of the contrast of a comparison group. The supplementary 1985 evaluation added a comparison group.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** WECC program clients differed from women registered at regular CECs in that they were on average somewhat older and better educated. Also, a significantly larger number of career changers registered at WECCs than at comparison CECs. Previous work experience for WECC re-entrants was considerably longer than for CEC re-entrants. On the other hand, WECC re-entrants generally had been out of the labour force for a longer period than their CEC counterparts. But by comparison, CEC re-entrants had been involved in job search more than twice as long as had the WECCs re-entrant clients before registration. Both WECCs and CECs had no major impact on moving clientele into non-traditional occupations. The impact of WECC in improving the employability of unemployed clients is not clearly evident in the short-term. WECC role in the job search process showed no improvement over the role of regular CECs.
Compared with the regular CECs, WECC has demonstrated an enhanced performance in terms of quality of service provided. WECCs provided their clients with a wider variety of EIC services than the CEC offices did. Counsellors spent on average twice as much time with the WECC client than with the CEC client.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** WECCs did not have a credible rationale in terms of moving career changers into non-traditional occupations.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** A stronger priority was required in following through with WECC clientele until placement is achieved, rather than concentrating assistance mainly on counselling as is the case.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:**
- 6.** **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**
Evaluation of the Women's Employment Counselling Centre (WECC) Pilot Program,
September 1984

TITLE: CHOICES	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: CHOICES is an acronym for Computerized Heuristic Occupational Information and Career Exploration System. It is designed as a counselling tool to assist people in acquiring knowledge and understanding of specific types of occupations so as to assist their employment and career development.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): CHOICES' objectives is to assist people in gaining a knowledge and understanding of specific types of occupations so as to facilitate their employment and career development.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: Unemployment Insurance Act which is the legislative basis for Employment Services</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: PYs: 0.16* \$5.5 thousand*</p>	
<p>* Management and development costs</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation:</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): A Cost-Effectiveness Evaluation of CHOICES, October 1981</p>	

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issue was to assess the program's effectiveness and direct costs in the day-to-day counselling environment within CECs and compare these with the effectiveness and costs normally incurred in the conventional approach to career counselling practised in CECs. Effectiveness measures focused on the delivery of information by CHOICES and the effect of CHOICES on the employment and career development behaviour of CEC clients. Cost-analysis measured any additional costs associated with CHOICES - over and above costs normally attributed to conventional career counselling for developmental work, operation of the system and time required by counsellors or other CEC staff in the normal counselling of a client.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The study used a pre-post, experimental-control evaluation design. A total of 86 CECs across Canada were involved - 48 sites using CHOICES terminals and 38 other offices using traditional counselling tools for comparison purposes. The client sample amounted to 10,000 individuals. Client-related data were collected at three points: before counselling using a self-completion questionnaire; six weeks after counselling by a telephone interview; and six months after counselling using a mail survey.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Evaluation, in terms of most of the indicators of effectiveness - detected little or no difference between the impact of CHOICES and that of conventional career counselling on clients. In general, clients who had used CHOICES expressed more satisfaction with the help received from the CEC (69% as opposed to 62% for non-users). Nearly two-thirds of counsellors who had used CHOICES felt positive about its usefulness as a counselling tool. It may be that for certain indicators - such as employment earnings and job satisfaction - the impact of CHOICES may not be evident before a significantly longer period of time, perhaps even years, has passed. Costs of using CHOICES (labour plus fixed operational) were four to five times the cost of counselling a client using conventional counselling techniques. As CHOICES was being administered, more staff time (counsellors and administrative support personnel) was required for each counselled client when compared with conventional career counselling.
The average use of CHOICES over the 20 months was only 2 clients per day (44 clients per month). CHOICES was being used by 18% of the clients in regular CECs where terminals had been installed, with a higher level of utilization (61%) in youth offices.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** CHOICES had a low utilization rate and degree of effectiveness. Both had the potential to improve with more experience and greater volume of clientele.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The amount of career counselling being conducted in the CECs was lower than originally believed. Even the CHOICES CECs exhibited low client volumes over the study period. The younger clients in general, and high school students in particular, appeared to be the best market for CHOICES, although all clients who interacted with it, CHOICES probably enhances their image of the CEC.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:**
- 6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

LABOUR MARKET ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM (EIC)

TITLE: SECTOR STUDIES AND THE CANADIAN OCCUPATIONAL PROJECTION SYSTEM (COPS)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** COPS was established within the Labour Market Outlook and Structural Analysis (LMOSA) Directorate of Strategic Policy and Planning (SPP) of EIC. It is essentially an occupational projection system. Sector Studies are research efforts aimed at describing and understanding one specific industry, its performance, growth and evolution. Its research function relies on the consultative process associated with the study. This process seeks to produce a realistic and workable document concerning long-term objectives, human resource needs, and training capacity.
2. **Program Objective(s):** COPS was designed to assemble and disseminate medium to long-term aggregated and disaggregated labour market information. Sector Studies had the ultimate objective of achieving a substantial increase in the private sector's role in training workers and in ensuring that training is more responsive to current labour market needs. This objective drives its activities of building networks of organizations (industry associations, unions and/ or training councils) that share human resource concerns.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Employment and Immigration Reorganization Act of 1977
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93*:**
 Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
 Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
* Overall, the expenditures of LMOSA have increased from \$5.2 million in 1987-1988 to \$14.6 million in 1992-93. Intermittently, its budget includes the costs of large scale surveys, mostly conducted for the department by Statistics Canada.
6. **First Year of Operation:**
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Sector Studies and the Canadian Occupational Projection System (COPS), October 1993

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They consist of the effects and impacts, implementation, achievement of objectives and rationale. The emphasis in the evaluation differed between Sector Studies and COPS. For Sector Studies the key question asked was: what has been achieved to date from the process? For COPS, the main question was: what is the use made and perceived usefulness of COPS-produced information?
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Sector Studies evaluation drew on two main data sources: 11 case studies, involving interviewing of public and private sector participants in the process; and a survey of 400 firms. Surveys were the most important input to the COPS evaluation. A COPS "users" survey was conducted. Within the Department, both in Headquarters and in the regions, and within provincial departments, information was obtained by key player interviews.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Sector Studies did not have a clear basis for priorities in the selection of one sector over another. Success of the sector studies process depends on the logical link between the activities of the sector council formed after the study, and the consensus issues identified by the sector study itself. The evaluation has not been able to provide evidence of the impact of the work of sector councils, although these councils have been established as a result of the sector studies. Apart from repeating well known phrases on the value of a training culture, sector studies produced by the partnership process have generally addressed training-related issues at the sectoral level and impacts at the level of the individual firm have not been confirmed. Evidence on the need for, and value of sector studies, remains weak so far. Evaluation indicated a need to articulate carefully the criteria for selection of sector studies and to clarify the objectives which sector studies are to achieve. COPS-related products have a highly differentiated market: it ranges from a relatively small number of expert users at Headquarters and in the regions, through a large number of guidance counsellors and teachers who consult Job Futures. The small group of technical people tend to use COPS on a frequent basis. The large group of casual users look for a particular piece of information. The largest group of career counsellors and others at educational institutions like the product and use it frequently. While users pointed out to inadequate marketing of the potential of the COPS data base, COPS products were viewed as sufficiently valuable and therefore in demand.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Role and rationale of Sector Studies were uncertain. COPS products and data base satisfied real user needs. COPS continues to be relevant for current and anticipated user needs.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Criteria for selection of sector studies need to be articulated. Objectives of these studies need to be clarified. Marketing of COPS data base needs to be improved.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT SERVICE (IAS)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: IAS assists workers, firms, communities and associations who are experiencing or about to experience labour force adjustment. It is an important component of government efforts to improve the functioning of the labour market. The Service evolved out of the Manpower Consultative Service (MCS) established in 1963 in response to recessionary plant closures and worker layoffs. It acquired the IAS name in 1984. IAS is least bureaucratic as it operates through leveraging the establishment of IAS committees. The on-going technological changes and globalization trend mean intense pressures for labour force adjustment and effective intervention strategies.
2.	Program Objective(s): IAS was designed to assist employers, workers, persons representing industries, communities and provinces/territories in establishing and operating adjustment committees composed of representatives of some or all of the above-mentioned parties to identify, develop and oversee the implementation of measures designed to remedy an actual or a potential workforce adjustment problem.
3.	Legislative Basis: Canadian Jobs Strategy Terms and Conditions approved by the Treasury Board on June 20, 1991 and relevant CJS Policy Statement approved by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission.
4A.	Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Joint consultative committees made up of employer and employee representatives and a third party chairperson. The committees may also include representatives of industries, communities and provinces/territories.
4B.	Number of Participants 1992-93: 266,312
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$16.3 million Operating Costs: PYs: 93 \$5.4 million
6.	First Year of Operation: 1963
7.	Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada
8.	Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of the Industrial Adjustment Service, 1993

TITLE: INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT SERVICE (IAS)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** IAS was established in 1963 by the federal government as one of a number of policies introduced in the decade involving an active intervention to enhance the functioning of the labour market. The program was expanded in 1974 to cover problems of human resource planning and recruitment of scarce skills related to major industrial developments. In the 1980s, IAS also assumed a role of enhancing or supplementing existing private sector labour market processes through contribution to the delivery of a number of special adjustment measures:

Industrial and Labour Adjustment Program (ILAP)

Work Sharing Program (WSP)

Canadian Industrial Renewal Program (CIRP)

IAS activities related to these measures are supplementary to the main IAS rationale. They are the subject of other evaluations. Prior to October 1984, the Service was known as the Manpower Consultative Service.

- 2. Program Objective(s):** To encourage labour and management to work together to bring about labour force adjustments needed because of economic and technological change within an industry, plant, enterprise or a community.

- 3. Legislative Basis:** Labour Mobility and Assessment Incentive Regulations

- 4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Joint consultative committees made up of employer and employee representatives and a third party chairperson. The committees may also include representatives of industries, communities and provinces/territories.

- 4B. Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____

- 5. Resources 1992-93:**

Grants and Contributions: \$16.3 million

Operating Costs: PYs: 93

\$5.4 million

- 6. First Year of Operation:** 1963

- 7. Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada

- 8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Industrial Adjustment Service (IAS) Program, November 1984

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were: (a) to assess the labour market impacts of the program; (b) to carry out benefit-cost analysis; (c) to assess the non-economic impacts of the program like effect on labour management relations and on workers' resistance to change; (d) to assess the effectiveness of program implementation and delivery; and (e) to examine the rationale and relevance of the program.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data were gathered through various means: (a) surveys of employee representatives (41), employer representatives (103), and committee chairpersons (200); (b) interviews of IAS managers and officers (35); review of agreement files (245); survey of workers (972); and literature review. A panel of experts appraised the methodology and preliminary findings. A labour force tracking study was conducted using the Longitudinal Data File. This study compared the employment experience of two groups of workers experiencing a lay-off in the 1982/83 period - one being assisted by the IAS process.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Results indicated that the positive impact of the program was confined to a minority of participants. Only 254 of the 612 employees who left firms with an IAS agreement said they had received assistance from the program. Of these 254, only 81 said that it had reduced their period of unemployment. Since 1982-83 was a year of high unemployment, the members of the Expert panel felt that many of the non-positive responses could be attributed to the obvious difficulties faced by committees in finding alternative employment for displaced workers. When assessed in a benefit-cost framework, even modest success was sufficient to yield net benefits to society - returns to society of \$710 for IAS participant compared to costs of \$150 per person. Other social gains, beyond net benefits, were in terms of reduced worker resistance to change and better industrial relations.
The IAS program appears to be delivered very effectively. Employer responses were almost invariably more positive than employee responses. This finding may reflect that adjustment costs fall heavily on workers and IAS can provide only limited help.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Adjustment services, in the context of continuing structural problems in the Canadian economy, are very much in demand. IAS, as one of the adjustment services, was relevant and effective in contributing to the adjustment of workers and firms.

4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Although adjustment costs of structural changes in the economy fall on both firms and workers, especially in downside adjustment situations, they fall more heavily on workers and IAS can provide only limited help.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were, in a broad sense, rationale of the IAS program, effectiveness of implementation and impacts of the program on workers, firms and labour-management relations.
Rationale questions were important in view of the expansion of the program in recent years. Implementation issues were focused on profiling program utilization and the effectiveness of delivery. They also included the effectiveness of the IAS committee process and the ability of the committees to analyze, develop and implement a plan of action for labour force adjustment.
Program impact issues reflect the emphasis of the program on outcomes. The model of adjustment utilized by the IAS (i.e. joint consultative committees) is expected to have an impact on the labour market experiences of workers undergoing adjustment, and on the way in which solutions to labour market adjustment problems are found and implemented.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Data came from several sources and they were analyzed through bivariate and multivariate techniques. Major data sources were case studies, file review, tracking study, employee survey, and representatives survey. Comparison group was a part of the evaluation design to find out the impacts of the program at the employee level in downsizing situations. Scope of data included both upside and downside situations.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** A fairly rigorous evaluation design and analysis were applied to firm-level downside situations. The analysis indicated that firm-level IAS downside agreements (mass layoffs) provided no benefits to workers in terms of labour market outcomes over a non-IAS downside mass layoff situation. In terms of two key indicators - wage change and amount of unemployment experienced - IAS group fared substantially worse than the non-IAS group. IAS workers tend to suffer more severe losses of income and longer periods of unemployment than those in the general population of large layoffs. These results suggest that IAS requires major rethinking in order to make it effective in dealing with the extremely difficult problems of downside adjustment.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions (cont'd):** Most IAS committee representatives believed that the committee process was effective. Chairperson plays a central role in influencing the contribution of the committee to the IAS effectiveness. Committees control the IAS process, making the service least bureaucratic, flexible and more private sector oriented partnership. The sense of ownership created ensures commitment to the IAS process. It appeared that the committee process as currently working was more successful in identifying and understanding the adjustment problems and devising plans for their resolution than in implementing the solutions. This means that the committee's assessment of the adjustment situation was effective but its implementation of a plan of action was less successful. Employee representatives were more critical of this aspect of their IAS agreement than employer representatives. This was especially so in firm level agreements. About one third of committee representatives involved in such agreements agreed that "no one implemented the action plan, so I don't think that the program produced the expected results". A smaller but still significant proportion of representatives involved in association and community agreements also agreed with this statement. However, the joint consultative committee process improved labour-management relations.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The program does not have a rationale in terms of its impact on worker clients who were members of mass layoff situations. However, the needs of these workers have to somehow be addressed. Program design needs rethinking to make it effectively serve the needs of the workers.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Substantial problems existed in terms of implementing action plans developed by LAS committees. There is a need to clarify whether the program is only accountable for the formation of committees and the identification of solutions, or whether it should also be accountable for ensuring that the identified solutions are implemented.
5. **Outstanding Issues:**
6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

TITLE: SKILL INVESTMENT	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Skill Investment, introduced in 1985 under the Canadian Jobs Strategy was designed to assist workers threatened by technological or market change. Workers who are displaced by structural changes often have extensive work experience but, lacking transferable skills, they often face long periods of unemployment after losing a job. Changes in technology and markets and implications for industrial competitiveness and continued employment of workers provided the rationale for SI.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of Skill Investment was "to assist persons whose employment is subject to change or elimination due to technological or market change, through training, relocation assistance, and other industry-based adjustment measures".
3.	Legislative Basis: CEIC Re-org. Act, NTA and Regs., UI Act and Regs., Financial Admin. Act, Treasury Board approved T's & C's for CJS, and EIC Policy Statement for CJS.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: Employees or displaced workers adversely affected by technological or market change. Employers (primarily small businesses) who need assistance to train work force to respond to technological or market change.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: Last year for program 1990-91 49,399 New Start participants
5.	Resources 1992-93: N/A Grants and Contributions: \$:115.0m. Last year 1990-91 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:
6.	First year of operation: 1985
7.	Program Delivery: EIC Regional Offices established overall training plans based on advice from Local Advisory Councils. Delivery was primarily through CECs and Coordinating Groups with CECs confirming eligibility of CG-selected trainees.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Skill Investment Program Evaluation - Final Report, February 12, 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation addresses a wide range of issues and questions grouped under three core categories: Rationale, which explored the extent to which the program was targeted on industries and individuals at risk; Incremental Impacts/Program Effectiveness in terms of improved employability and earnings and the impacts on firms in terms of commitment to training, productivity, etc.; and, Relative Cost-Effectiveness among the Program options evaluated.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation was designed to address a comprehensive list of evaluation issues and questions related to four principal areas of investigation, namely, Program Rationale, Objectives Achievement, Impacts and Effects, and Program Alternatives. An econometric model was constructed to measure incremental impacts and data were collected from the following sources: telephone surveys of approximately 100 Training Trust Funds; surveys of over 50 Coordinating Groups involved in the Indirect Purchase of Training; surveys of 787 employers participating in the Retraining Option and a comparison group of 753 non-participating employers; surveys of nearly 3,400 trainees who participated in the various program options; a survey of a general labour market comparison group of about 1,500 individuals; and, administrative data and interviews with Program officials.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Among worker participants, the evaluation found evidence that the Skill Investment Program resulted in improved skill levels, better attitudes towards training, reduced likelihood of unemployment, and higher earning power. The degree of success varied among Program options. Generally, the options showing the greatest success were those featuring a partnership approach. There was evidence that firms benefitted from program participation through more skilled and stable workforce. The traditional model of institutional training seemed relatively less effective in an overall sense although DPO and IPO seemed to benefit women and other members of the secondary labour market. The low cost of IPO suggested that this approach could be cost-effective for particular labour market segments. The evaluation revealed that the Program was not always targeted to those labour market segments most at risk.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation of Skill Investment reinforced the directions being pursued under the evolving Labour Force Development Strategy. In particular, the evaluation supported the continuing de-emphasis of Direct Purchase of Training in the context of labour market adjustment. The increasing use of the partnership approach actively involving the private sector was strongly supported by the evaluation findings.

The productivity-equity conundrum was highlighted by the apparently superior results of the Training Trust Fund option as this option tended to be the least targeted on the basis of need.

The comparison with the General Labour Market group suggested that training itself is beneficial no matter who funds the activity as long as the training is respondent to and reflective of labour market needs.

- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The Skill Investment Evaluation indicated that, from an operational standpoint, there was a sound rationale for the continuation of a skill investment approach but that certain program configurations were more beneficial than others. The appropriate approach to programming must be geared to the needs of the particular group involved. For example, while institutional training was found to be less effective overall in a labour adjustment context, for women and other members of the secondary labour market, the approach did produce benefits. The evaluation highlighted the advantages of intervening before at-risk workers actually become unemployed. The benefits to firms of participation in Skill Investment reinforced efforts to foster a training culture in the private sector as did the findings of the relative benefits of options featuring the partnership approach.

- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:** The former Skill Investment Program has been subsumed under the Labour Market Adjustment Program.

- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The principal issues in the evaluation were the impacts on trainees, the incrementality of funded activity, the impact of the Program on labour market shortages, and the effectiveness of Apprenticeship as a training mechanism.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The principal data sources included: telephone surveys of about 3,950 participating workers and almost 1,200 comparison subjects; telephone interviews with over 1,500 persons representing participating firms and about 500 persons representing non-participating firms; interviews with CEIC officials in headquarters and in the regions; interviews with representatives of Community Industrial Training Committees in Ontario and their counterparts in Quebec; statistical analysis of administrative data, a review of relevant literature, interviews with business organizations, and a review of Program data on the designation process. In addition, data collected by Statistics Canada through a National Apprenticeship Survey were used in the analysis. The analyses of program impacts were conducted within a comparison group design that employed econometric modelling techniques. Multivariate techniques were used to examine program incrementality and to determine factors distinguishing participating firms from non-participating firms.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The overall assessment of the evaluation was that the Skill Shortages Program was successful in meeting its objectives. The scale of the Program was not large in relation to the extent of shortages in the Canadian economy. The results for trainees were generally positive. In almost all cases, the Program contributed to growth in wages or in earnings and employability. For employed participants, impacts on wages were examined and positive impacts were found for Work-place Based Training and DPO. No significant impacts were found for IPO. For trainees who had been unemployed prior to the program, results for all program options were positive. The evaluation concluded that the program impacted positively on firms in terms of the amount, quality, and timing of the training undertaken.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The funding of training in occupations in short supply produces positive economic benefits to the participating trainees, participating firms, and, in a more general sense, to the economy. The future prosperity and competitiveness of the Canadian economy would be enhanced by the promotion of greater consistency of approach to training in apprenticeable trades. National standards could be developed for such training. Many employers indicated that they would like to see more funding available for Workplace-Based Training, not from the point of view of raising subsidy levels, which the evaluation found to be at least adequate and, probably, generous, but in the sense of having more funds available for distribution.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** By establishing close links between funding levels and the needs of individual trainees and firms, the total amount of training provided under the Program could be expanded. Certain occupational skills were found to be more effectively acquired under particular program options. The development of training plans would assist in the appropriate referral of trainees to options. Factors to consider in training plans would include the mix of on-the-job and classroom training, duration of training, and availability of well-qualified instructors and up-to-date equipment through competing training facilities.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The Skill Shortages Program was subsumed under the Labour Market Adjustment Program as part of the Labour Force Development Strategy. An issue of on-going concern is the accuracy with which current and future labour market shortages can be identified and forecast so that remedial action can be taken.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: CRITICAL TRADE SKILLS TRAINING	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	<p>Program Rationale/Background: The Critical Trade Skills Training (CTST) Program was a shared-cost program under which CEIC entered into a contract with an employer or group of employers to remunerate them for providing their employees with high-skill occupational training. In addition to part of their wage costs, employers could be reimbursed for course development costs such as instructors' salaries, institutional costs and course materials. CTST was the forerunner of the Skill Shortages Program and was intended to respond to identified situations of critical labour shortages with the associated considered to represent significant bottlenecks in the Canadian economy.</p>
2.	<p>Program objective(s): The objective of CTST was to alleviate skill shortages in occupations designated to be of national importance by financially assisting employers in the provision of training which would not have occurred without the Program.</p>
3.	<p>Legislative Basis: Adult Occupational Training Act and, subsequently, the National Training Act.</p>
4A.	<p>Clientele/eligibility criteria: Trainees had to be beyond the legal school-leaving age, a Canadian citizen or landed immigrant, employed by the employer during the training period, and likely to benefit from training by virtue of increased employment or earnings potential. Subsidized training was restricted to designated occupations.</p>
4B.	<p>Number of participants 1992-93: In 1983-84, there were 14,396 active trainees.</p>
5.	<p>Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$:63,139,000 in 1983-84 Operating Costs: PYs: \$:</p>
6.	<p>First year of operation: 1979-80</p>
7.	<p>Program Delivery: Delivery of CTST involved employers in developing training plans and selecting trainees; provinces, as part of federal-provincial committees, assisting in development of training plans, and managing apprenticeship programs; CEIC headquarters in developing program policies and procedures, allocation of funds to regions, and designation of shortage occupations; CEIC regional offices in establishing priorities for program implementation; and CECs in monitoring and promoting the program, assisting employers in specifying training plans and screening trainees to ensure eligibility.</p>
8.	<p>Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation to the Critical Trade Skills Training Program - December 1985</p>

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The principal evaluation issues were the incrementality of funded training activity and the extent to which the Program alleviated skill shortages in occupations of national importance.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** To explore the issue of incrementality, the evaluation analyzed the reported behaviour of participating and non-participating firms. Data were collected from telephone interviews with more than 1,000 firms and in-depth interviews with 200 participating firms. Fifty non-participating firms were also studied. Training impacts were obtained from 2,600 telephone interviews with a sample of participants from 1983/84. The training occupation was linked with the post-training job to determine the extent to which trainees were working in the training occupations. Trainees' gains in employability, wages and earnings from the pre-training to the post-training periods were assessed. Regression analysis was used to control for pre-training levels of these variables along with other demographic and training-related factors.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation concluded that about half of the training supported under CTST was incremental. The degree of incrementality was deemed to be related to firm size with larger firms being more likely to train without program intervention. With regard to the impact on skill shortages, the evaluation found that about 95% of CTST training occurred in designated occupations and that a high proportion (86%) of training completers were working in the occupation for which they were trained. The productivity, wages and earnings of trainees increased substantially.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Training in shortage occupations appeared to produce benefits for trainees in terms of increased earning potential and also appeared to increase productivity.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAMME EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** In order to maximize incrementality, training support should be directed towards smaller firms. This was, in fact, done under Skill Shortages and Skill Investment and incrementality was estimated to have increased to about 75% of activity.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** CTST was subsumed under Skill Shortages, and, to some extent, Skill Investment, both of which have now been superceded by the Labour Market Adjustment Program.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: WORK SHARING										
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION										
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: Under this program, workers, employers and the federal government are involved in formal agreements to avoid planned or immediate temporary layoffs by having an employer's available work shared among its all employees or a designated group of employees. As a result, the employees who would have been laid off retain their jobs while the employer preserves the skilled work force. To compensate the income lost due to work reduction, employees are paid unemployment insurance benefits for the hours of work given up, and their fringe benefits are maintained by the employer. The unemployment insurance benefits paid for work sharing do not affect work sharers' entitlement to the regular UI benefits.</p>										
<p>2. Program objective(s): There are several objective of the program: To maintain employment levels during periods of economic decline. Work Sharing essentially seeks to avert lay offs by redistributing unemployment within the firm rather than by laying off workers. To maintain skills, morale and to share the brunt of unemployment. To maintain skilled labour forces and avoid the rehiring and retraining costs associated with the end of a lay off period.</p>										
<p>3. Legislative Basis: U.I. Act. 1971, S.24) and Part VI, S.91-99) UIR.</p>										
<p>4A. Clientele/eligibility criteria: An employer who had intended to lay off 20 to 60 percent of employees for three months may use Work Sharing to reduce the regular working hours of all employees in the designated work unit by 20 percent over the same three month period. Work reduction must not be due to seasonal work fluctuations. Employers must provide a recovery plan which will allow for a return to full employment at the end of the Work Sharing Agreement.</p>										
<p>4B. Number of participants 1992-93: 123,544</p>										
<p>5. Resources 1992-93:</p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 40%;">Grants and Contributions:</td> <td style="width: 10%;">\$:</td> <td>Not Applicable</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Operating Costs:</td> <td>PYs:</td> <td>138</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>\$:</td> <td>1.1 Million</td> </tr> </table>		Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable	Operating Costs:	PYs:	138		\$:	1.1 Million
Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable								
Operating Costs:	PYs:	138								
	\$:	1.1 Million								
<p>6. First year of operation: 1978</p>										
<p>7. Program Delivery: CECs/Region</p>										
<p>8. Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of Work Sharing, 1993.</p>										

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There are several key evaluation issues addressed:
 Impact program has on employees
 Employer benefits achieved from the program
 The use of the program and its appropriateness
 The impact the program has on the UI Account
 What is the level of social benefit
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** This evaluation covered 1989 and 1990. It utilized multiple lines of evidence, and used several descriptive as well as econometric techniques.
 Several sources of data were used including:
 An analysis of a linked survey of employers and employees (1080 participating and comparison firms and 2070 participating and comparison employees).
 An analysis of UI administrative and earnings data.
 An analysis of qualitative sources such as Canadian and international literature review, expert panels and key informants.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The program largely achieved its objective of avoiding layoff for employees and retaining workforce for employers and yielded a positive return on public investment.
 During the years 1989 and 1990, about 64 percent of the planned layoffs were avoided as a result of the program.
 The program also helped employees avoid negative financial impacts associated with layoffs.
 The program helped participating employers avoid hiring and retraining costs, retain skilled work force with associated benefits: retention of skills, higher levels of morale, better attitudes towards work and management, better social relations, improved psychological and physical well being as compared to those in layoffs.
 Considering the costs and all benefits, a benefit-cost ratio of about 2.6 to 1 was estimated.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Overall the program is cost effective, therefore continuance of the program is suggested. Such proactive measures appear warranted given the nature of the current economic situation.
 Work Sharing helped employees avoid negative financial impacts associated with layoffs.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** There are several administrative amendments that are suggest as a result of the evaluation. The implementation of these suggestions should prove to be cost effective.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The evaluation revealed that the failure to develop a training component within the Work Sharing program is an unacceptable deficiency.

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** Employment and Immigration Canada, Program Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of UI Funded Work Sharing in Canada, 1980.
Employment and Immigration Canada, Program Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of UI Work Sharing, 1984.

TITLE: WORK SHARING	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: Work Sharing attempts to combat unemployment by eliminating the need for temporary layoffs of all or a number of a firm's employees by having the firm's available work shared among its employees, each of whom agrees to work fewer hours per week than normal. The program was implemented on a pilot basis between 1977 and 1979 but by early 1982 the economic conditions dictated that the program be introduced on a broader level.
2.	Program objective(s): The main policy objective of the program may be stated as follows: To eliminate the need for a planned or immediate temporary layoff of all or a number of a firm's employees.
3.	Legislative Basis: Section 24 of the U.I. Act. 1971, and Part VI, Sections 91-99 of the Unemployment Regulations.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: An employer who had intended to lay off 20 to 60 percent of employees for three months may use Work Sharing to reduce the regular working hours of all employees in the designated work unit by 20 percent over the same three month period.
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: 123,544 Fiscal 1990-91: 196,500 Calender Year(1992): 136,485
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: Not Applicable Operating Costs: PYs: 138 \$: 1.1 Million
6.	First year of operation: 1978
7.	Program Delivery: CECs/Region
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Work Sharing Program, March 1984.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** In all there were fifty-seven questions addressed in the 1984 evaluation of work sharing. These questions can be categorized into eight evaluation issues:
 - Layoff Prevention:** Questions related to the program's ability to maintain workers in their jobs.
 - Employers' Perspective:** Questions related to the experience that employers have with respect to the program.
 - EIC Perspective:** Questions related to the experience that EIC has had with respect to the program.
 - Employees' Perspective:** Questions related to the experience that employees have had with respect to the program.
 - Overall Effectiveness:** Questions related to the effectiveness of the program to society.
 - Union Perspective:** Questions related to the experience that Unions have had with respect to the program.
 - Integrity of the Agreements:** Questions related to determining whether work sharing agreements are negotiated and honoured within the intent of the program's objective.
 - Public Reaction:** Questions related to the overall reaction of the public towards the program.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed the use of descriptive statistical techniques. Several sources of data were used including:
 - EIC Administrative Data.
 - Survey of participating employers.
 - Survey of non-participating employers.
 - Survey of participating employees
 - Survey of non-participating employees.
 - Survey of firms.
 - Survey of community institutions and programs.
 - Survey of unions.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Firms financial position is not drastically altered when it makes use of the Work Sharing program.

The analysis revealed a strong counter cyclical relationship between Work Sharing use and general economic activity.

Actual UI benefits paid out under Work Sharing amounted to \$83.1 million in 1983. There was a decrease of 18 percent in the number of firms using the program between 1982 and 1983.

The number of workers covered by the agreements had fallen from 1982 to 1983. The evaluation showed that prime-age workers are the principal users of the program.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Work Sharing is an effective means of avoiding layoffs.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:**
 - Work Sharing cost more than regular UI due to deferral of waiting period, post-program layoffs and layoffs who do not claim UI.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** There were several evaluation issues addressed:
 The cost of work sharing program in terms of payments from the U.I. account.
 The costs to employees, unions and the employers, compared to costs of unemployment.
 The extent to which the number of people experiencing unemployment was reduced, and their period of unemployment reduced.
 The extent to which the program objectives were realized as a result of operational procedures.
 The extent to which individual skill losses due to prolonged periods of unemployment were avoided.
 To assess the degree to which costs of layoff to the employer in terms of subsequent recruitment and training of a skilled work force were avoided.
 To assess the anticipated side effect on all stakeholders.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation entailed a descriptive statistical analysis.
 There were several source of data used in the analysis:
 EIC administrative U.I. data
 Employer payroll data
 Survey of employees
 Survey of employers
 Survey of union officials
 Survey of community officials
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The evaluation indicated that continued expenditure of U.I. monies on work sharing, as the program is currently designed, is not warranted.
 Three options were identified for the work sharing program:
 Discontinue the program.
 Implement a program that approaches a "break-even" point in relation to the regular U.I. program.
 Implement a revised but less costly program than that used in the pilot phase.
 The large majority of the work sharing programs resulted in additional unemployment insurance benefits being paid out over and above the regular U.I. benefits which would have been incurred. Approximately 2.4 times what would have been paid in regular U.I. benefits in the absence of the program.
 Employees who participated in work sharing lost, on average, 7 percent of their gross weekly income while their working time was reduced, on average, by 20 percent.
 Employees who would have been laid off in the absence of the program had a gross income approximately 36 percent higher than they would have had with a layoff.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

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| 4A. | Policy Lessons Learned: Generally Work Sharing is effective in protecting temporary layoffs and in maintaining workers' incomes. |
| 4B. | Operational Lessons Learned: The design of the pilot Work Sharing projects led to excessive costs as compared to the layoff option. |
| 5. | Outstanding Issues: How can Work Sharing be modified to provide the benefit of temporary layoff prevention at a more reasonable cost? |
| 6. | Related evaluation documents/technical studies: None prior to the 1980 evaluation of Work Sharing |

TITLE: FEDERAL CONTRACTORS PROGRAM (FCP)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The Treasury Board directive dated August 1986 launched this program. It applies to Canadian firms with 100 or more employees who bid on federal contracts for goods and services worth \$200,000 or more. They are required to develop and implement an employment equity plan to achieve and maintain a fair and representative work force. The failure to comply will result in the exclusion of a contractor from bidding on future contracts of the Government of Canada.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): To ensure that suppliers of goods and services to federal government departments promote the achievement and maintenance of a fair and representative work force.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis: The program was established as a result of a 1985 policy decision of Cabinet. Roles and responsibilities of EIC and 22 (approx.) contracting departments are set out in Treasury Board Circular 1986-44.</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria: Applies to Canadian firms with 100 or more employees who bid on federal contracts for goods and services worth \$200,000 or more.</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: Pys: 48* \$2.9 million*</p>	
<p>* For both FCP and LEEP</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1986</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of the Federal Contractors Program (FCP), June 1992</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation issues for FCP, like LEEP, mainly revolve around the following themes:
 1. Have the objectives of the program been effectively translated into program activities and operational goals?
 2. How useful are the labour market information and employment consultancy services provided to employers?
 3. To what extent has the program reduced employment inequities faced by the members of the designated groups covered under the program?
 4. What changes, if any, are needed in the programs to improve the achievement of program objectives? Are there more cost effective ways for achieving the same objectives?
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Includes multiple lines of evidence, blending quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative methodology included: (1) Econometric Analyses of Labour Market Activity Surveys; and (2) Survey of LEEP and FCP firms and comparison groups. Qualitative methodology included: (1) Literature/File Review; (2) Interviews with Representatives of Designated Groups; (3) Focus Groups with Representatives of Designated Groups; (4) Review of FCP Compliance Review Reports; (5) Case Studies of FCP firms; and (6) Survey of Program Administrators.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** (1) Positive influence of compliance review activities on the development of employment equity plans; (2) no clear influence on the representation and wages of designated groups; (3) employers had positive feelings about services provided by the program staff; and (4) need for greater focus on follow-up reviews to ensure employer adherence to original commitments.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Given the long-term nature of employment equity objectives, the FCP was not in operation long enough to produce statistically measurable impacts on the representation and wages of designated groups.

4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Employers were generally positive on the program delivery. They do not credit FCP with influencing their employment equity actions. This may have been because they felt that to attribute a difference to the program would be to confirm that systemic barriers existed before.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: LEGISLATED EMPLOYMENT EQUITY PROGRAM (LEEP)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The Legislated Employment Equity Program (LEEP) came into being as a result of the Employment Equity Act which received Royal Assent in June 1986. It was designed to promote employment equity in the work force of federally-regulated employers and Crown Corporations. The Program was for those employers with 100 or more employees. They were required to report annually on their employment equity results.
 2. **Program Objective(s):** To achieve equality in the work place so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and,...,to correct the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and persons who are, because of their race or colour, in a visible minority in Canada, by giving effect to the principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the same way and also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.
 3. **Legislative Basis:** The legal basis for the program is the Employment Equity Act and Regulations (and accompanying Technical Reference papers).
 - 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Federally-regulated employers and Crown Corporations with 100 or more employees.
 - 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** 353
 5. **Resources 1992-93:** Grants and Contributions: \$:
Operating Costs: Pys: 48* \$2.9 million*
- * For both LEEP and FCP
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1986 initiated. 1988 full operation.
 7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
 8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Legislated Employment Equity Program (LEEP), June 1992

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. Key Evaluation Issues:

1. Have the objectives of LEEP been effectively translated into program activities and operational goals?
2. How useful are the labour market information and employment equity consultancy services provided to employers?
3. To what extent has the program reduced employment inequities faced by the members of the designated groups under the LEEP firms? What has been its impact on non-LEEP firms?
4. What changes, if any, are needed in the program to improve the achievement of its objectives? Are there more cost-effective ways for achieving the same objectives?

2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources: Multiple lines of evidence were used. They reflected a blending of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The quantitative approach included: (1) Econometric Analysis of Labour Market Activity Surveys; (2) Survey of LEEP and FCP firms and comparison groups; and (3) Quantitative Analysis of LEEP Annual Reports. Qualitative approach included: (1) Literature/File Review; (2)

Interviews with Representatives of Designated Groups; (3) Focus Groups with Representatives of Designated Groups; (4) Qualitative Analysis of LEEP Executive Summaries; (5) Case Studies of LEEP firms; (6) Survey of Program Administrators; and (7) Review of EE speeches.

3. Findings/Conclusions: The study found a substantial increase in employers' employment equity activities and an improvement in the representation of the designated groups. However, similar progress was recorded by non-LEEP organizations. As a result, evaluators were unable to detect positive program impacts on either employment growth or hires for any of the designated groups.

The study found that LEEP had favourable impact on wages for women. Another finding was that a clearly mandated compliance monitoring and enforcement mechanism would enhance the chance of achieving the program's objectives in the future.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** They were about ways in which the Employment Equity Act could be changed in the hope of achieving more substantial results. One such way was the need to clarify and strengthen the administration and enforcement provisions in the Act and to further highlight the importance of collecting information on employers' activities.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** They were about things that matter in terms of reporting requirements. The respondents feared that the existing small degree of duplication of LEEP with other employment equity programs is likely to increase as more jurisdictions implement such programs. Its negative impacts would be minimized if reporting requirements were made similar across programs. However, there is no way that EIC program officials can ensure this outcome, given divided jurisdictions.

5. **Outstanding Issues:** Legislative changes to the Employment Equity Act

6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (EIC)

TITLE: COMMUNITY FUTURES PROGRAM (CFP)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** This program was designed to assist non-metropolitan communities suffering from slow growth, chronic high unemployment and/or a limited economic base. It evolved from a long line of job creation efforts in communities in economic distress.
 2. **Program Objective(s):** To assist communities in need in their efforts to stimulate employment growth by (1) introducing adjustment measures for individual workers, such as training and relocation; and (2) strengthening the local economy by expanding opportunities for long-term permanent employment through small business development and entrepreneurial support.
 3. **Legislative Basis:** Canadian Jobs Strategy Terms and Conditions approved by the Treasury Board on June 20, 1991 and relevant CJS Policy Statement approved by the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission. It is a component of the Community Development Program.
 - 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Community groups, charitable and voluntary organizations in rural and remote communities, public and private sector and local small businesses and entrepreneurs.
 - 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
 5. **Resources 1992-93:** Grants and Contributions: \$76.8 million
Operating Costs: Pys: 298* \$\$12.4 million*
- * For all of Community Development Program
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1986
 7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
 8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Community Futures Program, November 1990

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were: (1) results/impacts of the program; (2) whether income/employment for communities and individuals had increased; (iii) whether program objectives were consistent with EIC mandate; (iv) and whether CF model provided efficient, coordinated approach.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** (1) Review of the role of CEIC and CFP in community economic development; (2) community impact analysis involving both case studies of communities and macro-economic analysis; (3) program effectiveness surveys including a follow-up survey of nearly 3,000 participants, a survey of over 1,000 comparison group subjects, and a survey of about 150 facilitators and program managers; (4) focus group discussions; and (5) consultation with an expert panel.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** (1) Program objectives were generally consistent with EIC objectives and mandate, with the exception of the objective of the Relocation Option; (2) the majority of CF communities were economically disadvantaged relative to their region at the time of selection; (3) program objectives fail to distinguish between economic development and adjustment assistance measures; (4) the CF committees were weak in their efforts at long-term strategic planning and they had uneven influence due to a lack of guidance and insufficient skills; (5) the self-employment component had a positive influence on employability and earnings; (6) the Business Development Centre Option also had positive influence on employment creation; and (7) both Purchase of Training and Relocation/Exploratory Assistance Options were failures. Program facilitators and managers mentioned Natives as being inadequately served.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** One important lesson was that objectives should be defined apart from means/activities. Another lesson was that the training of local committee members should be limited to training in organizational skills. Finally, clear lines of authority and accountability must be established and communicated to the committees/boards to improve their effectiveness.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** A definition of "community" which corresponds to existing areas (such as CEC areas, UI labour force economic regions, Statistics Canada's small area data designations for the Labour Force Survey or municipal boundaries), offers significant benefits. Labour market information would then be available to assist in strategic planning, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of local committees. Monitoring and evaluation would also be facilitated since the lack of common geographic units inhibits necessary comparative statistical analysis.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY (CES)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The CES was a response to the labour market issue of the chronically unemployed who relied on some form of transfer payments for most or all of their income. The heterogeneous group of chronically unemployed included many sub-groups: employable welfare recipients, youth, native people, the mentally and physically handicapped, ex-inmates, workers in areas of chronic unemployment or under employment, older workers, and women seeking entry or re-entry to the labour force. The CES had its origins in the Social Security Review undertaken jointly by Canada and the provinces in April 1973.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): The CES was designed to open up employment opportunities for persons experiencing particular and continuing difficulty in finding and keeping satisfactory employment and who consequently rely on some form of transfer payments for most or all of their income.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis:</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation:</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery:</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of the Community Employment Strategy (CES), April 1981</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

- 1. Key Evaluation Issues:**

- 2. Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The Program Evaluation Branch designed a national evaluation framework to ensure uniformity in the provincial evaluations without sacrificing flexibility. The field evaluations reflected the collaborative and developmental nature of CES. Process reporting was emphasized over the reporting of outcomes. Relying on close field observation and interactive evaluation techniques, projects were described in considerable detail and whenever possible, results were tied to the actions of the communities and their government partners.

- 3. Findings/Conclusions:** Project implementation was retarded due to an underestimation of the time required to develop employment strategies. The results jobs were in existence for only short periods of time when examined by the evaluators and little could be said, that was not highly speculative of their performance. Problems arose over the question of attribution and whether or not in many instances, CES was responsible for the employment gains being claimed by local associations and public officials.

While CES demonstrated the ability of communities to analyse problems and development comprehensive plans, the time needed to undertake this process was greatly underestimated by the early designers of the program. The two governments (federal and provincial) were in general reluctant to get involved in long-term development projects and in employment related activities such as day care centres. This reluctance forced some communities to emphasize short-term job creation measures even though their unemployment problems were of a structural nature.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The CES confirmed the need for government support of local economic development and rejected the notion that existing services were, by themselves, adequate and needed only to be coordinated. In particular, CES indicated the need to release the capital expenditure constraints applied to job creation programs if those programs were to be anything more than short-term palliative. It revealed the considerable ingenuity and energy that remained latent in many communities.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** There were in the areas of community selection, the emphasis on technical and managerial assistance and the inclusion of training for program staff. They were incorporated in the subsequent new program of Local Economic Development Assistance (LEDA). While CES showed considerable promise as a mechanism for promoting local employment development, both organizational and administrative constraints severely hindered its operation.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: SELF-EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVE (Component of the evaluation of Self-Employment for the Unemployed)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** In Canada, the idea of expanding re-employment opportunities for unemployed workers by assisting them to create their own jobs was proposed in 1987 when the Self-Employment Initiative (SEI) program was introduced as part of the Community Futures Program under the Canadian Jobs Strategy. The SEI provided participants (unemployment insurance and social welfare recipients in Community Futures areas) with periodic income support payments at a flat rate of \$230 per week for a maximum of 52 weeks for developing and operating new small businesses. Since June 1992, the SEI program has been replaced by the Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program, which extended coverage to non-Community Futures areas and provided training in addition to financial support.
2. **Program objective(s):** The objective of the SEI program is to promote labour market self-sufficiency for the unemployed through self-employment.
3. **Legislative Basis:** U.I. Act, 1977 S.26.1
- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** The SEI program is open to qualified Unemployed and Social Assistance Recipients. The eligibility criteria for enrolment is based upon an individuals ability to provide a moderate capital investment in the new business at the start-up.
- 4B. **Number of participants 1992-93:** The SEI program was replaced in June of 1992 with the Self-Employment Assistance program. It is estimated that enrolment in the program in 1992-93 will be upwards of ten thousand individuals.
5. **Resources 1992-93:**

Grants and Contributions:	\$:	Not Applicable
Operating Costs:	PYs:	N/A
	\$:	N/A
6. **First year of operation:** 1987
7. **Program Delivery:** The program is administered by individual CEC. Training is provided by Business Development Centres in the local area.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):** Self-employment for Unemployed Workers: Evaluation Lessons Learned, August 1993.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue for the SEI program is the extent to which SEI participants are more self-sufficient after program participation. The level of self-sufficiency can be measured both directly and indirectly. The main issues addressed are as follows:

UI dependence pre/post-SEI

Level of earnings pre/post-SEI

The main issues in the analysis of the general self-employment population are as follows:

Transition to Self-Employment from Unemployment

The Survival of Self-Employment

The Incidence of Self-Employment

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The analysis entailed the use of descriptive statistical techniques. Several econometric techniques were applied in the analysis of the LMAS data for the general self-employed group.

The main data component for the SEI evaluation is EIC's administrative data. This included information on the program participants as well as outcome data such as the level of UI benefits and earnings received post-SEI participation.

A comparison group of regular benefit claimants was established.

The analysis of general Self-Employment in Canada employed the use of several econometric techniques. The analysis used longitudinal LMAS data from 1988-1990.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** For the 1987-1992 cohorts combined, about 60 percent were male and 40 percent female.

Three quarters were between the ages of 25 and 44.

Approximately 60 percent were married.

Approximately 76.7 percent were UI and 23.3 percent social assistance recipients.

The program is successful in reducing participants' UI dependency. On average, 1988-1989 cohorts of participants had 1.2 fewer UI claims after SEI compared to the average of the three years prior to participation.

During participation, earnings for SEI participants dropped. However, SEI participants experienced substantial growth in earnings by the second or third year following SEI participation, bringing them to similar or higher levels of earnings than observed for the general UI population.

The LMAS analysis indicates that nationally 6.4 percent of the unemployed who receive UI benefits in one year make the transition to self-employment in the subsequent year.

The two year survival rate for these self-employment enterprises is 72.7 percent.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Based on several lines of evidence it was agreed that the SEI program did enable UI recipients to re-enter the labour market in a timely manner. However, the achievement of self-sufficiency has not been proven substantially.

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** None

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The evaluation did not undertake an analysis of Social Assistance Recipients and the transitions from UI to Social Assistance after the SEI program. Such an analysis was not possible given data limitations. The issue of the capital requirement was of concern given the fact that participants are not likely to have sufficient funds available. The capital requirements may discourage a portion of participants.

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:** U.S. Department of Labour (1992), Washington:Self-Employment Programs for the Unemployed Workers. Smith,P. and N. Tremlett (1990), Enterprise Allowance Scheme: 18 Month Interview Survey, London: U.K. Department of Employment.

TITLE: LOCAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (LEAD)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The LEAD program emerged from the restructuring of direct job creation programs in April 1983. The (a) LEDA program, (b) the infrastructure component of the CCDP and (c) the "retention projects" component of LEAP became the LEAD. Subsequently, it became the main component of the Community Futures program in 1986. The program was designed to increase local employment through the LEAD corporation, a non-profit community organization. The LEAD corporation offered consulting services and technical assistance to establish new businesses or to expand existing ones. It also administered an investment fund to provide loans to local firms whose projects generated jobs.
2. **Program Objective(s):** The LEAD program was designed to increase the number of permanent jobs in localities of chronically high unemployment.
3. **Legislative Basis:**
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____
- * Program no longer exists
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1983
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Local Employment Assistance and Development (LEAD) Program, November 1986

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Following the Nielsen Task Force in 1985, a number of questions on the effectiveness of LEAD corporations were identified as requiring special attention before this concept of assistance to communities was transformed into communities designated under the new "Community Futures" Program. These questions were: the extent of incremental jobs created; whether businesses created were viable over time; the cost per job; and possible alternative solutions.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation methodology drew on several types of data collection methods. First, it included visits to a representative sample of 50% of those LEAD corporations who made loans/investments prior to April 1, 1985. Second, client firms files kept by each corporation were reviewed. Eighty-five firms files were reviewed. Third, a telephone survey of businesses assisted by corporations was carried out. It covered 430 client firms. Finally, the evaluators reviewed the administrative and statistical documentation supplied by NHQ, regional offices and LEAD corporations.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**

The LEAD corporations successfully achieved their objective of job creation in localities continually facing high unemployment rates. Their cost-effectiveness in creating incremental jobs compared very favourably with those of other job creation programs.
Client businesses in these small communities had positive reaction to the corporations' activities.
The corporations succeeded in sensitizing the community residents to the concept of local economic development and the need to get involved.
The corporations' technical assistance services enhanced the management abilities of business entrepreneurs.
Orientation to the development of the small business sector was well-suited to the development of communities.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** The LEAD corporations' consulting services, technical assistance and loan activities were effective in developing small businesses in localities with high unemployment. These businesses had positive impact in creating permanent jobs in a more cost-effective manner compared to other job creation programs. However, it was uncertain how these corporations will change or survive if EIC contributions and grants were phased out.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** The LEAD corporations were mainly located in communities that satisfied program's selection criteria as far as the unemployment rate and the size of population were concerned. However, there were some corporations that were situated in regions that did not appear to be suffering from a chronically high unemployment rate. In general, the corporations seemed to have improved over the years, their ability to recognize and assist only potentially viable firms. Investment choices proved to be sensible in terms of the mandate given to them, that of acting as a catalyst for economic development with venture capital at their disposal.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: LOCAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (LEAP)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the introduction of a large number of job creation initiatives. Only when the LEAP program came on the stage did federal programs reveal a definite strategy for meeting the needs of the chronically unemployed. This strategy came in the form of long-term job creation based on small businesses. It was a two-faced strategy - preparation and retention projects. The preparation side looked to providing the chronically unemployed with the work skills and other abilities necessary for them to find and keep jobs in the labour market. The retention side aimed at creating long-term jobs for them.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): The LEAP program was designed to strengthen the attachment to the labour force of persons who were unable to compete for employment in the local labour market due to disadvantages (such as physical or mental disabilities, criminal record, drug abuse, lack of education, skills or work experience) or structural deficiencies in that market.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis:</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>* Program no longer exists</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1973</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of Local Employment Assistance Program (LEAP), May 1984</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to assess the impacts of the Preparation and Retention project components of the program on incremental job creation, skill enhancement and commercial viability especially of the Retention component. Another issue was to determine whether gender, education and length of stay on the project made a difference.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The methodology included a survey of participants conducted in two forms: a broad interview and an in-depth interview. Broad telephone interviews numbered 295. The in-depth in-person interviews of native persons numbered 130 and of non-native persons 105. Survey of facilitators covered 174 interviews. Site visits and a selected number of regional offices were also a part of the methodology. Finally, terminated Retention projects were traced in terms of their post-termination history.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**

Preparation Projects: They had a positive impact in terms of employability. These projects also improved the participant confidence in finding and keeping a job. Indicators, such as cost per trainee, were used in conjunction with effectiveness indicators, such as placement rates.

Retention Projects: They had a marginal impact in terms of employability. Participants were less confident in finding and keeping a job. Survey of terminated retention projects (for having reached funding time limits or commercial viability) showed that many of them (39%) were still in operation. Most of those still in operation (70%) were self-supporting. Projects still in operation had very little change, if any, in their objectives, activities and target groups.

Program-Wise:

Females did better than males

Shorter length of stay on LEAP was better

A high school grade was better than a lower school grade

Individuals with no university degree did better than those with a university degree

Better management and better working environment were needed

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** A two-faced strategy was loaded on the program design which impaired its impact and effectiveness. On one side, the strategy was oriented to the human resource development. On the other side, it was geared to the development of long-term jobs based on small businesses. However, it was the first time that federal programs revealed a definite strategy for meeting the needs of the chronically unemployed. As the lesson was learned and direct job creation programs were restructured in April 1983, the two parts of the LEAP program went in two different directions and LEAP disappeared.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Financial planning and performance measurement systems were not strong enough. Inefficiencies were observed in the area of project allocation. Review Boards were tardy.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: CANADA COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (CCDP)	
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: CCDP was one of the three job creation components introduced in 1980 under the aegis of the Canada Employment Program (CEP). The period covered in the evaluation excludes the extreme intensification of cyclical unemployment which occurred during the second half of 1981 and through 1982. Its main focus was on long-term structural problems of regional disparities in unemployment.</p>	
<p>2. Program Objective(s): The CCDP orientation was primarily geographic: aimed at areas/groups experiencing employment problems due to slow economic growth and generally low levels of business activity; focused on projects which developed skills or increased the number of on-going employment opportunities, and which supported federal/provincial development strategies.</p>	
<p>3. Legislative Basis:</p>	
<p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p>	
<p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p>	
<p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____</p>	
<p>* Program no longer exists</p>	
<p>6. First Year of Operation: 1980</p>	
<p>7. Program Delivery: Employment and Immigration Canada</p>	
<p>8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s): Evaluation of Three Job Creation Programs, August 1983</p>	

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to examine the effectiveness of the implementation of the program and its short-term and long-term impacts. Other key evaluation issues were: to assess the value of output of sponsored projects; whether projects created incremental employment for workers who had no other alternatives; whether the program provided skill development opportunities for the clientele; and whether the projects enhanced the subsequent short-run employment and the long-run employability of the clientele.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology included in-depth case studies involving site visits to a sample of projects, post-program survey of participants and comparison group, and long-term labour force tracking of pre and post-program employment experience.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**
 - (a) Some cases (not widespread) where CCDP supported projects which potentially could create dependency and which could not continue to operate on a modified basis through volunteers. They involved certain new community and/or social services. Communities become accustomed to services and projects cannot be terminated.
 - (b) Many CCDP projects visited did not employ disadvantaged groups as originally planned. Participation of youth and women did not reflect their distribution among the unemployed.

The CCDP projects, in the main, were incremental. Like CCSP, they were effective in generating incremental employment for their clientele as long as they were on the projects. Any special training provided had a positive impact on post-program employability.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. Policy Lessons Learned:** The CCDP type job creation program has a favourable short-term impact on employment of its clientele while on the projects. It should be targeted at the long-term unemployed only and should not attract some of those who are employed in temporary jobs. It should have an element of some kind of special training. However, CCDP had a dual objective of being both a contra-cyclical and local employment development measure. Any new measure should be only contra-cyclical. This is because the existing Community Futures addresses local employment development.
- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** Important lesson learned was that there should be more forward planning and investigation of project need. This was to ensure that projects don't overflow beyond areas of high unemployment. Another lesson learned was to ensure that projects don't focus on the creation of new community/social services and that they employ the groups specified in the original plan.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:**
- 6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

TITLE: CANADA COMMUNITY SERVICES PROJECTS (CCSP)**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** CCSP was one of the three job creation components introduced in 1980 under the aegis of the Canada Employment Program (CEP). The period covered in the evaluation excludes the extreme intensification of cyclical unemployment which occurred during the second half of 1981 and through 1982. Its orientation was primarily upon groups at a competitive disadvantage in the labour market.

 - 2. Program Objective(s):** To assist in the preparation of entrants and re-entrants for continuing labour market participation through employment projects in non-profit organizations (at the same time assisting such organizations during a period of expenditure restraint).

 - 3. Legislative Basis:**

 - 4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**

 - 4B. Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____

 - 5. Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: Pys: _____ \$: _____
- * Program no longer exists
- 6. First Year of Operation:** 1980

 - 7. Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada

 - 8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Three Job Creation Program, August 1983

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the program and its short-term and long-term impacts. Other key evaluation issues were: to examine the value of output of sponsored projects; whether projects created incremental employment for workers who had no other alternatives; whether the program provided skill development opportunities for the clientele; and whether the projects enhanced the subsequent short-run employment and the long-run employability of the clientele.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology included in-depth case studies involving site visits to a sample of projects, post-program survey of participants and comparison group, and long-term labour force tracking of pre and post-program employment experience.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:**

There were some cases (not widespread) where CCSP supported projects with potential to create dependency and which could not continue to operate on a modified basis through volunteers. They involved certain new community and/or social services. CCSP projects performed well in terms of adhering to hiring plans. In this respect, women in particular were strongly represented - youth less so. But CCSP did not succeed in attracting large numbers of the physically handicapped.

The CCSP projects, in the main, were incremental. Like CCDP, they had a substantial short-run impact in generating incremental employment for their clientele while on the projects. In cases where special training was provided, there was a positive impact on post-program employability.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Job creation policy in the form of CCSP projects, like CCDP, is effective in creating immediate incremental job opportunities for the unemployed. However, there was a strong indication that it attracted workers who actually had other employment options. Policy and program design should serve only those workers who do not have other employment options. They should also reflect the distribution of women, youth, etc., in the unemployed target group.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** For the CCSP type job creation measure, like CCDP, there is a need for an increased emphasis on skill development for clientele within projects selected. A stricter project selection process should also be developed.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

TITLE: LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (LEDA) PROGRAM

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The EIC launched the LEDA program in October 1980 on a pilot basis as a innovative approach to long-term job creation. LEDA drew on the experiences of the earlier Community Employment Strategy (CES) where communities were frequently able to identify small business opportunities but did not have the flexibility, in most cases, to use CES funds to create or support such enterprises. The program, which was implemented with the assistance of the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), had two distinct phases: the planning phase and the operational phase. In total, 13 communities were provided planning stage funds. All who completed the planning stage made submissions for operational stage funding, and were approved. Each established a LEDA corporation.
2. **Program Objective(s):** The LEDA program was designed to assist communities experiencing slow growth and persistently high levels of unemployment to play a direct and active role in stimulating private sector employment through local enterprise development. The LEDA corporations were designed to assess job creation possibilities, provide counselling and technical assistance to local business people, provide information on available financial resources/services, provide loans or equity positions in eligible local business projects and attract investment to the communities.
3. **Legislative Basis:**
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$:
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
- * Program no longer exists
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1980
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Interim Evaluation of the Local Economic Development Assistance Program (LEDA), June 1982

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were: (a) extent to which the program created incremental jobs; (b) extent to which businesses were becoming viable; and (c) possible alternative solutions.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The methodological approach consisted essentially of an assessment of the plans and activities of 10 of the LEDA corporations (only the Planning State, and the business counsel part of the operational stage). Other elements of the approach were a review of program documents, literature review, and a review of LEDA corporations' business plans.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** All of the LEDA communities reviewed felt there were opportunities for some small business growth. At the time of the evaluation, LEDA corporations were more representative of the business community than the local community at large. At that time, LEDA activities were mainly focused on planning stage activities. They related to developing the procedures, rules, guidelines, etc., governing corporation operations. Corporations had drawn up action plans relating to the proposed industrial focus of their activities and the number of jobs to be created, the number of businesses to be assisted, and so on. However, most of the corporations interviewed did not emphasize job creation considerations. Community knowledgeable also did not do so.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** EIC needed to clarify what its expectations were regarding the relationship between small business assistance, economic development and job creation - in the context of the long-run community economic development process. A panel of experts was extremely concerned with the short time frame (3 years) available under LEDA. In contrast, community development experience (literature review) points to a very slow process and lengthy time frames involved - with 5 years regarded as only the short-to-medium term. Thus, the real lesson may lie in the possibility that the planning requirements of the program may be inconsistent with the realities of the community economic development process.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Program management needed to clearly translate the program's objectives into operational terms - this was particularly important in view of the local autonomy delegated to corporations and was necessary if meaningful local employment strategies were to be developed.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

INFORMATION AND SPECIAL INITIATIVES (EIC)



TITLE: AUTOMATED JOB INFORMATION CENTRES (AJIC)**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The Automated Job Information Centres (AJIC) were to replace the job board method of displaying employer vacancies. All pilot CECs, besides offering electronic order display within their offices, also established public access kiosks for job order display in off-site locations. This evaluation presented results based on data collected in eight pilot CECs. Grace Harbour (Newfoundland), Charlottetown (P.E.I.), Bedford (Nova Scotia), Moncton (New Brunswick), Laval West (Quebec), Winnipeg North (Manitoba), Regina (Saskatchewan, and Edmonton South (Alberta).
 2. **Program Objective(s):** The AJIC were expected to yield person-year (PY) savings by automating the job board method of displaying employer vacancies. They were also expected to result in increase of clientele exposure to job order vacancies, an enhanced quality of service as well as other advantages (e.g. improved accuracy and quicker dissemination of job order information etc.). In other words, this initiative was aimed at giving the public greater access to more reliable job information and improving the efficiency of EIC operations.
 3. **Legislative Basis:** The conversion of existing Job Information Centres into Automated Job Banks was recognized by Treasury Board in minutes number 811641 dated August 23, 1989 as one of the most important Information Technology requirements in support of the Labour Force Development Strategy (LFDS).
- 4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
- 5. Resources 1992-93:** Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
- 6. First Year of Operation:** 1990
- 7. Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
- 8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Automated Job Information Centres (AJIC), October 1991

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key evaluation issue was to determine the extent of person-year savings possible by automating the job board method of displaying employer vacancies. Another such issue was to measure the extent of increased client exposure to job order vacancies, an enhanced quality of service as well as other advantages (e.g. improved accuracy and quicker dissemination of job order information, etc.).

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** A pre-post comparative survey design was employed in measuring the impact of automation on the job order display activity.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Automation of the job order display activity in the pilot and test offices resulted in PY savings which, in the worst-case scenario (0.22 Pys), was sufficiently large to allow for the full payback of installation and maintenance costs in less than four years. It resulted in greater client satisfaction and recorded overall improvement in efficiency (e.g. increased speed and accuracy of job order dissemination).

The availability of public access kiosks in retail locations revealed their potential in allowing a wider dissemination and viewing of job orders by job seekers without any impact on PY utilization by CECs.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** Pilots proved that automated JICs performed better than the job board method of serving clients. This means a green light to automate all other CECs and public access sites.
- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** Discovered that automated JICs yielded increased speed and accuracy of job order dissemination. Found that the availability of public access kiosks in retail location allowed a wider viewing of job orders by job seekers without any impact on PY utilisation by CECs.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

PROGRAM: CANADA EMPLOYMENT CENTRES ON CAMPUS (CEC-OC)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** CECs-OC were specialized offices that provided employment services to post-secondary students and recent graduates. Their range of services was less compared to CEC services. So some students were referred to a CEC when their needs could not be met by the on-campus office. From the outset, the service provided by on-campus centres was national in orientation. It recognized that post-secondary students and graduates came from all parts of Canada and were interested in employment opportunities throughout the country, and that employers seeking post-secondary graduates tended to organize their recruiting on a national basis. The program budget was \$3.6 million in 1989, Quebec accounting for two-thirds of this total.

2. **Program Objective(s):** The program was designed primarily to facilitate the matching of the demand for and supply of highly qualified labour. It had a secondary objective of providing labour market information to post-secondary students and the institution and to foster awareness within the community at large of the CEC-OC services, their applicability and benefits.

3. **Legislative Basis:** Employment and Immigration Act (SC 1976-77)

- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**

- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____

5. **Resources 1992-93*:** Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____

- * Being phased-out
6. **First Year of Operation:** First office opened in 1937

7. **Program Delivery:**

8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Program Evaluation Study of the Canada Employment Centres on Campus, November 1990

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The key issues were: (a) whether original rationale for the program was still valid; (b) extent of change in program activities since the last evaluation; (c) the effect of the Revitalization initiative; (d) impact of the program on secondary students and on small businesses; and (e) alternatives available to improve service to clients.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Evaluation data came from several sources. Fifteen CEC-OC managers and an equal number of school representatives were interviewed in person. This was followed by a telephone survey of all CEC-OC Managers and representatives of all serviced schools (typically, directors of student services). In addition, 1,903 graduates were surveyed by telephone. They were asked to give the name of their first employer after graduation, and 500 of these employers were later interviewed by telephone. Information on issues, specific to Cégeps was obtained at a meeting with representatives from the Fédération de Cégeps; administrative data from EIC provided the background material on the program. Econometric modelling was used to analyse the data.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** Although the evaluation was conducted solely in Quebec, the findings and conclusions were applicable to all CECs-OC across Canada. The program was not effective in increasing the chances of post-secondary students in finding employment. It had no impact as well on wages/earnings.

The program was no longer consistent with the new priorities coming on the stage with the introduction of the Labour Force Development Strategy in 1989 and the new mandate of Employment and Immigration Canada.

The evaluation concluded that the program was not productive or relevant and that it should be phased-out.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** CEC-OC resources needed to be used in helping those who were most in need (high school drop-outs) than those already advantaged (University and college graduates). Resource use needed to be realigned.

4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:**

5. **Outstanding Issues:**

6. **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

TITLE:	NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICE (NES)
PART I PROGRAM INFORMATION	
<p>1. Program Rationale/Background: Since 1940, the NES has been an integral part of the federal unemployment insurance system. Prior to that, the labour exchange function was under provincial jurisdiction and administration with the federal government providing some financial assistance. The NES, at the time of evaluation, had three program sub-activities - Labour Exchange, Development Services, and Labour Market Information. The Labour Exchange function was the largest resource component accounting for 54% of total person-years, and 46% of total expenditures forecast. In the early 1980s, in an environment of fiscal restraint and changing labour market, the NES had entered a process of revitalization so as to better respond to the projected needs of the 1980s and 1990s. One of the key modifications to the CEC operations was redirected efforts toward serving those client groups and industrial sectors that were not adequately served by existing labour market intermediaries or other institutions. An integral part of improving service to clients was to identify their needs, so as to better determine the nature and the level of services required. The Employment Service is the Commission's operational arm, delivering employment related services to the public.</p> <p>2. Program Objective(s): The NES was designed to meet CEIC's primary mission of promoting: (a) a labour force which meets national occupational requirements; (b) an economy capable of growth and adaptation without undue burden on individuals, individual groups and regions; and (c) equality of opportunity to compete for and have access to jobs.</p> <p>The public employment service had the role to enhance the functioning of the labour market by effecting more timely and beneficial labour market adjustments than would otherwise occur, thereby ensuring a more efficient and more equitable labour market.</p> <p>3. Legislative Basis: Unemployment Insurance Act and Regulations</p> <p>4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:</p> <p>4B. Number of Participants 1992-93: _____</p> <p>5. Resources 1992-93*: Grants and Contributions: \$: _____ Operating Costs: \$: _____ PYs: \$: _____</p>	

* Not practical or relevant any more to work out 1992-93 resources for Employment Services since the new Employment Programs and Services framework consolidated all of the employment services and all elements of the Canadian Jobs Strategy into four new programs.

**PART I (cont'd)
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- | | | |
|-----------|---|---|
| 6. | First Year of Operation: | 1940 |
| 7. | Program Delivery: | Employment and Immigration Canada |
| 8. | Evaluation title(s) and date(s): | Evaluation of the National Employment Service: An Overview Report, April 1989 |

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The main issue driving the evaluation study was to establish the extent to which the NES program actually promotes more efficient and more equitable labour market adjustments than would otherwise occur. With a view to provide direction for the future role and potential of the program, the evaluation study was to address such fundamental questions as: (i) "Which client groups are most likely to benefit?" (ii) "Which activities are most effective?" and (iii) "Which are the NES program impacts?". It was also designed to examine the impact of the revitalization process, then in place, in terms of improved services to clients and potential cost savings in the Employment Services.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Multiple lines of evidence were produced through various research strategies. Ten component studies were done within the following evaluation strategy framework: International and Past Assessments; NES Program Effectiveness; CEC operations and Environment; and the Role of Private Sector Agencies. Some of the evaluation study constraints included the complex nature of the program with its diverse features, multiple program sub-objectives that were sometimes competing (e.g. economic efficiency vs. employment equity), and a delivery structure in transition during the revitalization process.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The rationale for the NES lies more with employment equity objectives than with the conventional function to efficiently match workers with vacant jobs. In Canada, as in most other OECD countries, the public employment service that emerged over the past decade was as a focal point for delivering other federal labour market programs such as job creation and training (e.g. CJS, Employment Equity). The placement and counselling functions were most efficient when directed to situations such as plant closures and mass layoffs, skill shortages, and services to the employable disadvantaged. Thus, there was a rationale for maintaining the CECs network to provide services not otherwise available to client groups experiencing job search or recruitment difficulties. But the rationale for a comprehensive publicly funded ES was weak when weighed against the overall benefits accruing from the services provided.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

3. **Findings/Conclusions (cont'd):** The NES did not contribute to allocation efficiency in the labour market. This evaluation and other international studies found that the public employment service cannot efficiently serve every component of the labour market. However, the NES has contributed to a smoother functioning of the labour market under uncertain conditions (i.e. not normal) or in special circumstances as cited above. The image of the CEC remained as an agent of "last resort" to job seekers.

The NES made a difference when the labour market faced cyclical imbalances. It did not do so when the labour market behaved smoothly. Efficiency gains resulting from CEC use in "normal" times were minimal, although the employment service produced net equity benefits on a geographical - in rural areas - and gender-female-basis in such times.

The direction being pursued under revitalization - its emphasis on improved screening, targeted services, streamlining registration, and on self-service - was consistent with the international trend toward a more streamlined and selective service focusing on those most in need.

Privatization did not appear to be a practical alternative to a public employment service due to a lack of interest on the part of the private profit-oriented sector, except in certain large urban centres, and for some occupational categories. Privatization to the non-profit subsidized sectors already existed in the form of specialized service units such as Outreach, the Agricultural Employment Services, and the Industrial Adjustment Services programs.

ES and UI interface needed to be strengthened, especially in periods of sustained growth to improve the performance of NES. In such times, an emphasis on UI clients may be called for and resources reallocated accordingly. Savings to the income maintenance program could contribute to a rationale for maintaining the public employment service at those times when the NES does not yield significant efficiency gains.

- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** It was the most comprehensive and major evaluation study of the NES to date and it significantly changed the perspective on the Employment Services from that held previously. The Overview Report and the ten component studies came up with a major new perspective and wealth of evidence relevant for establishing the future direction for the NES and for redefining the mandate of the Employment and Insurance Program.

Privatization did not appear to be a practical alternative due to a lack of interest on the part of the private profit-oriented sector.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The direction of the revitalization of NES was consistent with the international trend toward a more streamlined and selective service focusing on those most in need. ES and UI interface needed to be strengthened.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:

PROGRAM: LOCAL ECONOMIC DATA SYSTEMS (LEDS)**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

- 1. Program Rationale/Background:** LEDS project was conceived in the summer of 1985. All CEIC regional headquarters and one CEC in each region were given a micro-computer to computerize labour market information at the local level. This was Phase One of the LEDS project. The Treasury Board, in its approval of the LEDS project, mandated that an evaluation be carried out before computerization was extended to other CECs under Phase Two of the project. It was thought that those micro-computers would allow local labour market information to be combined with data from sources such as census data provided by Statistics Canada, employer data provided by Revenue Canada/Taxation, and EIC's own data on UI claimants and program participants.
- 2. Program Objective(s):** Phase One was designed to test the dedicated use of micro-computers to automate labour market information storage and processing capabilities at the local level. The overall objective was to enhance labour market information and analysis at the local level. Improved labour market information was expected to facilitate the planning and delivery of the Canadian Jobs Strategy at the local level.
- 3. Legislative Basis:** Cabinet decision 14-85 RD, dated January 29, 1985 approving the Canadian Jobs Strategy program. Treasury Board approved the Pilot Project on January 16, 1986
- 4A. Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:**
- 4B. Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
- 5. Resources 1992-93:**
 Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
 Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
- 6. First Year of Operation:** Pilot Project conceived in the summer of 1985
- 7. Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
- 8. Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of the Local Economic Data Systems (LEDS), October 1988

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** They were: (a) whether needs for labour market information at the local level justified the use of micro-computers; (b) manner in which the micro-computers were used; (c) impacts of micro-computers on data quality, timeliness, accessibility and availability; and (d) savings in terms of person-years and direct expenditures.

2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Methodology had two components: (a) linking with the comprehensive evaluation of Employment Services to assess the overall rationale for LMI and (b) a comparison group approach to identify any differences in the experience and performance between LEDS and non-LEDS CECs. A field survey of both the LEDS and non-LEDS CECs was conducted to determine the collection and utilization of LMI in each CEC. A questionnaire was mailed to each CEC.

3. **Findings/Conclusions:** LEDS project demonstrated the feasibility of using micro-computers to automate labour market information at the local level. However, micro-computers were used primarily for the storage and retrieval of information in its raw form. Data analysis was done manually. LEDS CECs reported improvements in data quality, timeliness, accessibility and availability.
Reduction in person-years (PYs) or direct expenditures did not occur as a result of computerization. But one could say that CECs will be able to respond to greater LMI demands in the future without a commensurate increase in PYs.
Internally, LEDS CECs handled more LMI enquiries than non-LEDS CECs. LEDS had no impact on external dissemination of LMI. CECs external dissemination of LMI was still in a developmental stage.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4A.** **Policy Lessons Learned:** Dedicated use of micro-computers for LMI purposes did not fully utilize the capacity of this computer. Only much greater use of LMI than was evident would lead to the justification of micro-computer use at the local level.
- 4B.** **Operational Lessons Learned:** Utilization of LMI at the CEC level, particularly its external dissemination, was still in a developmental stage. The needs of NES, CJS and LACS for LMI were still in their early stages of evolution. LMI performance indicators had yet to be developed. LMIA handbooks had not yet been finalized. All these things added to the difficulty of assessing the impact of LEDS on LMI utilization.
- 5.** **Outstanding Issues:**
- 6.** **Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:**

TITLE: SPECIALIZED YOUTH UNITS (SYUs)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** Canadian youth faced serious employment difficulties in 1982. The Minister of Employment and Immigration announced a series of initiatives to encourage employment and to assist youth to make a successful transition from school to work. One of these initiatives was the implementation, on a pilot basis, of Specialized Youth Units within the overall framework of the regular Employment Service. The SYUs were financed and staffed by the reallocation of resources already available to the Employment Services within regions. All provinces established these units.
2. **Program Objective(s):** Program objectives were:
To help younger hard-to-employ clients to develop realistic employment goals and plans to achieve those goals; and
To facilitate their eventual successful integration into the labour force.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Unemployment Insurance Act which is the legislative basis for Employment Services
- 4A. **Clientele/Eligibility Criteria:** Target clients have the following characteristics:
A grade 10 education or less;
Be between the ages of 15 to 19 inclusive;
Be unemployed for the past 6 months or more, or have a history of intermittent short-term employment;
Be full-time members of the labour force and no longer in the educational system;
and,
Be assessed by the counsellor as lacking confidence and/or motivation, and not having any realistic occupational/employment goals.
- 4B. **Number of Participants 1992-93:** _____
5. **Resources 1992-93:**
Grants and Contributions: \$: _____
Operating Costs: PYs: _____ \$: _____
6. **First Year of Operation:** 1983
7. **Program Delivery:** Employment and Immigration Canada
8. **Evaluation Title(s) and Date(s):** Evaluation of Specialized Youth Units, October 1985

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PART II

PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** Several key evaluation issues were identified:
How clients were selected, services targeted, efforts coordinated with other agencies and employers in the community and with regular CECs?
Extent to which barriers to client employment were reduced; extent to which clients were integrated into the labour market; what the unit costs to the program were; and what the impact was in terms of equity objectives of EIC.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** Multiple lines of evidence were produced.
Evaluation design involved comparison between SYU clients and comparable clients selected from regular CECs and Outreach projects. A telephone survey of SYU clients gave 541 completed responses. Telephone survey of comparable clients from regular CECs and Outreach projects came up with 475 completed interviews. All SYU supervisors were surveyed through a mailed questionnaire. A Client Service Record was introduced to capture all services received by each client during the period of his/her involvement with SYU, CEC and Outreach project including the counsellor's time spent in providing services.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The SYUs were effective in contributing to the integration of young clients into the labour market. They produced more employability benefits per dollar of expenditure compared to those produced by regular CECs, for comparable young persons; SYUs were as effective as the Outreach services for young clients. SYUs developed effective linkages with community agencies to help clients in a cooperative manner.

SYU services were about two and half times more intensive in terms of counsellor time devoted to serving clients compared to the regular CEC services. On a proportional basis, however, they produced more employability benefits to clients than the regular CEC services.

The level of education was more important than age of young clients in influencing the employability of the clientele. Over 80% of the SYU clients surveyed stated they were more confident about job finding and job holding in general after being exposed to the SYU services. This compared favourably with 70% for the comparison group who expressed similar sentiment about the service they received from regular CECs. Only 46% of the clients meet the targeting objective of being 15-19 years of age with grade 10 or less education. Generally, the SYU services were delivered in a situation of less than fully dedicated resources.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

4A. Policy Lessons Learned: Role and rationale of SYUs were credible in terms of employability benefits realized by the clientele and in terms of contributions to EIC's equity objective.

4B. Operational Lessons Learned: Considerable potential existed for improving the targeting success of the SYUs.

5. Outstanding Issues:

6. Related Evaluation Documents/Technical Studies:

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

5. **Outstanding Issues:** The major outstanding issue being addressed by Phase II of the evaluation is the comparative cost of the CSTECC approach in relation to longer run outcomes.

6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE:	INNOVATIONS
PART I	
PROGRAM INFORMATION	
1.	Program Rationale/Background: The Innovations Program was the smallest of the six CJS programs and accounted for only about 3% of annual CJS expenditures. The Innovations Program funded pilot projects, demonstration projects and developmental activities.
2.	Program objective(s): The objective of the Innovations Program was to stimulate and support innovative labour market initiatives through pilot programs and projects, demonstration projects and development activities which would lead to the improved functioning of the labour market. The Program was intended to test the feasibility of innovations related to other CJS programs prior to their full-scale implementation. Innovations also provided an element of flexibility to existing labour market interventions by funding a number of projects which lay outside the scope of CJS programs as they were then constituted.
3.	Legislative Basis: Innovations was the "R & D" arm of the Canadian Jobs Strategy.
4A.	Clientele/eligibility criteria: Not applicable
4B.	Number of participants 1992-93: From 1985 to March, 1989, 254 proposals were approved.
5.	Resources 1992-93: Grants and Contributions: \$:52,000,000 program funds 1989-90 Operating Costs:\$685,000 PYs:55.1 \$:
6.	First year of operation: 1985
7.	Program Delivery: The delivery of Innovations involved proponents under Contribution Agreements with EIC. Proponents could be private sector businesses and organizations, educational and training bodies, provincial or territorial institutions, municipalities, individuals, and crown corporations not mainly funded through appropriations. Originally managed through a decentralized regional structure, Innovations subsequently shifted to a centralized reporting with NHQ having four main divisions and six field offices. Proposals exceeding \$1 million needed Ministerial approval.
8.	Evaluation title(s) and date(s): Evaluation of the Innovations Program - Final Report - August, 1990.

PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The evaluation concentrated on two main areas: a review of the rationale for the Program and the degree to which implementation and delivery systems supported the Program in meeting its mandate; and, secondly, an examination of completed projects in terms of impacts on future programming and potential impacts on the labour market. The examination of completed projects was further focused on three main thematic areas, entrepreneurial development, training, and interventions targeted toward Aboriginal Canadians.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The nature of the Program precluded the use of standardized analytical approaches. The evaluation drew upon qualitative and quantitative information from a variety of sources including the following: a review of field office files on completed projects; interviews with senior Innovations staff and with other EIC officials at NHQ and in the regions; structured interviews with 42 Innovations field office staff; telephone or personal consultations with at least one proponent from each of 99 completed projects; and more detailed reviews of 65 selected projects including interviews with key informants.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The Innovations Program was intended to provide a vehicle for learning lessons about labour market programming. As implemented in the period under review, the Program did not achieve its potential. Projects were not generally designed in such a manner that results attributable to the intervention could be distinguished from what would have happened in the absence of the initiative. Some lessons were gleaned from the thematic approach. In addition, some of the larger projects were evaluated separately in some depth and, from these evaluations, information was gathered on various labour market endeavours.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The evaluation suggested that an initiative such as Innovations should be divided into two separate streams. The bulk of the resources should be devoted to rigorous testing and field trials of major labour market interventions. Projects should be designed with clear and measurable objectives, systems should be put in place to collect appropriate information to determine outcomes and results, and a more controlled, experimental approach should be taken to the design, implementation, and assessment of projects. Generally, a more proactive approach should be taken to identifying suitable initiatives for experimentation.
The second, minor stream, would comprise other innovative labour market solutions which could not be accommodated in regular programs.

**PART II
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION**

1. **Key Evaluation Issues:** The highest priority evaluation issues were those related to the Treasury Board requirements as a basis for deciding upon further funding. These issues were the underlying rationale for the TIEM project, the extent to which its objectives had been achieved, and the financial viability of TIEM. Other issues such as the impacts and effects and alternative means of achieving the same results, were assigned lower priority but were addressed to the extent possible given the relatively short time frame in which the project had been operating.
2. **Methodology(ies)/Data Sources:** The evaluation relied upon eight basic methodological approaches: review of literature related to the project and similar incubator and pre-incubator programs; review of program documentation; review of project files on each of the TIEM centres; review of financial and accounting records; interviews with EIC and DRIE officials; interviews with TIEM managers and officers in each of the TIEM centres and TIEM headquarters; interviews with community representatives in order to assess TIEM's impact on the community and to compare performance with similar projects where applicable; and interviews with 84 of the 121 TIEM entrepreneurial clients.
3. **Findings/Conclusions:** The performance goals for TIEM were established through job creation targets specified by year and location. At the end of three years of operation, the evaluation found that the number of jobs which could be credited to TIEM was far below the targeted level. The prospects of TIEM remaining financially viable on the basis of performance were extremely remote. The estimated cost per job created, while sensitive to assumptions regarding incrementality of activity, appeared to be relatively high.
- 4A. **Policy Lessons Learned:** The "pay-for-results" formula would need to be very carefully thought out and specifically defined if it were to be given serious consideration. The formula used under the TIEM project did not have any qualitative criteria with the result that some centres targeted low-wage, service sector jobs rather than high growth industrial sectors.

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B. **Operational Lessons Learned:** The approach tested under TIEM requires more careful planning and monitoring and more specific definition.
5. **Outstanding Issues:** The poor performance attributed to the project resulted in the decision to terminate EIC support.
6. **Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

PART II (cont'd)
PROGRAM EVALUATION INFORMATION

- 4B. Operational Lessons Learned:** The thematic examination of entrepreneurial confirmed the demand for services to assist individuals to become self-employed or start small businesses. There was some evidence that, with appropriate assistance, business creation can be a viable alternative for some designated target groups such as women, visible minorities, and social assistance recipients. However, the "pay-for-results" concept based on jobs created did not prove effective as implemented. The review of training projects highlighted the need for active and early involvement by all major partners and revealed a need for experimentation with innovative training approaches for designated target groups. The evaluation of projects for Aboriginals suggested that these projects are best carried out by the Aboriginal peoples themselves and that a longer time frame and added resources are often required for consultation and planning. These interventions should have realistic objectives which are consistent with the economic, social, and cultural realities of Aboriginal communities.
- 5. Outstanding Issues:**
The "streamed" approach to labour market innovation has been implemented.
- 6. Related evaluation documents/technical studies:**

TITLE: THE INNOVATIONS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGEMENT PROJECT (TIEM)

**PART I
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

1. **Program Rationale/Background:** The Innovations and Entrereneurial Management Project (TIEM) was the largest of the entrepreneurial projects funded through the Innovations Program of the Canadian Jobs Strategy. The project was an enhanced business incubator designed to foster the creation and expansion of small business and improve the low success rates experienced by entrepreneurs. TIEM operated in five centres, St. John's, Sydney, Quebec City, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. Remuneration was based on the creation of new permanent jobs.
2. **Program objective(s):** The objective of TIEM was to test a model for the supporting the formation, maintenance, and growth of small businesses, thereby creating new permanent employment.
3. **Legislative Basis:** Project under Innovations, "R & D" arm of CJS.
- 4A. **Clientele/eligibility criteria:** Potential entrepreneurs who needed advice, assistance and capital to start a small business.
- 4B. **Number of participants 1992-93:** Estimated jobs created 1986 to 1989 - 319.5.
5. **Resources 1992-93:**

Grants and Contributions:	\$:	13,886,000
Maximum EIC commitment	Operating Costs:	PYs:
DRIE repayable contribution	\$:	
6. **First year of operation:** 1986
7. **Program Delivery:** Funding arrangements were based on a "pay-for-results" formula whereby remuneration was conditional upon the creation of new permanent jobs.
8. **Evaluation title(s) and date(s):**
Evaluation of the TIEM Project, March 30, 1989.

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